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ABSTRACT
Bowman v. Monsanto Co. signaled the end of an era of seed
saving. Farmers must buy new seed for replanting or risk patent
infringement. The familiar rhetoric of oppressed farmers belies the
fact that Monsanto’s success rests in part on farmers prizing its
innovations. Current trends indicate that this reliance on Monsanto
will continue. The Supreme Court correctly found for Monsanto.
However, future cases must iron out the kinks in the Bowman
decision. Despite the Court’s best intentions, inadvertence cannot
shield farmers from patent infringement. The Court must also make it
clear that patentees cannot use licensing restrictions to claw back
rights that patent exhaustion has extinguished.
Beyond patent exhaustion, the Supreme Court in Federal Trade
Commission v. Actavis recently held that the exercise patent rights,
even if validly obtained and infringed, are subject to scrutiny under
the rule of reason. The “scope of the patent” approach that shielded
Monsanto from scrutiny under antitrust law and patent misuse in the
past should be reexamined. The effects-focused approach under
Actavis will help yield outcomes that better track policy goals. That
approach should contain three features. First, it should be based on
a coherent theory of harm. Second, that theory should be supported
by evidence that the harm can be effected. Third, the approach
should contain heuristics to make it administrable, such as harm to
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competition and innovation and a shifting of the burden of
production in appropriate cases informed by judicial experience and
economic learning.
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INTRODUCTION
The rhetoric of antagonism against Monsanto is a familiar one.
Monsanto has been accused of turning farmers into serfs and
dominating our food supply.1 Yet the Supreme Court recently found

1. See, e.g., James Ming Chen, An Agricultural Law Jeremiad: The
Harvest Is Past, the Summer Is Ended, and Seed Is Not Saved, 2014 WIS. L. REV.
235, 235 (“The saving of seed exerts a powerful rhetorical grip on American
agricultural law and policy. . . . Seed-saving advocates protest that compelling
farmers to buy seed every season effectively subjects them to a form of serfdom.”);
James Matson, Minli Tang & Sarah Wynn, Seeds, Patents and Power: The Shifting
Foundation of Our Food System 37 (Nov. 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2525120
(“[F]armers have become captive buyers of commercial seed.”); Vandana Shiva, The
Seeds of Suicide: How Monsanto Destroys Farming, GLOBAL RES. (Mar. 13, 2014),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-seeds-of-suicide-how-monsanto-destroysfarming/
5329947 (“Control over seed is the first link in the food chain because seed is the
source of life. When a corporation controls seed, it controls life, especially the life of
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for Monsanto, holding that it was illegal for a farmer to buy soybean
seeds from a grain elevator for replanting.2 The progeny seed would
infringe Monsanto’s patents over traits that enabled soybeans to
survive the application of Roundup herbicide, also produced by
Monsanto.3 Instead the farmers could only use grain elevator seed for
their intended purpose—animal feed or consumption.4
The central legal issue in Bowman was patent exhaustion. The
doctrine was developed to prevent patentees from extracting further
tolls from items that they paid for as well as to facilitate the creation
of secondary markets for the items sold.5 As the Court put it, because
“‘the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent
rights to that item,’”6 the purchaser or any subsequent owner could
“‘use [or] sell’ the thing as he sees fit.”7 Users, however, cannot
farmers. . . . Monsanto has become the ‘Life Lord’ of our planet, collecting rents for
life’s renewal from farmers, the original breeders.”).
2. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1766 (2013).
3. Id. at 1764; see also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining glyphosate inhibits the metabolic activity of the enzyme
5-enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate synthase (EPSPS), which converts sugars into
amino acids needed for plant growth); Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The RE39,247E patent (the ‘247E patent) claims a DNA
molecule containing a genetic code for an enzyme that enables Roundup Ready
crops to withstand glyphosate-based herbicides, glyphosate-tolerant plant cells as
well as seeds and plants comprising the DNA molecules, and a method of
controlling weeds by planting the transformed seeds and spraying glyphosate over
the fields in which those seeds were planted. Id. The 5,352,605 patent (the ‘605
patent) claims chimeric gene expressed in plant cells and for the plant cells
comprising that chimeric gene. Id.
4. See Saby Ghoshray, Food Safety and Security in the Monsanto Era:
Peering Through the Lens of a Rights Paradigm Against an Onslaught of Corporate
Domination, 65 ME. L. REV. 491, 521 (2013) (stating that grain elevators sell seed
for feed and other purposes, but not for replanting, and that seed from grain
elevators is known as “junk seed,” containing seed of different maturities unsuitable
for planting).
5. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
513 (1917) (stating that a patentee’s reward should be commensurate to his
contribution and that “he should not be permitted by legal devices to impose an
unjust charge upon the public in return for the use of it”); id. at 516 (forbidding a
patentee from “send[ing] its machines forth into the channels of trade of the country
subject to conditions as to use or royalty to be paid, to be imposed thereafter at the
discretion of such patent owner. The patent law furnishes no warrant for such a
practice, and the cost, inconvenience, and annoyance to the public which the
opposite conclusion would occasion forbid it”).
6. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766 (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008)).
7. Id. (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249-50
(1942)).

562

Michigan State Law Review

2015:559

make new copies of the patented invention.8 Hence, Bowman could
not avail himself of patent exhaustion because the progeny seed that
grew from the seed he had bought was an unauthorized “making.”9
The Court was correct to find for Monsanto. The Roundup
Ready trait in soybean seeds “carries forward into each successive
. . . generation.”10 Giving Bowman an unfettered right to grow new
seed would reduce Monsanto’s patent rights to a single sale, as each
seed would become a mini-factory of infringement. Farmers may
quibble about specific licensing terms, but spending patterns show
support for transgenic seed.11 Our food is grown more efficiently,
with less harm to the environment, and is infused with more
nutritional punch than ever before.12 We owe these blessings to
Monsanto and other agrobiotech companies like it. The modified
seed helps farmers ease the squeeze that comes from growing
demand and shrinking available farmland.
Monsanto’s record and its plans for the future show that
rational market choice has played a part in its success. Roundup and
Roundup Ready, the transgenic trait that confers resistance to
Roundup, has entered the public domain. However, Monsanto is
already in the process of offering next generation genome
sequencing, data analysis and genetic prediction for its technology in
seed traits.13 Monsanto has also transitioned to its new offering,
Roundup Ready 2 Yield, and its microbial-based herbicide and
pesticides technology in its pipeline could displace current chemical
alternatives as the next industry standard.14
Still, the Bowman decision is problematic for at least two
reasons. First, the Court wrongly focused on Bowman’s intention to
free ride and stressed that inadvertent or de minimis infringement
might shield farmers inflicted by transgenic pollution they did not
want.15 It did so arguably to avoid criticism that the Bowman decision
would toss farmers like tussled-up sheep to the wolves. But intent
8. Id. at 1764.
9. Id. at 1767-68.
10. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
11. See infra Section I.C.
12. GM Crop Use Continues to Benefit the Environment and Farmers, PG
ECON. (May 6, 2014), http://www.pgeconomics.co.uk/page/36/-gm-crop-usecontinues-to-benefit-the-environment-and-farmers.
13. Maxx Chatsko, 3 Reasons Monsanto Company’s Stock Could Rise,
MOTLEY FOOL (August 25, 2014) http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/08/
25/3-reasons-monsanto-companys-stock-could-rise.aspx.
14. Id.
15. See infra Section II.A.
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and control are irrelevant to infringement.16 Bowman has made it
uncertain at what point farmers who passively benefit from a trait
using routine farming practices infringe the patents that cover it. This
uncertainty is unfair to farmers—and to patentees—who must now
punt on patent liability.
Second, the Court flirted with correcting the Federal Circuit’s
controversial conditional sale doctrine during oral arguments but
ultimately decided to duck the issue.17 The conditional sale doctrine
allows patentees to restrict uses that can be made of the patented
invention. The doctrinal basis is a simple but insidious one: since
patentees can exclude others from all uses, it follows that they can
parcel out any part of those uses with take-it-or-leave-it conditions.
Those who take it, whether as licensees or purchasers, must adhere to
the restrictions or risk a stinging patent infringement suit. The
problem with the conditional sale doctrine is that it is an end-run
around patent exhaustion, which extinguishes a patentee’s right to
patent remedies once an authorized sale has been made.18 Buyers
should be entitled to use, sell, or otherwise dispose of those items.19
The doctrine turns innocents into infringers.
The Court’s silence in Bowman emboldens patentees, who can
continue to rely on the conditional sale doctrine to convert every sale
into a license. This unfairly overcompensates patentees and could
create patent hold-ups downstream if the patentee sued users who
had sunk investments into developing infrastructure to comply with
16. See, e.g., Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
17. Numerous commentators and at least one court have categorically said
that the conditional-sale doctrine contravenes patent policy and precedent and is bad
law. See infra Section II.B.
18. See infra Section II.B; Daryl Lim, Self-Replicating Technologies and
the Challenge for the Patent and Antitrust Laws, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 131,
195 (2013) (“[F]armers would be liable for patent infringement if they used those
seeds in a manner prohibited by the patentee, even though they were using the seeds
bought (rather than new seeds grown), as long as the patentee had restricted the
permissible uses through its license agreement.”).
19. Lim, supra note 18, at 195 (“The Court’s express expunging of
Mallinckrodt in Bowman v. Monsanto would have been helpful in clarifying the law.
More importantly, it would have provided a critical avenue out for these farmers,
whose rights must now be tested and defined by further litigation.”); Li Guo, SelfReplicating Technologies: Do They Exhaust Patent Rights?, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y
197, 211 (2013) (“It remains unclear to what extent a patent owner can use a
conditional license to impose restrictions on downstream purchasers to avoid patent
exhaustion or whether the Quanta opinion has affirmatively rejected the view that
one can contract around the doctrine.”).
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the patented technology.20 The doctrine is no longer good law and
should be abrogated.
Living with Monsanto requires vigilance against abuses of its
patent rights. Until recently, jurisprudence advocating the “scope of
the patent” approach shielded patentees from scrutiny under the
antitrust laws and patent misuse under all but a sliver of
circumstances. For antitrust law, that changed after the Supreme
Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, which held that
patent rights, even if validly obtained and infringed, are subject to
antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason.21 In so doing, the Court
rejected the “scope of the patent” approach which had traditionally
shielded patentees behind a per se rule of legality and accepting any
anticompetitive harm as part and parcel of the exercise of patent
rights.
Post-Actavis, the view that patentees should be granted broad
rights to reward innovation and to allow coordination of derivative
streams of innovation must be qualified by the Court’s reiterating
that “patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the
‘scope of the patent monopoly.’”22 Patent misuse jurisprudence
tracking the “scope of the patent” approach contains the same
formalistic flaws and should be rethought as well.
Operationalizing Actavis requires courts to balance the
consequences of intervention on the one hand with inaction on the
other. This effects-focused approach will help yield outcomes that
better track policy goals and should contain three features.
First, it should be based on a coherent theory of harm. The
discussion focuses on the foreclosure of access to Monsanto’s traits
and articulates how foreclosure might be problematic as a matter of
both antitrust and patent policy. Foreclosure raises antitrust concerns
when it raises prices, lowers output, or diminishes the quality of
goods offered. Patent misuse is concerned about foreclosure as well.
However, unlike antitrust law, it safeguards against abuses of the
patent system that impede technological progress, with protecting
competition as a secondary goal.
20. Richard H. Stern, Post-Sale Patent Restrictions After Mallinckrodt—An
Idea in Search of Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 4 (1994); Brief of BSA,
The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21-22,
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796) (warning that patent
hold-ups in the downstream market could occur if the defendant incurred sunk costs
by adopting the technology).
21. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
22. Id. at 2231.
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Second, that theory should be supported by evidence that the
harm can be effected. Complainants in antitrust litigation already
must show actual or circumstantial evidence of harm. That
framework can easily be applied in cases involving Monsanto and
others like it. Patent misuse does not require its complainant to show
market power unless tying has been alleged. It is sufficient to prove
that the conduct supporting the theory of harm had in fact occurred.
Third, the approach should contain heuristics to make it
administrable. Antitrust law requires the showing of antitrust injury
and offers judges the use of a truncated rule of reason in appropriate
circumstances. The former requires plaintiffs to show harm to the
competitive structure rather than to the plaintiff alone. The latter
allows the initial burden to be shifted to the antitrust defendant to
explain the restraint or conduct where judicial experience and
economic learning indicate a strong likelihood of anticompetitive
harm. In patent misuse cases, the defendant similarly stands before
the court as a proxy for the public interest. Where appropriate, the
court may truncate the inquiry by shifting the burden onto the
patentee to explain its conduct. This will incentivize the party best
placed to provide the information to the court to do so.23
I. A NECESSARY “EVIL”
Every movement has its icons. Agrobiotech has several. In
1994, genetically modified Flavr Savr tomatoes hit supermarket
shelves.24 With their ripening process delayed, they lasted longer
23. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 16-18 (1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm#t34 (“Application of the rule
of reason generally requires a comprehensive inquiry into market conditions.
However, that inquiry may be truncated in certain circumstances. If the Agencies
conclude that a restraint has no likely anticompetitive effects, they will treat it as
reasonable, without an elaborate analysis of market power or the justifications for
the restraint. Similarly, if a restraint facially appears to be of a kind that would
always or almost always tend to reduce output or increase prices, and the restraint is
not reasonably related to efficiencies, the Agencies will likely challenge the restraint
without an elaborate analysis of particular industry circumstances.”).
24. GL Woolsey, GMO Timeline: A History of Genetically Modified Foods,
ROSEBUD (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.rosebudmag.com/truth-squad/gmo-timeline-ahistory-of-genetically-modified-foods#sthash.XByFPD6i.dpuf; G. Bruening & J.M.
Lyons, The Case of the FLAVR SAVR Tomato, CAL. AGRIC., July-Aug. 2000, at 6, 7,
available
at
http://californiaagriculture.ucanr.org/landingpage.cfm?article=ca.
v054n04p6 (“Demand for [the FLAVR SAVR tomato] was high and remained high,
but the product was never profitable . . . .”).
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than conventional tomatoes.25 Soon after, a gene engineered to resist
the papaya ringspot virus saved the Hawaiian papaya industry from
ruin.26 Genetically modified corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, and
sorghum offer farmers the opportunity to grow crops with better soil
quality, reduced erosion, and less insecticide use.27 Grains feed us
both directly and indirectly when they are processed into feed for
animals that nourish us with their flesh.28 So successful are
genetically modified crops that the National Research Council has
urged greater use of genetic modification to more crops for more
purposes.29
Up until the late nineteenth century, seed varieties were
publicly funded and freely distributed.30 However, the free-seed
program crowded out private breeders from the marketplace, and
breeders lacked the incentive to invest in plant productivity.31 To
encourage private investment, Congress passed the Plant Protection
Act in 1930, extending patent-like protection for asexually
reproducing seeds, and the Plant Variety Protection (PVP) Act
protecting sexually reproducing seeds in 1970.32 As public funding
25. See Bruening & Lyons, supra note 24, at 6.
26. Pamela C. Ronald & James E. McWilliams, Genetically Engineered
Distortions, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2010, at A19 (“[Eighty] percent of Hawaiian
papaya is genetically engineered, and there is still no conventional or organic
method to control ringspot virus.”).
27. Id.
28. Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 9 (“Grain is the foundation for
many foods, including a wide array of traditional and processed foods. It is also
important for feeding livestock. Most of the calories in the human diet are supplied,
directly or indirectly, by grain. . . . Much of the world’s grain production is used to
feed livestock and poultry, which in turn provide meat, dairy products and eggs
(animal protein) for human consumption.”).
29. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE IMPACT OF GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED CROPS ON FARM SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 219 (2010);
Ronald & McWilliams, supra note 26, at A19 (noting that modifications could allow
crops to be grown in “difficult conditions throughout the world. . . . Drought-tolerant
cassava, insect-resistant cowpeas, fungus-resistant bananas, virus-resistant sweet
potatoes and high-yielding pearl millet are just a few examples of genetically
engineered foods that could improve the lives of the poor around the globe”).
30. See Lim, supra note 18, at 140.
31. Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed
Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 268-69 (2003); JACK RALPH
KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY 64 (1988).
32. Plant Patent Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-245, 46 Stat. 376 (codified
with some differences in language at 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2012)); Plant Variety
Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, §§ 51-52, 84 Stat. 1542, 1548 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2422 (2012)).
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stagnated, universities relied more heavily on patent revenues as well
as major seed companies to finance their research.33 Seed companies
in turn demanded more control over access to trait and variety
technology and integrated more functions such as breeding,
production, and marketing in the process.34
The march toward privatizing agrobiotech research and
development continued with the passing of the Bayh–Dole Act in
1980, which enabled public and university research institutions to
patent their results and exclusively license private corporations.35 In
2001, the Supreme Court held that seeds could be protected by
overlapping utility patents with PVP protection.36 PVP protection
confers less robust protection than utility patents because they allow
farmers to save seeds for replanting his own acreage and provides for
a research exception for private, noncommercial uses of protected
seed.37
33. JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, USDA, AGRIC. INFO. BULLETIN NO. 786,
THE SEED INDUSTRY IN U.S. AGRICULTURE: AN EXPLORATION OF CROP SEED
MARKETS, REGULATION, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
47-49 (2004), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/260729/aib786_1_.pdf;
see also Lim, supra note 18, at 146 (“Once the backbone of seed germplasm
research, public expenditure leveled off in the 1970s and began to decrease by the
mid-1990s. In contrast, private investment in seeds and genetic trait research
doubled from $146 million to $305 million between 1979 and 1980, and domestic
soybean production has increased 96% and yields per acre have increased 55%. By
2010, private investment rose to $2 billion. Private spending continues to outpace
government spending.” (footnotes omitted)).
34.See Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 8 (“Over time, seed companies
began to integrate plant breeding, production, conditioning, and marketing
functions, and continued to replace the public sector as a source
of
seed
for
farmers.”).
35. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-20 (1980) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2012)).
36. J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135
(2001) (“Denying patent protection . . . simply because such coverage was thought
technologically infeasible in 1930 . . . would be inconsistent with the forwardlooking perspective of the utility patent statute.”); see also Elizabeth I. Winston,
Sowing the Seeds of Protection, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 445, 448 (noting that unlike the
PVP, utility patent protection covers traits found in multiple seed varieties); Rita S.
Heimes, Post-Sale Restrictions on Patented Seeds: Which Law Governs?, 10 WAKE
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 98, 109 (2010) (stating that this case “signaled a shift in
enforcement of plant intellectual property rights from litigation against corporate
competitors to lawsuits against the end-user farmer”). PVP protection does not
require a showing of nonobviousness or written disclosure. 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2012).
37. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2543-2544; see also UNIDROIT, Intellectual Property
Rights and Contract Farming, at 9, Study 80A/Doc. 1/Add. 18 (Aug. 2014),
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2014/study80a/wg04/s-80a-
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The results were evident. A recent empirical study showed that
average corn yields rose thirteen-fold, mostly through gene
technology.38 Traited crops have “reduced chemical pesticide use by
37%, increased crop yields by 22%, and increased farmer profits by
68%.”39 Farmers have been buying seeds from seed companies since
1965, and nearly all soybean acreage is planted with annually
purchased seed.40
Farmers routinely buy much of their seed annually for various
reasons. In some cases, replanting results in inferior varieties. Hybrid
crops such as corn and sorghum lose their traited qualities with
subsequent crops, and farmers must buy new seed each season to
keep the trait potency strong.41 Corn farmers have been exclusively
growing commercial hybrids for more than half a century.42
With crops such as soybeans that “breed true,” preventing seed
saving becomes important for agrobiotech interests because the seeds
produced replicate genetically identical traited seeds.43 This means
01-add18-e.pdf (“The seed saving exemption as currently codified in US law
remains more generous than its counterparts in many other UPOV-based regimes.
The US seed-saving exemption does not require the seed-saving farmer to pay a fee
to the PVP owner for the saved seed, while other jurisdictions (such as Europe,
under the Community Plant Variety regime) do require payment.”).
38. Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 6 (“From 1930 to the mid1990s, average U.S. corn yields rose seven-fold, from 20 bushels per acre to 140
bushels per acre. Today, yields average about 160 bushels per acre, and can
sometimes reach 260 bushels per acre in prime corn-growing locations. Genetic
improvements, including the development of high-performance ‘hybrid’ corn
varieties, account for much of the gain (although mechanization, chemical
fertilizers, pesticides, seed treatments, irrigation, and seed placement strategies have
also played key roles).” (footnotes omitted)).
39. Wilhelm Klümper & Matin Qaim, A Meta-Analysis of the Impacts of
Genetically Modified Crops, PLOS ONE, Nov. 2014, at 1, 1, available at
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pon
e.0111629&representation=PDF.
40. Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 7.
41. See Aoki, supra note 31, at 250.
42. Dan Charles, Top Five Myths of Genetically Modified Seeds, Busted,
NPR (Oct. 18, 2012, 11:51 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/
2012/10/18/163034053/top-five-myths-of-genetically-modified-seeds-busted (“By
the time Monsanto got into the seed business, most farmers in the U.S. and Europe
were already relying on seed that they bought every year from older seed
companies. . . . This shift started with the rise of commercial seed companies, not
the advent of genetic engineering. But Monsanto and GMOs certainly accelerated
the trend drastically.”).
43. See Richard Jefferson, Science as Social Enterprise: The CAMBIA BiOS
Initiative, INNOVATIONS, Fall 2006, at 13, 14, available at http://www.bios.
net/daisy/patentlens/3068/version/default/part/AttachmentData/data/Science_as_Soc
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that each seed becomes a mini-factory capable of making every new
sale the seed seller’s last. Without proper patent protection, biotech
companies may have simply focused on hybrid crops.44 It was this
worry that pulsed through the Supreme Court’s deliberations as it
weighed the merits of a patent lawsuit by the world’s largest
agrobiotech company against a pro se seventy-five-year-old soybean
farmer from Indiana.45
A. Bowman v. Monsanto
Monsanto’s Roundup herbicide contains glyphosate, a
chemical that kills vegetation by inhibiting the metabolic activity of
an enzyme necessary for growth.46 Roundup offers farmers a simple
one-stop solution. It is effective against most weeds, can be applied
at all stages of growth, and is easily integrated into conservation
tillage and narrow row spacing.47 Roundup can be paired with
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready seeds, which contain a synthetic gene
and plant cells containing a promoter that endows crops with
glyphosate resistance.48 The gene sequence is unaffected by
glyphosate, allowing the seed to continue the sugar-conversion
function required for cell growth.49 The Roundup Ready technology
ial_Enterprise-_The_CAMBIA_BiOS_Initiative.pdf (“[S]eeds of most crop plants
breed true . . . .”).
44. Tamar Haspel, Unearthed: Are Patents the Problem?, WASH. POST
(Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/unearthed-arepatents-the-problem/2014/09/28/9bd5ca90-4440-11e4-9a15137aa0153527_story.html.
45. Andrew Pollack, Farmer’s Supreme Court Challenge Puts Monsanto
Patents at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/16/
business/supreme-court-to-hear-monsanto-seed-patent-case.html?pagewanted=all.
46. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(describing EPSPS, which is necessary for the conversion of sugars into amino
acids).
47. Janet Carpenter & Leonard Gianessi, Herbicide Tolerant Soybeans:
Why Growers Are Adopting Roundup Ready Varieties, 2 AGBIOFORUM 65, 65
(1999); see also Roundup Ready® Soybeans, STINE, http://www.stineseed.com/
soybeans/traits/roundup-ready/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (allowing farmers to
“spray Roundup® agricultural herbicides in-crop from emergence through flowering
for unsurpassed weed control, proven crop safety and maximum yield potential”).
48. N.C. Farmers’ Assistance Fund, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 740 F. Supp. 2d
694, 696 (M.D.N.C. 2010).
49. McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1338 (“ROUNDUP READY® soybean seeds
produce both a ‘natural’ version of EPSPS that is rendered ineffective in the
presence of the glyphosate in ROUNDUP® herbicide, and a genetically modified
version of EPSPS that permits the soybean seeds to grow nonetheless.
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was quickly adopted and became an industry standard in
agriculture.50
Since 1996, Monsanto has itself sold Roundup Ready soybean
seeds and licensed the Roundup Ready technology to seed partners
who insert the trait into their own seed varieties.51 In either case,
farmers buying the seeds must adhere to a number of restrictions,
including single-season planting.52 Farmers may sell progeny seed to
grain elevators. Monsanto does not require these grain elevators to
screen its buyers for their intended use of the seed.53 The seed,
known as commodity seed, are a mix of undifferentiated seeds of
different maturities and therefore unsuitable for planting a crop.54
For his first crop, Bowman bought seed from Pioneer Hi-Bred,
one of Monsanto’s licensed seed partners, and adhered to the singleseason restriction.55 For the riskier late-season crop, Bowman bought
commodity seed from a grain elevator to avoid paying the premium
ROUNDUP®, or other glyphosate-based herbicides, can thus be sprayed over the
top of an entire field, killing the weeds without harming the ROUNDUP READY®
soybeans.”).
50. UW EXTENSION, WISCONSIN FARMERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CALL FOR
GLYPHOSATE (ROUNDUP) STEWARDSHIP (2013), available at http://extension.
psu.edu/pests/weeds/control/glyphosate-wi.pdf; see also Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,
249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750 (N.D. Miss. 2001) (“Roundup Ready® seed technology
was first marketed commercially in time for the 1996 planting season. Although
relatively new to the agricultural market, Roundup Ready® seeds have already
earned a reputation as an effective product, and are considered to be a significant
technological advancement to place in the hands of growers, resulting in greater
efficiency.”).
51. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see
also McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1339 (“Under this license, seed companies gain the
right to insert the genetic trait into the germplasm of their own seeds (which can
differ from seed company to seed company), and Monsanto receives the right to a
royalty or ‘technology fee’ of $6.50 for every 50–pound bag of seed containing the
ROUNDUP READY® technology sold by the seed company. Monsanto also owns
several subsidiary seed companies that comprise approximately 20 percent of the
market for ROUNDUP READY® soybeans.”).
52. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1344-45; McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1339 (limiting
planting to single season; “[t]o not supply any of this seed to any other person or
entity for planting[;] . . . [t]o not save any crop produced from this seed for
replanting, or supply saved seed to anyone for replanting[; t]o not use this seed or
provide it to anyone for crop breeding, research, generation of herbicide registration
data or seed production”).
53. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345 (“Based on Monsanto’s statements, the only
permissible reading of the Technology Agreement for purposes of this appeal is that
it authorizes growers to sell seed to grain elevators as a commodity.”).
54. Id.
55. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1765 (2013).
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on Roundup Ready seed.56 After Bowman applied glyphosate to
confirm their resistance, he treated his second crop with it.57 He
saved that crop for replanting as a second crop over eight years.58 In
all this, Bowman was open and explained his practices to
Monsanto’s representatives when asked.59
Monsanto sued for infringement, winning in the lower courts.60
The district court and Federal Circuit based their analysis on two
grounds. First, the sale of all Monsanto’s seeds was conditional on
adhering to the single-season planting restriction, leaving Monsanto
with the right to control the replication of the trait in the seed sold.61
Since farmers who buy the seed can only give what they own, neither
the grain elevator nor Bowman possessed the right to replicate the
trait. Second, even if the right in the seed sold was exhausted, the
seed that Bowman grew was never sold, and exhaustion could not
affect it.62 The “making” was unauthorized and therefore infringing.63
The case centered on the scope of patent exhaustion.
Bowman’s bone of contention was that exhaustion should not apply
because he was simply “using seeds in the normal way farmers do”
and that “allowing Monsanto to interfere with that use would create
an impermissible exception to the exhaustion doctrine for patented
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1346 (“Bowman did not attempt to hide his
activities, and he candidly explained his practices with respect to his second-crop
soybeans in various correspondence with Monsanto’s representatives.”).
60. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 (S.D. Ind. 2009);
Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1349.
61. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1344-45.
62. Id. at 1347-48; see also N.C. Farmers’ Assistance Fund, Inc. v.
Monsanto Co., 740 F. Supp. 2d 694, 697 (M.D.N.C. 2010) (“‘The claims of the ‘605
patent have been construed numerous times by other district courts, as well as the
Federal Circuit, in cases involving the replanting of saved Roundup Ready
soybeans. These cases have concluded that Claims 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the ‘605 patent
cover saved Roundup Ready soybeans. Thus, there is ample case law holding that
replanting saved Roundup Ready® crops is a direct infringement of the ‘605
patent.’” (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Parr, 545 F. Supp. 2d 836, 841 (N.D. Ind.
2008)); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[W]e
must presume that Monsanto’s ‘435 patent reads on the first-generation seeds, it also
reads on the second-generation seeds.” (footnote omitted)).
63. Bowman, 133 S. Ct at 1764; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012)
(“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports
into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.”).
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seeds.”64 It seems trite to say that replication is part of the natural
cycle of any living organism, particularly if those organisms are
seeds.65 For Bowman, it was reasonable to expect that a farmer who
buys seed should be entitled to use seed qua seed.66 This argument
has intuitive appeal. One who buys a cow expects to own its calf.
The Court rejected this argument. The quid pro quo of arguing
every seed embodies future generations is that the buyer must pay for
every seed through a billion-dollar sale.67 If Bowman could make and
sell endless copies of the seed bought, Monsanto’s patents would be
telescoped into a single sale. The Court reasoned that “[w]ere the
matter otherwise, Monsanto’s patent would provide scant benefit.”68
64. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1763.
65. See Ghoshray, supra note 4, at 510 (“Relying on more than 10,000
years of history of human civilization, what has been traditionally recognized and
understood by mankind as ordinary pursuit should be the controlling authority in
determining what constitutes normal usage for the purpose of determining- what
activities by the buyer are permitted under sale of a patented product. Implicit in this
interpretation is the recognition that patent exhaustion occurs when a purchaser buys
a patented item for the purpose of using it in the ordinary pursuit of life.”); SUZANNE
ASHWORTH, SEED TO SEED: SEED SAVING AND GROWING TECHNIQUES FOR
VEGETABLE GARDENS 15 (Kent Whealy & Arllys Adelmann eds., 2d ed. 2002)
(describing how farmers select “heirloom varieties” based on favorable traits which
allowed crop diversity adapted to different regions, soil types, climates, local pests,
diseases, and cultures by the process of phenotypic selection, where seeds from the
healthiest and most productive plants were selectively saved).
66. Tabetha Marie Peavey, Bowman v. Monsanto: Bowman, the Producer
and the End User, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 465, 487 (2014) (“Seeds, such as
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready® soybean, present similar concerns and are particularly
troubling not only because their only real purpose is to reproduce, but also because
all the aspects of the patented biotechnology are passed to subsequent
generations.”).
67. See, e.g., Brief for the American Seed Trade Association as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 16, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937) (arguing that the price for that transaction would
be “so prohibitively expensive that few farmers could afford to purchase it”); see
also Lim, supra note 18, at 172-73 (“The problem with this argument is that both the
buyer and seller of a Russian doll know exactly how many baby dolls are sheathed
within its wooden bosom, and its market price is set accordingly. With [selfreplicating technologies] in general, and with soybeans in particular, no such
number can be determined ex ante, or can be assumed to be infinite. . . . If
exhaustion does apply, progeny seeds will quickly compete with seed sold by
Monsanto or its seed company licensees, depressing the market price toward the
competitive price. Anticipating this, owners would charge a price for the first sale
based on the present discounted value of its expected future income. The
prohibitively high price would lead to market failure, unless farmers formed a
consortium wealthy enough to induce a sale.”).
68. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1767.
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After Monsanto sold its first seed, other seed companies could
produce the patented seed to compete with Monsanto, and farmers
would need to buy seed only once.69 Besides being inconsistent with
the twenty-year period of exclusivity that patentees generally enjoy,
telescoping Monsanto’s commercialization into a single sale could
lead to a less-competitive seed market and one that discourages
disclosure of new technologies. Instead of licensing other seed
companies, Monsanto might vertically integrate downstream and
keep its technologies secret.70
According to the Court, exhaustion severs the legal rights
tethering the patented article to patentees, preventing them from
extracting further economic rents from downstream commerce.71
Thus, “‘the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all
patent rights to that item.’”72 At the same time, the user does not
acquire the right to replicate the item because “‘a second creation’ of
the patented item ‘call[s] the monopoly, conferred by the patent
grant, into play for a second time.’”73 The Court concluded that “it is
really Bowman who is asking for an exception to the well-settled
rule that exhaustion does not extend to the right to make new copies
of the patented item.”74

69. Id. (explaining that the exhaustion doctrine application would negate
Monsanto’s reward).
70. Lim, supra note 18, at 173.
71. Bowman, 133 S. Ct at 1766. From the patentee’s perspective, “patent
exhaustion limits a patentee’s right to control what others can do with an article
embodying or containing an invention.” Id. From the buyer’s perspective, “the sale
confers on the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, ‘the right to use [or] sell’ the
thing as he sees fit.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Univis Lens
Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942)).
72. Id. (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617,
625 (2008)).
73. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961)); id. (“Consistent with that rationale, the
doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights only as to the ‘particular article’ sold; it leaves
untouched the patentee’s ability to prevent a buyer from making new copies of the
patented item. . . . That is because the patent holder has ‘received his reward’ only
for the actual article sold, and not for subsequent recreations of it.” (citations
omitted)).
74. Id. at 1763.
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B. The “Make-Use” Dichotomy
This “make-use” dichotomy allows patentees to secure returns
on their inventions.75 Bowman presented the Court with a novel
issue: Was using the self-replicating function illegal if that function
was one of its primary purposes? The Court’s response was that
replication was a form of “use” but pointed to the fact that it had
“always drawn the boundaries of the exhaustion doctrine to exclude
that activity, so that the patentee retains an undiminished right to
prohibit others from making the thing his patent protects.”76
Allowing replication “would result in less incentive for innovation
than Congress wanted. Hence [its] repeated insistence that
exhaustion applies only to the particular item sold, and not to
reproductions.”77
In contrast to Bowman, the trail of vaporized business models
indicates that the Court is not mesmerized by pleas of longstanding
practice if the industry is able to subsist on narrower rights.78 In
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., the Court
refused to find infringement of a patent directed to methods of
delivering electronic data even when the steps were designed to be
performed by different parties to circumvent the law on direct
infringement.79 That result eviscerated many multi-actor method
claims, but the solution lay in proper claim drafting and not in

75. See Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 22 (“Widespread ‘seed
saving’ may depress seed prices and revenues, and may at some point pose an
existential threat to the seed companies themselves.”).
76. Bowman, 133 S. Ct at 1768 (citing Cotton–Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106
U.S. 89, 93-94 (1882) for its “holding that a purchaser could not ‘use’ the buckle
from a patented cotton-bale tie to ‘make’ a new tie”).
77. Id.
78. For parallel examples in copyright law, see Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355-56 (2013) (holding that textbooks sold more
cheaply in Thailand could be imported into and offered in competition with more
expensive local ones); Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2502-03
(2014); Tanya Agrawal & Jonathan Stempel, Video Streaming Service Aereo Files
for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2014, 2:26 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2014/11/21/us-aereo-bankruptcy-idUSKCN0J513K20141121
(“That decision effectively forbade New York-based Aereo’s business model, an
attempt to offer a less-expensive alternative to cable television.”).
79. 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014) (rebuking the Federal Circuit for
“fundamentally misunderstand[ing]” basic principles of patent law and holding that
it could not justify finding infringement on the Federal Circuit’s theory of divided
infringement even though there was misappropriation).
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stretching direct infringement to cover the legal loophole.80 In
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the
Court invalidated claims over isolated, naturally occurring DNA
segments while allowing synthetic DNA sequences and stressing that
the decision did not implicate claims over gene manipulation
methods, application of the knowledge of the isolated DNA
sequences, and the patentability of sequences where nucleotide order
had been altered.81
The same could not be said of Bowman. The Court recognized
that exhaustion did not include “uses”—even time-honored ones—
that allowed the user to create replicas that would compete with the
patentee’s primary market—in this case, Monsanto’s market for
traited seeds.82 This was because
in short order, other seed companies could reproduce the product and
market it to growers, thus depriving Monsanto of its monopoly. And
farmers themselves need only buy the seed once, whether from Monsanto,
a competitor, or (as here) a grain elevator. The grower could multiply his

80. Bridget Hayden, John T. Kennedy & David H. Tseng, Post Limelight v.
Akamai, Are Multi-Actor Method Patent Claims D.O.A.?, DORSEY (June 3, 2014),
http://www.dorsey.com/eu-post-limelight-akamai-multi-actor-patent-claims/
(“[Akamai] renders many multi-actor method claims D.O.A. as no single supplier for
many of today’s e-commerce (and other) solutions infringes such claims by
‘controlling or directing’ the actions of one or more vendors, suppliers or customers
as is often necessary to practice every step of such claims.”); MICHAEL DZWONCZYK,
BULLETPROOFING METHOD CLAIMS FOR POST-LIMELIGHT ENFORCEMENT 9 (2014),
available at http://www.sughrue.com/files/Publication/2c8b4990-0c73-4330-b50e625e2877f3c2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d9d2bf57-98b6-4080-a8d864e9de4463f3/01-18-14%20Final%20Naples%20Paper%20(2).pdf (“The use of
system claims, single-actor method claims and method claims that omit all but the
most essential features of the inventive process remain commercially valuable both
now and after the Court’s ultimate decision [in] Limelight. Claiming nonessential
elements that can be carried out by second or third entities, or those that can be
easily exported, may very well deprive a patent holder of the right to enforce an
important method claim.”).
81. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119-20 (2013); see also Supreme Court’s Decision Is
a Gene-Patent Gambit Says Professor Daryl Lim at Chicago’s John Marshall Law
School, PR WEB (June 18, 2013), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/6/
prweb10842966.htm (noting that patents on human gene sequences accounted “for
[only] 10% of all gene patents,” and that “biotech firms like Myriad have valuable
data on gene mutations locked away as trade secrets”); D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics,
Inc. [2014] FCAFC ¶ 218 (Austl.) (finding isolated nucleic acid patent eligible).
82. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766 (“If the purchaser of that article could make
and sell endless copies, the patent would effectively protect the invention for just a
single sale.”).
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initial purchase, and then multiply that new creation, ad infinitum—each
time profiting from the patented seed without compensating its inventor.83

For this reason, the Court concluded that exhaustion was
limited to the items sold “to avoid . . . a mismatch between invention
and reward.”84 Even Bowman agreed that it was the “‘well settled’”
principle “‘that the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the right
to ‘make’ a new product.’”85
Commercial expectations also informed the inquiry. Seeds
purchased from grain elevators are not for replanting.86 They are of
different maturities and intended for animal feed and processing.87
Further, existing markets for grain and processed soybean product
indicate that traited seed have non-infringing uses.88 Unlike
conventional seeds, there is no legitimate expectation that those
seeds could be used to produce another harvest. Part of the reason is
practical: The commingled seed was unsuitable for farming use.89
Part of the reason is legal: Every new generation of seeds that
contains the glyphosate-resistant trait is infringing, regardless of
whether glyphosate is actually used.90
Monsanto managed to frame the issue as “all or nothing,” a
tactic that ultimately helped it win the case. Cauterizing the right to
replant seed with patented traits comported with orthodoxy on
infringement for unauthorized “making.” However, this result does
not make it self-evident that easing up on the level of control given
to Monsanto would necessarily diminish a societally optimal level of
innovation. What the Court in Bowman did was to provide a neat

83. Id. at 1767.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1766 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 37, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761
(No. 11-796)); id. (“Bowman himself disputes none of this analysis as a general
matter.”).
86. Id. at 1763 (“Bowman purchased soybeans intended for consumption
from a grain elevator; planted them; treated the plants with glyphosate, killing all
plants without the Roundup Ready trait; harvested the resulting soybeans that
contained that trait; and saved some of these harvested seeds to use in his late-season
planting the next season.”).
87. Ghoshray, supra note 4, at 552.
88. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765 & n.1.
89. See Ghoshray, supra note 4.
90. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766 (“[T]he exhaustion doctrine does not
enable Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s
permission.”).
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solution to appropriating investment returns without having to rely
on less administrable alternatives.91
For instance, making an example of a few farmers in breach of
licensing agreements by pursuing contractual remedies may, in
reality, have been sufficient to deter others from replanting traited
seeds. However, contracts require privity between the parties,
offering limited protection.92 Restrictions on alienation could also
impose great transaction costs.93 The risk would be that enforcement
costs could eventually make it commercially unviable for Monsanto
to license its patents and lead it to protect inbred parent lines as trade
secrets, as many in fact do.94
Trade secrets are not an option for crops like soybean that
“breed true.” Like drugs, seed traits and varieties are self-disclosing
and therefore cannot be kept secret.95 A Chinese woman who was
91. Lim, supra note 18, at 183-86 (explaining why other alternatives not
listed below, such as PVP protection and first-mover advantages, are unsuitable).
92. Brief for Respondents at 51-55, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No. 11-796)
(noting that in a world where soybeans “could be purchased from another grower or
a grain elevator, plucked from a field or road, or snatched off the back of a truck,”
patent owners would have to establish “contractual privity with every person who
might try to misappropriate its patented technology”).
93. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The
First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 541 (2011)
(“[T]he ‘infringement’ action permits enforcement of the restriction at much lower
transaction costs than the endless series of breach of contract actions.”).
94. Roger A. McEowen, Legal Issues Related to the Use and Ownership of
Genetically Modified Organisms, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 611, 636 (2004) (“The practice
of protecting inbred parent seed under trade secret law has been adopted as a
strategy by several breeders of proprietary lines of inbred lines.”); see also Norman
W. Hawker, Competition Issues Arising from Generic Biotech Crops, 18 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 137, 139 (2013) (“[C]orn (maize) and sorghum are generally produced
commercially as hybrids in most areas of the world, and the open-pollinated
varieties in commercial use are not generally covered by patents.”).
95. Jeremy N. Sheff, Self-Replicating Technologies, 16 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 229, 242 (2013) (“Self-replicating technologies don’t merely teach competitors
how to practice a new invention, they supply such competitors with a factory as
well. So for novel technologies that we believe have characteristics of public goods
and therefore warrant a proprietary right to the inventor in the first place, selfreplication poses an additional barrier to such appropriation. Granting an inventor a
property right only in the first generation of a self-replicating technology merely
pushes the free-rider problem that patent protection purportedly solves down to
subsequent generations.” (footnote omitted)); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising
Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313 (2008)
(“For products that are inherently self-disclosing (the wheel, say, or the paper clip),
trying to keep the idea secret is a lost cause. We don’t need trade secret law to
encourage disclosure of inherently self-disclosing products—inventors of such
products will get patent protection or nothing.”); Katherine J. Strandburg, What
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recently charged in a plot to steal U.S. corn technology by smuggling
corn seed in boxes of microwave popcorn packed in luggage is a
reminder of how vulnerable to misappropriation these technologies
are.96
Monsanto also owns patents on technology that result in sterile
seed, known as genetic use restriction technology (GURT), and in
theory could use that technology to prevent unauthorized
propagation of its technology. In the face of adverse public opinion,
however, Monsanto has committed not to use it.97 GURT also
exchanges one problem for another. Useful research that might
otherwise have been channeled into improving agronomic or
nutritional qualities could be diverted to devising appropriate GURT
“locks” on seed.98
From a patent policy perspective, GURT is also suboptimal
since there is no date on which the technology enters the public
domain and becomes freely accessible.99 If challenged, a colorable
claim could be made that GURT amounts to an impermissible
restriction on patent exhaustion because it eliminates the possibility
of resale and reuse of progeny seed. If so, state law contracts
purporting to facilitate transactions of GURT seeds between
Monsanto and its seed distributors could be preempted.
In addition to contracts and GURT, there is the option of
compulsory licensing. Other countries have explored compulsory
Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
81, 104-18 (distinguishing between self-disclosing and non-self-disclosing
inventions).
96. MoFo Tech, Seeds Worth More than Gold, JDSUPRA (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/seeds-worth-more-than-gold-24973.
97. See Samuel K. Moore, Terminating the Terminator, CHEMICAL WK.
Oct. 13, 1999, at 9; Terminator Genes: Fertility Rights, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1999, at
104. At the time the announcement was made, Monsanto’s Chief Executive Officer
explained that “[t]hough we do not . . . own any sterile seed technology, we think it
is important to respond . . . by making clear our commitment not to commercialize
gene protection systems that render seed sterile.” Letter from Robert B. Shapiro,
CEO, Monsanto, to Gordon Conway, President, Rockefeller Found. (Oct. 4, 1999),
available
at
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/monsanto-ceo-torockefeller-foundation-president-gordon-conway-terminator-technology.aspx.
98. Chen, supra note 1, at 252 (“Because every investment in GURTs
diverts resources that could have been aimed at improving crops’ agronomic and
nutritional attributes, the whole enterprise reeks of enforcing legal rights at the
expense of actual innovation.”).
99. Lim, supra note 18, at 183 (“[T]his solution has the distinct
disadvantage that unlike patents that expire after twenty years, the technology lock
is perpetual.”).
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licensing as a means to provide a blanket solution to replanting
traited seed.100 The compulsory licensing scheme could also create a
clearinghouse for stacked traits. Seed companies could obtain
licenses to multiple traits rather than negotiate with each trait
patentee individually, thus lowering transactions costs.101 The U.K.
regime allows farmers owning less than 150 acres to save their seed
in return for a license fee charged through seed cleaners.102 Brazil
charges grain elevators that benefit from higher seed yields.103
Argentina taxes farmers’ crops.104 The administration of that regime
could be similar to collecting societies like the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), charged with
collecting licensing fees for copyrighted works.105
The main obstacle is political. The Judiciary Committee has on
three occasions considered and rejected proposals for farmers to save
seed and pay license fees that would be administered by an office in

100. A compulsory license scheme would not be limited to “essential” traits
and would therefore be broader in application to a compulsory licensing remedy
under the antitrust essential facilities doctrine. See id. at 208 (discussing the essential
facilities doctrine and advocating for its application to allow derivative products to
be offered); see also discussion infra Section IV.A.
101. The need to lower transaction costs has also led commentators to argue
for a liability regime in transacting plant breeder rights overseas. For one such
perspective, see Viola Prifti, The Breeding Exemption in Patent Law: Analysis of
Compliance with Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, 16 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
218, 235 (2013) (“If a liability regime were not implemented, plant breeders would
be forced to enter into negotiations in order to obtain commercial licensing. In this
case, the costs involved in private bargain may overcome those of public
intervention. This is mainly because negotiations may fail or involve higher
transaction costs than governmental intervention. This risk is particularly urgent
when plant breeders need to access genetic material which is owned by different
patentees. Even if all the licenses were issued, the time dedicated to negotiation
procedures would undoubtedly delay the coming of new varieties into the market. In
a liability regime, this would not occur since breeders would be free to access
relevant patented material subject to the reward mechanism.”).
102. Jay P. Kesan, Licensing Restrictions and Appropriating Market Benefits
from Plant Innovation, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1081, 1090
(2006).
103. US-Latin Accord on GM Crops a Timely Warning for Australia,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2004), http://www.cpa.org.au/z-archive/g2004/1174gm.html.
104. Id.
105. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 5
(1979). However, note that copyright collecting societies have thousands of
members upstream, compared to few upstream trait distributors and even fewer trait
owners.
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the Department of Agriculture.106 For instance, the Seed Availability
and Competition Act of 2013 was shot down in Committee.107
Another reason for its unsuitability is the considerable bureaucratic
costs imposed by creating an agency to deal with the financial and
administrative aspects of the royalties.
Bowman exemplifies the tension in patent law between
inventors and the public.108 The public desires to minimize the tax
imposed by the patent system on the items they buy, sell, and use.109
In the case of Roundup Ready, Monsanto’s licensing restrictions on
replanting, together with the widespread adoption of its seed,
profoundly changed longstanding replanting practices. Inventors
desire sufficient control of their invention to prevent free riding and
appropriate rewards for their time and effort.110 Patents allow patent
owners to control the manufacture, use, and sale of the patented
invention. For agrobiotech, patents are critical both to the existence
and growth of the industry.111 Studies show a strong correlation
106. These three occasions were in 2011, 2009, and 2004. See Seed
Availability and Competition Act of 2013, H.R. 193, 113th Cong.; see also Kevin E.
Noonan, House Considers Alternative Patent Royalty Scheme for Genetically
Engineered Seed, PATENT DOCS (Jan. 14, 2013), available at http://
www.patentdocs.org/2013/01/house-considers-alternative-patent-royalty-schemefor-genetically-engineered-seed.html (“But regardless of which side has the better
policy argument in that debate, Rep. Kaptur’s bill is not a remedy required by the
politics or economics of the situation. Indeed, it would just impose another
government bureaucracy on U.S. agriculture that would not promote either
agriculture or technological progress.”).
107. Benjamin M. Cole, Brent J. Horton & Ryan Vacca, Food for Thought:
Genetically Modified Seeds as De Facto Standard-Essential Patents, 85 U. COLO. L.
REV. 313, 375 n.394 (2014) (“The Seed Availability and Competition Act of 2013 is
unlikely to pass, as it has been stuck in the House Agriculture Committee since
January 4, 2013.”); Brent J. Horton, How Corporate Lawyers Escaped SarbanesOxley: Disparate Treatment in the Legislative Process, 60 S.C. L. REV. 149, 171
(2008) (“[I]f committee members disfavor the bill for any reason, they can do
nothing and allow the bill to languish in committee.”).
108. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13-14 (2003).
109. In theory, the dynamic efficiency gains to society from the patent
system should outweigh the static efficiency losses it imposes through higher market
prices and lower market output. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 3.3, at 38 (7th ed. 2007).
110. Patents typically cover intangible knowhow with high costs of initial
production and low unit costs of subsequent reproduction. Patent law confers limited
exclusive rights to incentivize investment by allowing patent owners to appropriate
the gains enjoyed by society attributable to the invention. See id. § 3.3, at 38-39.
111. James H. Davis & Michele M. Wales, The Effect of Intellectual
Property on the Biotechnology Industry, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE
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between patent protection and the increase in yield and production.112
Given that their livelihood depends on successful patent
enforcement, we can expect agrobiotech to respond in a muscular
way if their core interests are challenged.
The Bowman opinion masks a surprising fact. Monsanto’s
patents were due to expire in 2014, just over a year later.113 Why
would Monsanto take its fight to the Supreme Court over those soonto-expire patents? One answer is the precedential value of the
opinion. Monsanto obtained a court order for Bowman to pay
$85,000 in damages114—an amount that does not even begin to cover
its attorney fees.115 What was truly valuable for Monsanto was the
defense of the Federal Circuit’s holding below, upholding the
legality of its business model.
C. Roundup Ready Goes Generic: Why It’s Business as Usual for
Monsanto
Even with the expiry of its flagship product, Monsanto’s
fortunes are anything but on the wane. Monsanto spends $2.6 million

HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 427, 433 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (“If other companies
were permitted to copy biotechnology or pharmaceutical products as soon as they
were approved, no rational drug company would expend the cost and effort of
developing new drugs.”); Jasemine Chambers, Note, Patent Eligibility of
Biotechnological Inventions in the United States, Europe, and Japan: How Much
Patent Policy is Public Policy?, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 223, 224 (2002)
(noting the critical role of the patent system in growing the biotechnology industry).
112. A. Bryan Endres & Carly E. Giffin, Necessity Is the Mother, but
Protection May Not Be the Father of Invention: The Limited Effect of Intellectual
Property Regimes on Agricultural Innovation, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 203,
248 (2012) (noting that the United States, unlike the other countries studied,
protected the process to develop the genetically improved seed and the plant itself
under the utility patent regime).
113. See Hawker, supra note 94, at 140 n.15 (“Monsanto also relies on third
party patents, however, including U.S. Patent No. 5,717,084 (filed June 6, 1995)
(issued Feb. 10, 1998) and U.S. Patent No. 5,728,925 (filed Apr. 28, 1995) (issued
Mar. 17, 1998), that do not expire until 2015.”).
114. See Vernon Bowman, Indiana Grain Farmer: Monsanto “Grabbing at
Straws,” HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 20, 2013, 5:43 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/02/20/vernon-bowman-farmer-vs-monsanto_n_2727067.html.
115. See Jim Kerstetter, How Much Is That Patent Lawsuit Going to Cost
You?, CNET (Apr. 5, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/how-much-isthat-patent-lawsuit-going-to-cost-you/.
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a day on research and development.116 In 2014, its seed and genomic
sales are valued at $10.3 billion, and it owns traits covered by 1,700
patents.117 It expects to double its profits by 2019 relying almost
entirely on its seed and genomics businesses.118
Monsanto’s continued success has much to do with American
society’s dependence on it. As with nearly every other industry,
farming is heavily dependent on technology and will remain so for
the foreseeable future. The days of agrarian self-sufficiency are
largely a relic of the past. The Supreme Court noted the trend toward
“a progressive division of labor and separation of function” as early
as 1949 in Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb:
Economic progress . . . is characterized by a progressive division of labor
and separation of function. Tools are made by a tool manufacturer, who
specializes in that kind of work and supplies them to the farmer. The
compost heap is replaced by factory produced fertilizers. Power is derived
from electricity and gasoline rather than supplied by the farmer’s mules.
Wheat is ground at the mill. In this way functions which are necessary to
the total economic process of supplying an agricultural product, become,
in the process of economic development and specialization, separate and
independent productive functions operated in conjunction with the
agricultural function but no longer a part of it.119

In short, farmers today buy seeds in the same way that they buy
fertilizer and farming equipment through external sources.120
Soybeans stacked with Roundup Ready makes weed control a
simpler and cheaper chore.121 Some farmers and their advocates
equate seed saving with farming.122 That notion is a mistaken one.

116. See Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, MONSANTO,
www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/why-does-monsanto-sue-farmers-who-saveseeds.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
117. Dan Mitchell, Why Monsanto Always Wins, FORTUNE (June 26, 2014,
4:03 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/06/26/monsanto-gmo-crops/.
118. Id.
119. 337 U.S. 755, 761 (1949).
120. Chen, supra note 1, at 235 (“Farmers today often buy seed, just as they
buy other agricultural inputs. That way lies the path of economic and technological
progress.”).
121. Id. at 260 (“The alternative to blanket applications of broad-spectrum
herbicide readily explains the popularity of herbicide-resistant crops. Herbicides and
herbicide-resistant crops are substitutes for physical labor of the most demoralizing
sort. Without herbicides, the farmer has no choice but to remove weeds by raw
force.”); see also UW EXTENSION, supra note 50.
122. Chen, supra note 1, at 235.

Living with Monsanto

583

Farmers routinely purchase new seeds for hybrid crops such as corn
because they lose trait vigor in subsequent harvests.123
Farmers who wish to save their seed have the option of
developing organic and heirloom varieties. These “offer none of the
traits that make proprietary varieties so popular. But they can be
saved.”124 More importantly, even though organic produce is sold at
higher prices than their genetically modified counterparts, seed
sellers are generally unwilling to invest in creating new and
improved organic varieties, making them a poor source for trait
innovation.125 In the real world, hunger cannot be solved on an
organic basis.
Market demand for row crops has risen dramatically due to
desertification, crops being used as biofuel, and simply having more
mouths to feed.126 The demand for U.S. crops takes the form of direct
exports or indirect exports, such as through products derived from
animals that feed on the grains.127 Estimates point to having to double
grain production by 2050 to keep up with demand.128 At the same
time, rapid population growth has led to a halving of agricultural
land per capita compared to fifty years ago.129 Failure to keep pace
will mean price shocks and economic volatility.
123. Layla Katiraee, Patents and GMOs: Should Biotech Companies Turn
Innovations over to Public Cost-Free?, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (Apr. 22, 2014),
http://geneticliteracyproject.org/2014/04/22/patents-and-gmos-should-biotechcompanies-turn-innovations-over-to-public-cost-free/.
124. Chen, supra note 1, at 256 (“For farmers whose self-actualization
hinges on the ability to save seed, these varieties offer an emotional and
philosophical refuge.”).
125. See ORGANIC SEED ALLIANCE, STATE OF ORGANIC SEED 38 (2011),
available
at
http://seedalliance.org/index.php?mact=DocumentStore,cntnt01,
download_form,0&cntnt01pid=7&cntnt01returnid=139.
126. Neil D. Hamilton, Harvesting the Law: Personal Reflections on Thirty
Years of Change in Agricultural Legislation, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 563, 567 (2013)
(“The rapid change in the use of farm products is best reflected by the use of over
forty percent of the U.S. corn crop for ethanol to burn as vehicle fuel.”); see also
Adam Garmezy, Patent Exhaustion and the Federal Circuit’s Deviant Conditional
Sale Doctrine: Bowman v. Monsanto, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR
197, 214 (2013) (“Providing the proper incentives for private investment in
biotechnology is especially important because of rapid global population growth and
increased desertification.” (footnote omitted)).
127. See Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 11.
128. Deepak K. Ray et al., Yield Trends Are Insufficient to Double Global
Crop Production by 2050, PLoS ONE, June 2013, at 1, available at http://www.
plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0066428#pone--Ǧ
0066428--Ǧg002.
129. See Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 11.
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This puts pressure on farmers to produce more per acre and
work their fields through more difficult conditions to meet that
demand.130 Genetic modification provides the solution farmers need.
A 2014 study revealed that herbicide and insect resistance increased
yields by 9% and 25% respectively, raising profits by as much as
69% compared to farmers who did not use genetically modified
crop.131
Farmers have been adopting Roundup Ready’s successor,
Roundup Ready 2 Yield (RR2Y) since 2009.132 Monsanto developed
better trait-insertion techniques to develop the RR2Y trait.133 It offers
higher yield, an average 4.5 bushels per acre over Roundup Ready
soybeans, along with glyphosate resistance.134 RR2Y was planted on
fifty million acres in the first four years, was planted on an additional
forty million acres in 2013,135 and will be planted on an anticipated
130. Margo A. Bagley, The Wheat and the (GM) Tares: Lessons for Plant
Patent Litigation from the Parables of Christ, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 683, 688
(2013) (“Other touted GM benefits include improved agricultural performance under
poor conditions, higher yields, and an increased ability for farmers to meet the needs
of a hungry world.”).
131. The Biggest Study So Far Finds That GM Crops Have Large,
Widespread Benefits, ECONOMIST (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/science-and-technology/21630961-biggest-study-so-far-finds-gm-crops-havelarge-widespread-benefits-field; see also Brief for Economists as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 3, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013)
(No. 11-796) (noting a $3.3 billion increase in soybean-related income in 2010).
132. Andrew Pollack, As Patent Ends, a Seed’s Use Will Survive, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/business/18seed.html
(“Monsanto said it was confident that most farmers and seed companies would move
to Roundup Ready 2, which uses the same bacterial gene but places it in a different
location in the soybean DNA. Monsanto said that Roundup Ready 2 crops would
have higher yields, and that other desirable traits would be added to those crops over
time.”).
133. Roundup Ready Soybean Patent
Expiration, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/roundup-ready-patent-expiration.aspx
(last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
134. Genuity® Roundup Ready 2 Yield® Soybeans, GENUITY
http://www.genuity.com/soybeans/Pages/Genuity-Roundup-Ready-2-Yield.aspx
(last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (“Roundup Ready 2 Yield soybeans have developed
more 3-, 4- and 5-bean pods per plant than the competition. . . . Studies show that
Roundup Ready 2 Yield soybeans develop greater root biomass, more nodes on the
main stem and larger shoot biomass than original Roundup Ready® soybean
products.”).
135. Sadfar Abbas, Genuity Roundup Ready 2 Yield Soybeans,
AGRIBUSINESS (June 16, 2013), http://www.agribusiness.com.pk/genuity-roundupready-2-yield-soybeans/ (“After four years on the market, more farmers than ever
are using [Genuity® Roundup Ready 2 Yield® soybeans] on their farms.”).
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hundred million acres by 2019.136 Monsanto’s next generation
offerings include Roundup Ready 2 Xtend, with dicamba and
glyphosate resistance, and VistiveGold, with oleic and
omega-3
oils.137
The technology does not come cheap. The annual bill for seed
technology alone is estimated to be $3.5 billion in R&D costs.138 An
argument may be made that if personal saving without selling were
allowed, the seed need only be bought once. This was the
arrangement envisioned by PVP protection. The overlay over utility
patent rights seals up that exception.
In 2013, Monsanto announced a partnership with Novozymes,
a biological company, to research and develop microbial-based
products designed to use bacteria and fungi to protect the crops from
weeds and pests.139 Novozymes already has a biological called
JumpStart containing a soil fungus that interacts with plant roots and

136. See Hawker, supra note 94, at 139-40 (“Monsanto has already placed its
RR2Y soybean in commercial production and the product enjoys expanding acreage
with each passing year.”); see also Monsanto’s Expanded Set of Innovations
Highlight Long-Term Opportunity and Continued Growth Outlook, MONSANTO
(Aug. 20, 2014), http://news.monsanto.com/press-release/corporate/monsantosexpanded-set-innovations-highlight-long-term-opportunity-and-conti.
137. MONSANTO, Q&A: PATENTS (n.d.), available at http://www.
soybeans.com/pdf/soybeans.com-qa.pdf. Monsanto has also entered into crosslicensing agreements with other seed partners such as Dow AgroSciences to offer
other RR2Y stacked products. See Press Release, Dow AgroSciences, Monsanto and
Dow AgroSciences Reach New Licensing Agreement on Roundup Ready 2 Yield®
Soybean Technology (June 2, 2010), available at http://www.dowagro.
com/newsroom/corporate/2010/20100602a.htm; see also Growth Through
Technology Leadership, DOW, http://www.dow.com/investors/reports/databook/
health_agricultural_services.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (noting the “bringing
together [of] Monsanto’s Roundup Ready 2® technology with LibertyLink®
herbicide tolerance”).
138. Brief for the American Seed Trade Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 17, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013)
(No. 11-796).
139. MONSANTO & NOVOZYMES, THE BIOAG ALLIANCE (n.d.), available at
http://www.novozymes.com/en/about-us/brochures/Documents/BioAg-Alliancefactsheet.pdf (“Microbial-based products are derived from naturally-occurring
microorganisms such as bacteria and fungi. They are normally applied to seeds
before planting, in-furrow or sprayed on crops, and they protect crops from pests
and diseases and enhance plant productivity and fertility. With faster development
cycles compared to other agricultural innovations, as well as broad geographic and
crop applicability, microbial solutions offer tremendous potential to deliver
sustainable, cost-effective solutions that can increase yield using less input.”).
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increases yield through improved nutrient intake.140 These biologicals
complement or replace chemical products and represent a growing
market segment worth $2.3 billion annually with double-digit growth
each year.141
Monsanto is also offering FieldScripts, a prescriptive-planting
system. FieldScripts uses soil and weather data from Climate
Corporation, a Silicon Valley startup Monsanto bought for $1 billion,
to predict which seed grows best in all twenty-five million fields in
America.142 The data is used to run machines by Precision Planting,
another Monsanto acquisition. The machines steer themselves using
global positioning system technology and plant fields with different
crop varieties at different depths and spacings, according to weather
conditions. Yields have increased 5% in just two years and added a
substantial amount to farmers’ incomes, “a feat no other single
intervention could match.”143 Others have attempted to follow suit.144
Monsanto’s rise reflects the technological revolution of
agriculture in America. The progress of science has displaced old
methods of commerce and reshuffled rights between actors and
different points of a new value chain. Monsanto is representative of a
breed of agrobiotech companies created by breakthroughs in gene
and crop science. Syngenta, Dow, and DuPont also sell seed to
farmers. These companies thrive on the thirst of farmers desiring
crops stacked with traits to yield more cash per bushel and more
crops per acre. Even critics of this revolution concede that those who
choose to eschew traited crops risk being swept aside by market
forces.145
140. Carey Gillam, Monsanto Deal with Novozymes Aims to Accelerate New
Crop Products, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=
USL1N0JP12U20131210.
141. MONSANTO & NOVOZYMES, supra note 139.
142. Digital Disruption on the Farm, ECONOMIST (May 24, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21602757-managers-most-traditionalindustries-distrust-promising-new-technology-digital (“By 2010 its database
contained 150 billion soil observations and 10 trillion weather-simulation points.”).
143. Id. (“The seed companies think providing more data to farmers could
increase America’s maize yield from 160 bushels an acre (10 tonnes a hectare) to
200 bushels—giving a terrific boost to growers’ meagre margins.”).
144. Id. (“Last November another seed producer, Du Pont Pioneer, linked up
with a farm-machinery maker, John Deere, to beam advice on seeds and fertilisers to
farmers in the field. A farm-supply co-operative, Land O’Lakes, bought Geosys, a
satellite-imaging company, in December 2013, to boost its farm-data business.”).
145. See Ghoshray, supra note 4, at 513 (“[T]o eschew GE seeds is almost
certainly illusory. Few farmers will be able to compete in the mass marketplace
without using the hardier, pesticide-resistant GE products.”).
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Farmers benefit through Monsanto’s win in less obvious ways.
The certainty of reward over the life cycle of their products and
potential for private and government antitrust enforcement may
encourage greater support from patent owners, which will be crucial
if farmers are to continue enjoying better seed varieties and access to
foreign export markets.146 The United States is the largest producer
and exporter of transgenic grain and crops.147 About 90% of U.S.
soybeans, cotton, and corn are transgenic.148 Grain traded globally
accounts for over forty-billion dollars in export revenue annually.149
Whole soybean exports to China alone are worth thirteen-billion
dollars150 and are expected to account for more than 90% of projected
growth in global soybean imports.151
All genetically modified crops require regulatory approvals
before they can be imported into key markets such as the European
Union and China.152 Monsanto has spearheaded Accord: The Generic
Event Marketability and Access Agreement, which “sets out the
rights and duties involved in commercializing patented single-gene
plant products and encourages patent holders to continue developing
and commercializing their technology while ensuring international
regulatory and stewardship responsibilities are maintained.”153
Adopting RR2Y may become crucial for farmers who seek to
export their crop overseas. As seeds go off-patent, patentees
rationally lose the incentive to maintain those stewardship
146. Lim, supra note 18, at 215 (noting that the patent system “encourages
them to participate in the innovation and commercialization of products containing
traits going off-patent. It also encourages licensing agreements without obliging
farmers to pay post-expiration royalties, as well as destroy or return seed after
licenses expire”).
147. AM. SEED TRADE ASS’N & BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., FACTSHEET 1
(2012), available at http://www.agaccord.org/include/facts.pdf.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Soy Stats 2014, U.S. Exports: Soy Exports by Customer, AM. SOYBEAN
ASS’N, http://soystats.com/u-s-exports-soy-exports-by-customersda/ (last visited
Apr. 13, 2015).
151. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OCE-2013-1, USDA AGRICULTURAL
PROJECTIONS TO 2022, at 31 (2013), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/
1013562/oce131.pdf.
152. Hawker, supra note 94, at 146 (“The failure to get approval overseas for
such crops can lead to significant trade disruption and resulting liability risks.”);
Lim, supra note 18, at 216 (“Transgenic grain exports thus require periodic
renewals. Approvals in the European Union expire after ten years, and those in
China expire after three.”).
153. See Lim, supra note 18, at 214.
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responsibilities. While Monsanto has committed to maintaining
regulatory approvals until 2021, farmers will have to switch to RR2Y
or another approved variety to reach export markets.154 In the long
run, it will not be in Monsanto’s interest to maintain a source of
generic competition, and it will not likely do so.
Transgenic crops clearly have their disadvantages. Prior to the
introduction of Roundup Ready, there were no glyphosate-resistant
weeds. By 2005, there were six species.155 The repeated use of
glyphosate has also exerted selection pressure on weeds, giving rise
to glyphosate-resistant “super weeds.”156 Farmers increase use of
other types of herbicides and heavy tillage in an attempt to combat
the problem.157 Similarly, caterpillars have also adapted to toxins
meant to kill them and were found feasting on Bt cotton crops.158
And there are other problems. The uptake of transgenic crops
like those covered by Roundup Ready patents lead to biodiversity
loss, contaminate organic sources, and cause socioeconomic
upheavals.159 In 2011, organic farmers sought a declaratory judgment
154. K. Sauer, Roundup Ready® Soybean Post-Patent Regulatory
Commitment Extended Through 2021, MONSANTO (July 8, 2010),
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/roundup-ready-soybean-post-patentcommitment-extended-through-2021.aspx.
155. CHRIS BOERBOOM & MICHEAL OWEN, FACTS ABOUT GLYPHOSATERESISTANT WEEDS 5 (2006), available at weedscience.missouri.edu/
publications/gwc-1.pdf.
156. See Micheal D.K. Owen & Ian A. Zelaya, Herbicide-Resistant Crops
and Weed Resistance to Herbicides, 61 PEST MGMT. SCI. 301, 301 (2005). “Super
weeds” were detected as early as 1996 in Australia. Woolsey, supra note 24
(“Research shows that the super weeds are seven to 11 times more resistant to
glyphosate than the standard susceptible population.”).
157. Eight Ways Monsanto Fails at Sustainable Agriculture, UNION
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/food_and_agriculture/our-failingfood-system/genetic-engineering/eight-ways-monsanto-fails.html (last visited Apr.
13, 2015); Allyson Martin, Seed Savers v. Monsanto: Farmers Need a Victory for
Wilting Biodiversity, 24 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 95, 146 (2013)
(“The need to manage glyphosate-resistance by using other herbicides alongside
Roundup also undermines another advertised benefit of Roundup—the ability to
control weeds with only one product.”).
158. Woolsey, supra note 24.
159. See Ghoshray, supra note 4, at 503-04 (“The fallout of this invention
has been well-documented through multiple instances of economic harm,
fundamental reshaping of choice and lifestyle changes for farmers and consumers,
irreversible loss of biodiversity, pervasive contamination within the environment,
and irreparable harm to ecology through pollution.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id.
at 504 (“[G]enetically engineered crops propagate pollution via transgenic pathways
by triggering widespread contamination as they alter and enhance gene flow from
genetically engineered crops to target organic entities and species.”). The loss of
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against Monsanto. They argued that Monsanto’s corn caused the loss
of biological diversity due to crop contamination by genetically
modified plants, the yet unknown toxic effects from the use of
glyphosate and Bt toxin produced by Monsanto’s corn.160 The
Federal Circuit found these concerns irrelevant to the narrow
question of patent infringement it was asked to decide.161
The modern history of patent law is speckled with instances
where courts have been asked to weigh extralegal questions of high
social policy in determining questions of patent eligible subject
matter and utility. Each time, the courts were content to focus the
patent law inquiry based on its mandate—to promote the “useful
Arts,” deferring to Congress to legislate on those other issues.162 As
Professor Jim Chen noted, patent protection has become a “surrogate
biodiversity has also been exacerbated by the consolidation of agro-biotech firms
and exclusive dealing restrictions. See Lim, supra note 18, at 149, 201-20
(discussing antitrust and patent misuse claims against Monsanto).
160. First Amended Complaint at 1-2, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n
v. Monsanto Co., No.11-cv-2163-NRB (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2011), available at http://
www.pubpat.org/assets/files/seed/OSGATA-v-Monsanto-Complaint.pdf; see also
William Neuman & Andrew Pollack, Farmers Cope with Roundup-Resistant Weeds,
N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/energyenvironment/04weed.html?; Aziz Aris & Samuel Leblanc, Maternal and Fetal
Exposure to Pesticides Associated to Genetically Modified Foods in Eastern
Townships of Quebec, Canada, 31 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 528, 528-33 (2011).
161. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Aside from the risk of suit by Monsanto, none of the alleged
harms caused by contamination is traceable to Monsanto’s enforcement of its
patents, they could not be remedied by a declaratory judgment, and they cannot
serve as a basis for jurisdiction in this case.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 901 (2014).
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 316-17 (1980) (“We are told that genetic research and related
technological developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may result in a
loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to depreciate the value of
human life. . . . The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for
resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination,
and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot. That process
involves the balancing of competing values and interests, which in our democratic
system is the business of elected representatives. Whatever their validity, the
contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to the political branches of the
Government, the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts.”); Juicy Whip,
Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Of course,
Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions unpatentable for a variety
of reasons, including deceptiveness. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (exempting from patent
protection inventions useful solely in connection with special nuclear material or
atomic weapons). Until such time as Congress does so, however, we find no basis in
section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility
simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of the public.”).
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for direct, meaningful engagement of uncomfortable environmental
issues in agriculture.”163 Patent law is not a one-size-fits-all legal
solution. It is a legal tool to promote innovation and should be left to
deal with what it does best. Once that piece is in place, we can
refocus on finding solutions that directly address the problem.164
One example is the concern over a dearth of competition and
innovation in the seed market.165 Commentators have traced this to
“high concentration, single-firm dominance, and strategic conduct
[that] forecloses rivals from the access to technology that is critical
for intra-platform competition.”166 Part III examines the “scope of the
patent” approach that courts have applied in condoning Monsanto’s
activities with scant scrutiny and explains why future cases must
undertake a more thorough effects-focused analysis of that same
conduct.
Separately, as Part II will show, the promise and peril of
genetically modified crop technology can cause courts to defer
excessively to patentees like Monsanto. Conversely, the courts may
be overprotective of consumers like farmers. Bowman opened the
floodgates to both types of mischief. They must be closed.
163. Chen, supra note 1, at 253.
164. One that has been seriously considered in recent years is turning bugs
into livestock. Insects are rich in protein and essential micronutrients. They need
much less space, emit lower levels of greenhouse gases, are drought resistant, and
yield more edible protein per unit of feed. Meal made from insects could also
replace soybeans fed to farm animals, lowering the cost of livestock products and
freeing up grains for human consumption. See Emily Anthes, Lovely Grub: Are
Insects the Future of Food?, MOSAIC (Oct. 14, 2014), http://mosaicscience.
com/story/eating-insects (noting that the key to selling the diet is to process,
disguise, and rebrand the bugs). For example, wax worms that live in beehives and
eat honeycombs taste “buttery” and “reminiscent of bacon.” They have been
rechristened “honey bugs” and “honeycomb caterpillars.” See id. (noting that food
preferences change, pointing to the fact that sushi was seen as a “strange foreign
dish that showcased raw fish” that “became not just acceptable but trendy in the
West”).
165. DIANA L. MOSS, AM. ANTITRUST INST., TRANSGENIC SEED P LATFORMS:
COMPETITION BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD P LACE? 11-12 (2009), available at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/AAI_Platforms%20and%20Trans
genic%20Seed_102320091053.pdf (“Intra-platform competition involves rivalry
within platforms whereby firms develop new transgenic seed products, in part, by
obtaining access to rivals’ patented traits.”).
166. Id. at 14; see also Joseph M. Purcell, Jr., Note, The “Essential
Facilities” Doctrine in the Sunlight: Stacking Patented Genetic Traits in
Agriculture, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1251, 1271 (2011) (“Given that the anti-stacking
provisions in Monsanto’s licenses had the clear effect of restricting competition in
stacked traits, it stands to reason that these licenses count as denial for the purposes
of essential facility analysis.”).
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II. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Early on, the Solicitor General had advised the Court not to
take the Bowman case, warning that it might have unintended
consequences.167 The Court took the case anyway but tried to confine
its holding as narrowly as possible. It noted that infringement might
not be found when the replication occurred outside of the purchaser’s
control or where replication was a necessary but incidental step in
using the item.168 The opinion also gave particular emphasis to
Bowman’s premeditated conduct, leading commentators to question
if the dicta could color the outcome in future cases.169
During oral arguments, the Supreme Court had also inquired
about the conditional sale doctrine.170 The government’s response
was that the Court need not rule on it because “[Quanta Computer,
Inc. v. LG Electronics., Inc.] largely decided the issue” and “the
Federal Circuit has not applied their previous version of the
[c]onditional [s]ale [d]octrine to enforce the post-sale restrictions
since this Court’s decision in [Quanta].”171 The Court ultimately
167. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at
18, Bowman v. Monsanto Co, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No. 11-796).
168. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769 (“Our holding today is limited—addressing
the situation before us, rather than every one involving a self-replicating product.”).
169. Kristen Salvaggio, Patent Law—First-Sale Doctrine Does Not
Extinguish Patentee’s Rights in Self-Replicating Organisms—Bowman v. Monsanto
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013), 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 451, 459 (2014) (“While not
requiring a showing of intent to prove patent infringement, the Supreme Court
hinted that intent may be an important factor when analyzing cases involving selfreplicating organisms and appeared strongly persuaded by Bowman’s apparent
intent . . . .”).
170. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-34, Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (No.
11-796), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/11-796-1j43.pdf (“There is this issue in the case where you disagree,
which is the Conditional Sale Doctrine. I am just wondering, before you finish up,
could you say a bit about whether that doctrine is causing trouble as it presently
exists in the Federal Circuit? In other words, could we just ignore that doctrine if we
wanted to, or is it a very problematic one that we should take this opportunity to do
something about?”).
171. Id. at 34 (“I think the Court does not need to do something about it in
this case. I think Quanta largely decided the issue, even though it didn’t say so
explicitly, and as far as I’m aware the Federal Circuit has not applied their previous
version of the Conditional Sale Doctrine to enforce the post-sale restrictions since
this Court’s decision in Quanta.”); see also id. at 47 (“[W]e agree with the
government that there’s no need for the Court to address the question of conditional
sales and the extent to which patent law recognizes under some circumstances
conditional sales because in this case the Federal Circuit did not address that ground
which we advocated and we still advocate . . . .”).
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declined to address it in its opinion. The Court’s silence will only
serve to embolden the use of restrictions to convert every sale into a
license.172 This is an unfair burden to users, who should be entitled to
use, sell, or otherwise dispose of the items they buy as they wish.173
Both of these issues should be addressed.
A. A Question of Inadvertence
The Court focused on Bowman’s knowledge and intent to show
how he could not have been an innocent infringer. It stressed that
“Bowman devised and executed a novel way to harvest crops from
Roundup Ready seeds without paying the usual premium.”174 Unlike
other farmers, he bought seeds from a grain elevator anticipating that
many would contain the Roundup Ready trait.175 Bowman’s spraying
of his field with glyphosate would be irrational unless he knew a
substantial percentage of soybeans had Roundup Ready traits. He
“culled any plants without the patented trait” and then harvested
Roundup Ready soybeans “at a chosen time; tended and treated
them, including by exploiting their patented glyphosateresistance.”176 The Court concluded that “it was Bowman, and not the
bean, who controlled the reproduction (unto the eighth generation) of
Monsanto’s patented invention.”177
The Court thus introduced inadvertence as a potentially
relevant factor in the analysis. To dispel any notion that this focus
was accidental, the Court went on to add that “[i]n another case, the
article’s self-replication might occur outside the purchaser’s control.
Or it might be a necessary but incidental step in using the item for
172. Stern, supra note 20, at 4 & n.5 (transferring of possession of a patented
product was a sale regardless of whether or not it was “accompanied by what
purported to be a license”).
173. Guo, supra note 19, at 211 (“It remains unclear to what extent a patent
owner can use a conditional license to impose restrictions on downstream purchasers
to avoid patent exhaustion or whether the Quanta opinion has affirmatively rejected
the view that one can contract around the doctrine.”); Lim, supra note 18, at 195
(“The Court’s express expunging of Mallinckrodt in Bowman v. Monsanto would
have been helpful in clarifying the law. More importantly, it would have provided a
critical avenue out for these farmers, whose rights must now be tested and defined
by further litigation.”).
174.
Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769.
175. Id. at 1763-64 (“Bowman conceded that he knew of no other farmer
who planted soybeans bought from a grain elevator.”).
176. Id. at 1769.
177. Id.
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another purpose. . . . We need not address here whether or how the
doctrine of patent exhaustion would apply in such circumstances.”178
Why did the Supreme Court focus on inadvertence? One
possibility is that it was anxious to reassure organic farmers and
others who find genetically modified crops on their land that they
would not be hauled into court to face an infringement suit. During
oral arguments, the Justices seemed most concerned about them.179
Another possibility is that it wanted to reassure the public that its
ruling would not “prevent farmers from making appropriate use of
the Roundup Ready seed they buy.”180
Transgenic crops spread by a variety of means. This includes
seed drift, animal droppings, and movement of humans and vehicles.
These could lead the trait to spread widely.181 Bowman results in a
risk asymmetry. While farmers remain liable for infringement
whether they desire the traited seeds or not, Monsanto appears to
bear no responsibility for harmful changes in soil and potentially
diminished yields.182 In 1998, organic corn processed into tortilla
178. Id.
179. Justice Kagan wondered about traited seeds contaminating organic crop
fields and schoolchildren growing soybean seeds for science projects being sued for
infringement. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 170, at 41 (“[S]eeds can be
blown onto a farmer’s farm by wind, and all of a sudden you have Roundup seeds
there and the person—farmer is infringing, or there’s a 10-year-old who wants to do
a science project of creating a soybean plant, and he goes to the supermarket and
gets an edamame, and it turns out that it’s Roundup seeds. . . . And, you know, these
Roundup seeds are everywhere, it seems to me. There’s, what, 90 percent of all the
seeds that are around? So it seems as though—like pretty much everybody is an
infringer at this point, aren’t they?”). Justice Scalia was worried about farmers
unintentionally growing contaminated seeds bought from grain elevators. Id. at 2728 (“[L]et me give you another horrible result, and that is if—if we agree with you,
farmers will not be able to do a second planting by simply getting the
undifferentiated seeds from—from a grain elevator because at least a few of those
seeds will always be patented seeds, and no farmer could ever plant anything from a
grain elevator, which means—I gather they use it for second plantings where the
risks are so high that it doesn’t pay to buy expensive seed. Now they can’t do that
anymore because there’s practically no grain elevator that doesn’t have at least one
patented seed in it.”).
180. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1768.
181. Bagley, supra note 130, at 689-90 (describing the spread of StarLink, a
Bt pest-resistant corn from 1% of Iowan cornfields to more than half of the fields
there in only a year, introducing traits that were approved only for animal
consumption into the processed food supply).
182. Carey Gillam, Roundup Herbicide Research Shows Plant, Soil
Problems, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Aug. 14, 2011, 3:32 PM),
http://www.mnn.com/your-home/organic-farming-gardening/stories/roundupherbicide-research-shows-plant-soil-problems (reporting that the use of glyphosate
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chips was rejected by the European Union and destroyed because it
had been contaminated by cross-pollination from a neighboring
field.183 The shipment was worth half a million dollars.184 In addition
to export bans, transgenic contamination results in market
restrictions, lower crop prices, and the loss of organic certification.185
Focusing on intent and control as elements of infringement
avoids or mitigates these consequences. However, there are at least
three problems with this focus. Shortly after Bowman was decided,
the Federal Circuit was presented with an appeal concerning
Monsanto. The reported decision highlights these three problems. In
Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., about
300,000 farmers, seed producers, and agricultural organizations
members sought a declaratory judgment against Monsanto.186 The
plaintiffs grew non-transgenic crops, often including certified
organic corn, soybeans, and canola.187 They had sought an express
waiver from Monsanto against inadvertent infringement.
Monsanto refused, pointing them to its website declaration
undertaking not to sue for inadvertent infringement based on trace
amounts of patented seed or traits.188 It maintained that it would be
economically irrational to sue for trace infringement since damages
would be minimal. The plaintiffs sued.
The first problem with focusing on inadvertence is that
infringement is a strict-liability tort. The Federal Circuit noted that
even one who “(replants) or sells even very small quantities of
patented transgenic seeds without authorization may infringe any
could be responsible for fungural root disease “that limit crop health and
production,” as well as “cancer, miscarriages and other health problems in people
and livestock”).
183. Richard A. Repp, Comment, Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for
Genetically Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 585,
591 (2000).
184. Id.
185. Presumably such harms can be remedied under tort law. See Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 222 (Wash. 1977) (finding substantial economic
loss for loss of organic certification).
186. Aisha Mahmood Haley, Note, The Blame the Beans Defense: Should
Organic Farmers Look to Patent Exhaustion and Misuse for Protection Against
Inadvertent Infringement?, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 372, 377 (2014).
187. Id.
188. Monsanto’s Commitment: Farmers and Patents, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/commitment-farmers-patents.aspx (last
visited Apr. 13, 2015) (“It has never been, nor will it be Monsanto policy to exercise
its patent rights where trace amounts of our patented seeds or traits are present in
farmer’s fields as a result of inadvertent means.”).
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patents covering those seeds.”189 Infringement would result “even
though that compound’s self-replicating properties might ‘place
potential infringers in the untenable position of never knowing
whether their product infringes because even a single undetectable
[molecule] would infringe.’”190 Intent may be relevant as a defense to
induced infringement when a defendant believes a patent is invalid,
but that is a separate issue.191
Second, the Court’s emphasis on intent and control makes the
basis for infringement unclear.192 While the Federal Circuit noted that
Bowman “leaves open the possibility that merely permitting
transgenic seeds inadvertently introduced into one’s land to grow
would not be an infringing use,” it also hedged its opinion, deciding
that it would “assume (without deciding) that using or selling
windblown seeds would infringe any patents covering those seeds,
regardless of whether the alleged infringer intended to benefit from
the patented technologies.”193 At least one commentator has noted
otherwise, arguing that Bowman emphasized the “importance of
affirmative action in negating patent exhaustion. An exhaustion
defense should thus still be available for a farmer who, unlike
Bowman, only incidentally grew a patented self-replicating
technology because of genetic drift and pollen blow over.”194
The problem is particularly acute when it concerns traits that do
not require overt action like Roundup Ready. Monsanto’s
glyphosate-resistant trait is valuable only when paired with

189. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 901 (2014).
190. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
191. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1368-69
(Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 752 (2014) (mem.). 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)
(2012) provides that “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.” See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced
Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 406 (2006)
(arguing that good faith belief in invalidity should negate intent).
192. Peavey, supra note 66, at 486 (“The Court’s focus on Bowman’s active
participation in selecting for Monsanto’s technology leaves ambiguous whether
Farmer X’s use should be considered different from Bowman’s, or if Farmer X’s
use, regardless of her passivity, would still entail making and thus infringing.”);
Haley, supra note 186, at 384 (“The emphasis on control suggests that it was the
crux of the issue—and, potentially, a new gatekeeper to the patent exhaustion
doctrine. In this rare situation in patent law, intent was relevant.”).
193. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1356.
194. Haley, supra note 186, at 385.
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glyphosate.195 Farmers using that trait must do so by spraying
glyphosate onto their crops, which makes it difficult for them to later
argue that they did not have knowledge or intent to infringe.
Bowman’s strategic use of grain elevator seeds for late-season
planting over eight years is an easy case to pin liability based on
intent and control.
It will be considerably more difficult to prove intent and
control where the patented technology fortifies the seed against
environmental agents such as drought or insects.196 The same might
be said for traits that increase yield, such as Monsanto’s own RR2Y.
Professor Christopher Holman has suggested that farmers caught
with patented seed could argue that they were trying to save money
by obtaining cheap seed and had no intention of planting patented
seed.197 Holman also suggests that farmers could argue that the
patentee’s own actions rendered infringement unavoidable by
encouraging widespread adoption of patented seed, “effectively
pushing the technology into local grain elevators.”198 Given that
seeds are not separated or marked by grain elevators, this could be a
commonplace occurrence.
Third, the wrinkle introduced by the Court’s dicta obfuscates
the fact that farmers continue to face the threat of suit. It is true that
Monsanto disclaimed any intent to sue inadvertent users or sellers of
seeds that are inadvertently contaminated with up to 1% of seeds
carrying Monsanto’s patented traits.199 This was probably intended to
cover U.S. Department of Agriculture-certified organic farm or
handling operations prohibited from using genetically modified

195. In theory, glyphosate can be used without a patented glyphosateresistant trait. However, given that this has not been done in a widespread fashion,
the issue is arguably academic.
196. Christopher M. Holman, How Real Is the Concern That Seed Patents
Will Turn Farmers into Inadvertent Infringers?, 33 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 165,
169 (2014).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 168; see also Food, Inc FAQs, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/food-inc/pages/faqs.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (“It
has never been, nor will it be, Monsanto policy to exercise its patent rights where
trace amounts of our patented traits are present in farmers’ fields as a result of
inadvertent means. We have no motivation to conduct business in this manner, nor
have we ever attempted to conduct business in this manner—and we surely would
not prevail in the courts if we did.”); Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v.
Monsanto, Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 901
(2014).
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seed.200 This was also ostensibly pegged to the 0.9% standard
allowed for imports into the European Union.201 It is true that the
Uniform Commercial Code could provide downstream purchasers
with a claim of derivative liability against the upstream seller, if not
excluded.202 It is also true that the Federal Circuit noted that
Monsanto’s declaration had an estoppel effect against it.203
However, the likelihood of transgenic contamination rising
above that 1% level is real given how farming works in practice.204
The disclaimer is also of limited value. As an initial matter,
Monsanto would not exclude the possibility of suing famers who had
no intent or control even if they did not use glyphosate.205 The panel
also noted “a substantial risk” that farmers “could be liable for
infringement if they harvested and replanted or sold contaminated
seed.”206 This was because “about one half of domestic cropland is
200. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1358 (“While the USDA has not
established an upper limit on the amount of trace contamination that is permissible,
the appellants argue, and Monsanto does not contest, that ‘trace amounts’ must mean
approximately one percent (the level permitted under various seed and product
certification standards).”).
201. Bagley, supra note 130, at 706.
202. See U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (“Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a
merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be
delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement or the
like but a buyer who furnishes specifications to the seller must hold the seller
harmless against any such claim which arises out of compliance with the
specifications.”).
203. See Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1358 (stating Monsanto’s
representations not to sue would have estoppel effect). For a view that such pledges
should be deemed enforceable under a reliance-based theory, see Jorge L. Contreras,
Patent Pledges 4 (Univ. of Utah Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 93, 2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2525947.
204. Brief for Farm & Ranch Freedom Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 9, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co.,
851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 1:11-cv-2163-NRB-RLE), available at
http://cdn.woodprairie.com/downloads/Amici%20Brief%20on%20Standing.pdf
(“Given the realities of farming . . . it is certain that at least some of the Plaintiff
farmers already have contamination that exceeds any of those levels.”).
205. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1359 (noting Monsanto was
noncommittal on “whether it would assert its patents against a conventional grower
who inadvertently uses or sells greater than trace amounts of modified seed, but
who, for example, does not make use of the Roundup Ready trait by spraying the
plants with glyphosate”). But see id. at 1356 (excluding farmers “whose crops
become accidentally contaminated, and who do not treat their fields with Roundup,
but who, knowing of the contamination, harvest and replant or sell the seeds”
expressly).
206. Id.
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sown with genetically modified crop varieties, and that some crops
are ninety percent sown with Monsanto’s genetically modified
seed.”207
Farmers who do not want to use Monsanto’s seed run the risk
of infringement simply by purchasing seeds from a third-party
source, and it may be impossible for unwilling users to prevent the
unauthorized “making” of patented seed given the widespread
commingling of seed containing the Roundup Ready trait.208 Even the
Federal Circuit seemed resigned to the fact that the risk of
infringement is inevitable.209
To protect inadvertent infringers, courts could rely on the fact
that the farmers did not benefit from the infringement.210 None of the
300,000 plaintiffs in Organic Seed Growers alleged that they had
more than 1% of contaminated crop or that they planned “to
selectively harvest and replant or sell contaminated seeds in a
manner favoring the reproduction of transgenic seeds. To the
contrary, the appellants are ‘using their best efforts to avoid’
contamination.”211
Courts might also cap remedies in view of inadvertent
infringement. In Monsanto v. Swann, the court awarded damages for
current planting, but refused to extend those damages to potential
future damages resulting from planting seed produced from the
current infringing incident.212 In Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, the court
207. Id. at 1357.
208. Id. (“Like any other seeds, transgenic seeds may contaminate nontransgenic crops through a variety of means, including seed drift or scatter,
crosspollination, and commingling via tainted equipment during harvest or postharvest activities, processing, transportation, and storage.” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. (“[D]espite stringent precautionary
measures meant to prevent any commingling of modified and conventional seed
crops, a large majority of conventional seed samples have become contaminated by
Monsanto’s Roundup resistance trait.”).
209. Id. (“The genetically modified seeds cannot easily be separated from
conventional seeds; thus, a grower who harvests and uses or sells contaminated
crops risks incurring infringement liability.”).
210. Salvaggio, supra note 169, at 460 (“For example, if Bowman had not
sprayed his late-season crop with a glyphosate-based herbicide, he would not have
utilized the benefit of the invention, thus leaving both parties in the same position
they would have been in if there had been no unauthorized use at all.”); see also
Peavey, supra note 66, at 485.
211. 718 F.3d at 1359 (citation omitted).
212. 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 944-46 (E.D. Mo. 2003); see also WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 23 (1997) (noting that the
jury, on finding that the defendant had not intentionally infringed, awarded only
20% of the damages sought by the patentee).
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only allowed injunctive relief and not monetary damages that were
based on speculative claims.213 Following from the Court’s decision
in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., courts are now more willing
to deny injunctive relief in appropriate cases, particularly where an
injunction would impose substantial hardship on the defendant or the
public interest.214
While the existence and extent of benefits may impact the
quantum of damages eventually awarded, the farmer remains liable
for infringement.215 Suits still cost farmers their legal fees and the
cost of removing the contamination from their fields, leaving them
without seed for the following years.216 Risk-averse farmers may end
up having to purchase a bundle of licenses to avoid inadvertent
liability for infringement from multiple patentees.217
States such as California have enacted legislation to protect its
citizens against infringement suits by trait owners. California’s Seed
Law exonerates farmers from contractual liability
based on the presence or possession of a patented genetically [modified]
plant on real property owned or occupied by the farmer when the farmer
did not knowingly buy or otherwise knowingly acquire the genetically
[modified] plant, the farmer acted in good faith and without knowledge of
the genetically engineered nature of the plant, and when the genetically
engineered plant is detected at a de minimis level.218

213. See 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 758 (N.D. Miss. 2001) (stating that
quantification of “other damages, including that resulting from previous and
potential future unlicensed brown bag sales of Monsanto’s patented Roundup
Ready® and Bollgard® technology, are far less easily determined and computed.
Equally difficult to discern are the resulting damages due to loss of consumer good
will, the effect on Monsanto’s efforts to control and steward its technology, and the
corresponding dampening effect on Monsanto’s research and development activities
in the agricultural arena” as well as finding that injunctive relief was appropriate
rather than monetary relief).
214. 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006).
215. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1356 (“[W]e will assume (without
deciding) that using or selling windblown seeds would infringe any patents covering
those seeds, regardless of whether the alleged infringer intended to benefit from the
patented technologies.”).
216. Jessica Lynd, Comment, Gone with the Wind: Why Even Utility Patents
Cannot Fence in Self-Replicating Technologies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 663, 679-80
(2013).
217. Id. at 680 (“[P]ermitting infringement suits even when the court does
not award damages creates a system through which the high risk of using
conventional seeds and being sued due to unintended pollen drift incentivizes
farmers to use GM seeds.”).
218. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 52305 (West 2009).
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Maine law has a variation that prohibits a claim for damages
from farmers found to have infringed based on de minimis amounts
of traited crop.219 However, commentators agree that such laws are
vulnerable to federal preemption.220 Less robust state laws stipulate
procedures patentees have to comply with in order to enter crop
fields to investigate or provide instructions to prevent crosscontamination.221
Any real solution must come from Congress. It could enact a
sector-specific legislative exemption based on the principle of de
minimis non curat lex to protect against trace infringement.
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Bowman noted, incidental uses
could be exempt, citing a legislative exemption for copyright
infringement for transitory copies made in the course of using a
computer.222
European Union law offers an interesting alternative, framing
the issue as one of statutory subject matter. European law confers
patent protection only where “the product [is] incorporated and in
which the genetic information is contained and performs its
function.”223 In Monsanto Tech, LLC v. Cefetra BV, Monsanto sued
importers of soymeal prepared from Roundup Ready soybeans.224
Since the patented trait was glyphosate resistance, the soymeal did
not enjoy patent protection.225 This would not have availed the
organic farmers who brought their grievance before the Federal

219. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 7, § 1053(1) (2009).
220. Heimes, supra note 36, at 150 (“To the extent mere possession of a
patented gene or sequence in the form of a living plant can constitute ‘use’ or
‘making’ of the patented material, and therefore infringement, these laws would be
preempted by federal law.”). The Biotechnology Industry Organization’s successful
challenge of Montana’s Bill with a provision similar to the Californian law on the
basis that the bill would “‘improperly restrict federal patent and plant variety
protection rights established by the U.S [sic] Constitution and federal intellectual
property law’ and would likely ‘be preempted by federal law.’” Id. at 120 (quoting
Hearing on H.B. 445 Before the H. Agriculture Comm., 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mont. 2009) (statement in opposition)).
221. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 52301(a), N.D. CENT. CODE § 424-13(2)(a) (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 38-1-45 (2002).
222. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013) (stating that
reproduction “might occur outside the purchaser’s control” or “might be a necessary
but incidental step in using the item for another purpose”).
223. Council Directive 98/44, art. 9, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 19 (EC).
224. Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech, LLC v. Cefetra BV, 2010 E.C.R. I06765.
225. See Bagley, supra note 130, at 707 (discussing the case).
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Circuit, but it does identify yet another bog of patent infringement
that awaits the unwary.
For now, however, the best farmers can do is not to plan their
commercial affairs assuming that the Federal Circuit’s decision
offers any safe haven. They should instead marshal their
considerable lobbying prowess and push for a legislative safe
harbor—and hope they are not worth Monsanto’s time.
B. The Conditional Sale Doctrine
Monsanto and other seed companies impose “bag-tag” licenses
on farmers, so called because of tags printed on each bag of seed
stating prohibitions, including the resale of seed or replanting of
saved seed.226 The district court in Bowman found that neither the
grain elevator nor farmers who sold their seeds to it could confer
these rights to Bowman since they did not have those rights
themselves.227 The Federal Circuit affirmed.228
This restricted or “conditional sale” doctrine sprang from the
Federal Circuit’s opinion in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., a
case decided at the height of patent expansionism.229 At issue was a
“single use” restriction on a patented medical nebulizer. The patentee
placed a notice of the restriction on the device as well as its
packaging. Hospitals paid the defendant to recondition used
226. Bruce Stutz, Companies Put Restrictions on Research into GM Crops,
ENVIRONMENT360 (May 13, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/companies_put_
restrictions_on_research_into_gm_crops/2273/ (“Farmers don’t simply buy a bag of
GM seed from Monsanto, Syngenta, or DuPont. Scientists found their research
ultimately subject to seed company approval. Instead, they enter into a
‘Technology/Stewardship Agreement’ with the company that developed it, the fine
print of which lays out, among other things, the terms under which the seed can be
used, where it can be grown, where it can be sold (many international governments
do not allow the sale of GM crops or products made with them), and the brand of
herbicides that can be used. This ‘bag-tag,’ as it’s known, also specifically restricts
any use of the seed for research.”).
227. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 839 (S.D. Ind. 2009)
(citing Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
228. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
229. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust:
Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 336 (2014)
(“From the 1980s through to early 2000s, the pendulum swung in the direction of
strong patent rights.”). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust Policy:
A Brief Historical Overview 4 (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 0531, 2005), available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=869417
(“[W]e once again live in an era of IP expansionism.”).
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nebulizers in violation of those restrictions.230 The district court held
that exhaustion applied, reasoning that allowing patentees to impose
conditions on patented articles post-sale would turn what was in
substance a sale into a license.231 The Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that parties were free to structure their dealings as long as it
was within the scope of the patent rights.232 Since a patent confers a
basket of rights to the patentee to sell, use, make, import, and offer to
sell the invention, patentees could also sell patented articles with
conditions.233
While unconditional sales give patentees “an amount equal to
the full value of the goods,” with conditional sales “it is more
reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects
only the value of the ‘use’ rights conferred by the patentee.”234 Any
anticompetitive effects extending beyond that scope would not be
prohibited as long as the restrictions did not violate antitrust law or
amount to patent misuse.235 Under Federal Circuit jurisprudence, only
an authorized, unconditional sale exhausts the patentee’s rights in the
item.236
The conditional sale doctrine has kept exhaustion at bay,
allowing patentees to sue downstream users who breached these
restrictions for infringement based on unauthorized uses of the item
sold.237 The quasi-sale model, upon which the conditional sale
doctrine rests, derives from the use of licenses to convey the right to
230. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 702.
231. Id. at 703 (“The court stated that policy considerations require that no
conditions be imposed on patented goods after their sale and that Mallinckrodt’s
restriction could not ‘convert what was in substance a sale into a license.’” (citation
omitted)).
232. Id. at 708-09 (finding post-sale restrictions such as field-of-use
restrictions enforceable by patent infringement if within the patent scope, and per se
unenforceable only in cases of price-fixing or tying).
233. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 529 (“One possible justification for the
single use only restriction rests on the observation that inherent in the patent grant is
the right to limit output. A patentee has the right to produce any amount of the
patented good it pleases, right down to zero. A single use restriction is in fact a type
of output reduction.” (footnote omitted)).
234. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
235. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708.
236. Id. at 706; see also Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753
(N.D. Miss. 2001) (“The exhaustion doctrine only applies where the sale or license
of the patented invention is an unconditional one.”). This was not the Federal
Circuit’s first attempt to restrict the scope of a patent defense. See Lim, supra note
229, at 333.
237. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708-09.
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use the software but not to reproduce it in contravention of licensing
terms.238
The seed-trait industry adopted this business model, creating a
chain of licenses from trait developers to propagators, distributors,
and farmers, all the while leaving that leash in the hands of the
patentee.239 Since a license historically also involves the return of the
good at the end of the license term, Monsanto cherry-picked the
convenient characteristics of licenses while protesting in its brief to
the Supreme Court that selling soybeans to farmers was “[t]he only
practical way to license the Roundup Ready® trait commercially.”240
In contrast with “more traditional technologies” where patentees can
license uses while transferring title, the seeds “delivering the
patented technology to licensees are fully consumed when used; they
cannot be leased or rented because Monsanto could not require
return of those articles upon completion of the licensed use.”241
Neither was a pure license appropriate, Monsanto asserted, because
traited beans are produced “only through propagation and crossbreeding of a seed that already contains the patented invention.”242
As a matter of economic theory, parceling out rights and
charging users based on the nature and extent of use is generally
efficient.243 Parties generally settle upon terms reflecting the value a
buyer places on the bundle of rights the seller is offering. However,
there are three problems with using the conditional sale doctrine to
achieve this.
The first problem is that the Federal Circuit misapplied
Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court last spoke on patent
238. Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting
Around Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93,
101 (2006) (“Owners of intellectual property now use licenses to transfer chattels
without transferring many presumed rights, including the right to transfer the chattel
to another, the right to possession and use without temporal limit . . . .”).
239. Winston, supra note 36, at 453 (“This broad range of control allows the
seed developer to maintain privity and to ensure that the title to the seed never
leaves the developer’s hands.”); see also Winston, supra note 238, at 103 (“The
impact of this circumvention on the public’s rights is startling. For example, by
licensing instead of selling seed, Monsanto can impose significant post-transfer
restrictions on the use of the seed, as it did in the McFarling case discussed above,
thereby completely vitiating the first sale doctrine.”).
240. Brief for Respondents, supra note 92, at 13, 35 n.21.
241. Id. at 46.
242. Id. at 47.
243. Kesan, supra note 102, at 1085 (“Differential pricing allows many more
transactions to clear in the marketplace than is the case if only unconditional sales
were allowed.”).
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exhaustion in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.244 The
patentee granted Intel a chip manufacturing license to its method
patents that unconditionally authorized Intel to sell the
microprocessors.245 Intel made microprocessors, which it sold to the
defendant manufacturer, Quanta, who in turn made computers using
Intel chips.246 The Court held Intel’s patents were exhausted with
respect to the chips despite the license expressly forbidding third
parties from practicing the patents by combining them with non-Intel
parts.247
Some commentators have characterized Quanta narrowly,
arguing that defter contract language would impose a post-sale
restriction on downstream purchasers.248 Had LG prohibited Intel
from making those sales, the process patents in suit would not have
been exhausted. However, at least two signs point in the opposite
direction.
The first indication comes from the exchange during oral
arguments in the Bowman case itself. When Justice Kagan invited
the government to speak to the conditional sale doctrine, the basis for
it declining to do so was that “Quanta largely [settled] the issue” and
“the Federal Circuit has not applied their previous version of the
Conditional Sale Doctrine to enforce the post-sale restrictions since
this Court’s decision in Quanta.”249 That is not quite correct, since
the Federal Circuit did rely on the conditional sale doctrine to find
patent infringement in Bowman.250 Monsanto’s counsel also declined
to address the issue, wisely preferring to focus liability simply on the
new “making” as the basis for infringement.251 However, the key
takeaway here is the government’s basis for not speaking on the
doctrine: Quanta had set the Federal Circuit right.
The second indication lies in the reasoning from the oft-cited
district court opinion in Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark
International, Inc.252 The district court in that case noted that “from
the beginning the Supreme Court has recognized a difference
244. 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
245. Id. at 623-24.
246. Id. at 624.
247. Id. at 637-38.
248. See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing
Law Jurisprudence: Its Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 237 (2009).
249. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 170, at 34.
250. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
251. See supra note 171.
252. See 615 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
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between end users of patented articles and licensees of the right to
make and/or sell those articles.”253 The basis for this distinction lay in
the fact that manufactures make and sell the item containing the
patentees’ technology and share its exclusive rights.254 In contrast,
end users obtain the right to use a patented article “‘in the ordinary
pursuits of life.’”255 They do not exercise any rights directly under the
Patent Act via a license from patentee. Thus, “when the machine
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits
of the monopoly. It passes outside of it, and is no longer under the
protection of the act of Congress.”256
At this point, the item becomes “private, individual property,
not protected by the laws of the United States, but by the laws of the
State in which it is situated.”257 The court concluded that “[t]he
Supreme Court’s broad statement of the law of patent exhaustion
simply cannot be squared with the position that the Quanta holding
is limited to its specific facts.”258 Commentators agree that the
conditional sale doctrine is no longer good law post-Quanta.259
253. Id. at 579, 582 (“In sum, the Supreme Court’s overview of its history of
statements on the law of patent exhaustion reveals that the Court has consistently
held that patent holders may not invoke patent law to enforce restrictions on the
post-sale use of their patented products. After the first authorized sale to a purchaser
who buys for use in the ordinary pursuits of life, a patent holder’s patent rights have
been exhausted.”); see also Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873)
(noting that while the right of licensee–manufacturers to make and sell the coffin
lids was restricted to the circle often miles around Boston, the right of their
customers to use the coffin lids was not).
254. Static Control Components, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 582 (“Language in
the Mitchell opinion, however, suggests the Court considered the restriction at issue
to be a condition limiting the right to sell, rather than a post-sale restriction on the
right of use. For example, the Court wrote that ‘the grantor under whom the
respondents claim never acquired the right to sell the machines and give their
purchasers the right to use the same . . . beyond the term of the original patent . . . .’
In this way, Mitchell is distinguishable from the Court’s other cases dealing with the
doctrine of patent exhaustion.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 550 (1872))); see also id. (“[In] General
Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., . . . the license from the patent
owner prohibited the manufacturer from making its initial sales of the patented
amplifiers to commercial users. Sales to commercial users were thus unauthorized
and did not result in patent exhaustion.” (citations omitted)).
255. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008)
(quoting Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852)).
256. Bloomer, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 549.
257. Id. at 550.
258. Static Control Components, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 586; see also
Samuel F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted Defendant: Should Parties Be
Able to Contract Around Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation?, 2014 U. ILL. J.L.
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An intermediary manufacturer licensee remains liable for both
contractual remedies for breaching the terms of the license and
patent remedies since a license is nothing more than a covenant not
to sue.260 In General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.,
the case the Federal Circuit used as the basis for its conditional sale
doctrine, the Supreme Court was presented with a license to make a
sound system subject to a post-sale field-of-use restriction for
noncommercial use.261 It did not concern the sale of a patented item.
The licensee sold the finished product without restriction in violation
of the license agreement. Since the first sale of a completed good in
the transaction was not “authorized” by the patentee, exhaustion did
not apply.
As between two corporate entities, the manufacturer and patent
owner are better placed to bear the burden of allocating risks and
determining a market-clearing price.262 It may also be asked why
TECH. & POL’Y 445, 448 (“[I]n the years since the Quanta decision, the lower courts
have generally adopted the broader reading of Quanta.”).
259. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 528 (“The Federal Circuit’s now
overruled Mallinckrodt decision had departed from Supreme Court precedent by
permitting a patentee to enforce a post-sale restraint on some patented articles by
distinguishing unconditional from conditional sales.”); Thomas G. Hungar,
Observations Regarding the Supreme Court’s Decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v.
LG Electronics., Inc., 49 IDEA 517, 532-33 (2009); Sheff, supra note 95, at 234; Li,
supra note 19, at 205 (“While the Federal Circuit’s conditional sale doctrine
provides broad protection to the patent owner by allowing post-sale restrictions to
prevent exhaustion of the patent owner’s rights, the Supreme Court appears to reject
the conditional sale doctrine in Quanta by providing downstream purchasers, not
patent owners, with more protection under the patent laws.”); Heimes, supra note
36, at 118 (“Since the Scruggs case was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court broadened
the patent exhaustion doctrine in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,
reversing the Federal Circuit’s narrow application of the [exhaustion] doctrine.”
(footnote omitted)).
260. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 522 (“When the patentee sells an
unfinished article that requires application of the patentee’s method patents in order
to make that particular copy of the article useable or marketable the first sale
doctrine also applies. Further, both the technology embodied in the article and the
process patents needed to finish it are exhausted as to that copy.”); see also id. at
521 (“By contrast, when the patentee licenses production rights to someone else
there is no inherent limit on the number of patented articles that the licensee can
make or what their disposition will be. That means that post-transfer conditions are
essential and generally enforceable, including by means of infringement actions,
unless they are anticompetitive or in violation of patent policy.”).
261. 304 U.S. 175, 176-77 (1938).
262. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 524 (“A pure manufacturing license
without a post-contract restriction would place no limit on the licensee’s ability to
produce as much as it wished and sell wherever and to whomever it pleased.”).
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contractual remedies against distributors would be insufficient to
make aggrieved patentees whole. It may be that agreements between
them require careful drafting to better allocate risks, but that burden
should not be placed on consumers who live under the threat of a
patent infringement suit.
District courts have chafed at being forced to apply the
conditional sale doctrine.263 As one noted:
Quanta itself reaffirms the Supreme Court’s articulation of the doctrine of
patent exhaustion as set forth in the cases discussed in the previous
section. It represents a change in the law, however, because the Court
reasserted a broad understanding of patent exhaustion in the face of
Federal Circuit case law that had narrowed the scope of the doctrine. That
Federal Circuit case law had been followed as binding precedent by the
district courts, including this one.264

The second problem with the Federal Circuit’s conditional sale
doctrine is that it over rewards patentees. Exhaustion is a doctrinal
safety valve to prevent extension of the patent right beyond the first
sale.265 Under the conditional sale doctrine, unauthorized uses of the
article sold would itself be patent infringement as long as the patent
was in force, giving patentees an end-run around exhaustion.266
Licensing models more commonly found in software and ecommerce should only be applied to tangible goods with
considerable caution. Consumers in the online world show a
263. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, No. 3:00CV-161-P-D, 2009 WL 536833, at
*2 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 3, 2009) (“[T]he Court is fully cognizant of the wealth of
persuasive authority which posits the opposite conclusion, e.g. that Quanta’s
holding on the doctrine of patent exhaustion is a substantial limitation on the rights
of patent holders.”).
264. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d
575, 582-83 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
265. Garmezy, supra note 126, at 198 (noting that patent exhaustion “works
to counterbalance the patentee’s monopoly power and prevent anticompetitive
abuse”).
266. See Eric J. Rogers, The Inexhaustible Right to Exclude Reproduction
Doctrine, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 389, 406 (2013) (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s
reasoning in Mallinckrodt allows patentees to use contracts to prevent patent
exhaustion via terms defining an authorized sale and enforce post-sale restrictions
using patent infringement actions.”); Garmezy, supra note 126, at 198 (“The Federal
Circuit, however, has developed an opposing doctrine, the conditional sale doctrine,
under which a patentee may use an enforceable contract to restrict the rights of a
buyer using a patented article, even after a subsequent sale.”); Ghoshray, supra note
4, at 506 (“Implicit in the Bowman scenario, then, is Monsanto’s quest for an
assurance that would seem to go against this basic principle, as it attempts to apply
the conditional sale exception to the future sale of its patented seed technology in
perpetuity.”).
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preference for acquiring subscriptions for streaming services. Zip
cars and bike share schemes are also increasingly popular. However,
in all these instances, consumers are clearly licensing only the rights
to use the items and have not acquired ownership rights over them.
Once consumers stop paying subscription fees, access ceases.
Seeds sold by Monsanto and its authorized seed partners are
physically transferred without an expectation for their return. The
Quanta Court found patents over methods and processes exhausted
upon an authorized sale. With seeds that contain patented traits, the
argument that patent exhaustion should apply to resale and uses of
the seeds that fall short of replication is even more compelling than
for methods or processes. If the price tag on the seed indeed
inadequately reflects the cost of the bundle of rights farmers obtain
as a result, the burden should rest on Monsanto, as the price-setter, to
justify that it deserves more.267 If patentees can reach deep into the
tributaries of downstream commerce, they can sue any number of
downstream buyers who used the item in a manner contrary to the
conditions placed upon the sale for the duration of the patent.268
Watering down exhaustion to safeguard specific uses from
exhaustion results in a regime that is both arbitrary and unfair.269
More recently, the Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. unequivocally noted the “absurd result” that would exist
if a copyright owner could exercise downstream control even when it
authorized the first sale.270 Giving patentees the ability to meter
downstream uses under the threat of infringement goes against the
expectation that buyers own the rights to use the invention as long as
267. Heimes, supra note 36, at 132 (“A patent on a genetically modified
plant is commonly a composition of matter patent, the embodiment of which is
typically in an article or tangible thing (seed) and thus even more likely to fall under
exhaustion principles upon sale than something more ephemeral like methods or
processes.”).
268. 2 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW
§ 17:4 (2015) (labelling as “problematic” the Federal Circuit’s “rationale that since
the patentee had imposed express license restrictions on authorized sales of its
patented seeds, an ‘unrestricted sale’ for purposes of the exhaustion doctrine had not
occurred”).
269. Heimes, supra note 36, at 132 (“They must as well accept the
consequences, which include being subject to the exhaustion doctrine. Arguments
that innovation in plant technologies will be stifled if their self-replicating nature is
not given special status for exhaustion purposes are not likely to carry the day with
this Court. The Quanta Computer opinion reflects the Court’s skepticism of creating
exhaustion-free categories for patent protection, as they invite clever claims drafting
in an attempt to ‘end run’ around the doctrine.” (footnote omitted)).
270. 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1366 (2013).
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it does not impinge on recoupment in the owner’s primary market.
Patentees should turn to upstream sellers for redress.
Third, by turning every sale into a license, the conditional sale
doctrine impedes the formation of a secondary market for seeds sold
by Monsanto or its seed partners.271 The U.S. District Court in the
Northern District of Mississippi noted that the defendants would
secure “an unfair advantage over all growers who have acted in good
faith in compliance with their licenses” if a “‘black market’” for crop
seed were “allowed to exist and to thrive.”272 It concluded that “to
have patented technology pirated” would “discourage future
investment in innovative technology” and “is not in the public’s best
interest.”273 Another court analogized a farmer to a “car-lessor crying
foul upon discovering he cannot retain the car after his lease
expires.”274
These are remarkable statements. Not all uses that derogate
from restrictions patentees placed on users are illegitimate. Farmers
with the audacity to grow new seed will face the sting of patent
infringement. In other instances, patentees who authorized the initial
sale have been rewarded and cannot control subsequent uses.275 It is
the “ability of buyers to transact in patented articles without fear of
patent infringement liability” that “encourages vibrant downstream
market competition.”276
Allowing patentees to control downstream users would erode
the property rights in the purchased goods and raise the risk of

271. See Mark R. Patterson, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Patent
Infringement Through Field-of-Use Licensing, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 204
(2007) (“Part of the problem here may stem from the Federal Circuit’s failure to
distinguish between contracts and licenses.”).
272. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 760 (N.D. Miss. 2001).
273. Id. at 760-61.
274. Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 942 (E.D. Mo. 2003)
(“They are not in the position of new-car purchaser obliged to purchase a new car
every year. Rather, they are in the position of a car-lessor crying foul upon
discovering he cannot retain the car after his lease expires.”).
275. Elsewhere, I have suggested a framework for delineating unauthorized
“making” from authorized “uses.” In essence, it should fulfill a public notice
function by being sufficiently clear and certain for patentees and others. Second, it
should protect the patentee’s monopoly while not stifling reasonable competition by
taking into account customary expectations. Third, the actor or factor allegedly
creating the new article is irrelevant. Also irrelevant is how the defendant views or
markets its products. What is relevant is the relative life expectancies of the patented
and unpatented portions of the article. See Lim, supra note 18, at 170.
276. Id. at 168.
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infringement to an intolerable level.277 It can be difficult for
consumers to determine whether the item was obtained as a result of
a license or sale and that the attendant rights of the original buyer
accrue to the user.278 According to Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, the
conditional sale doctrine is “excessive given the self-deterring nature
of harmful reuse restrictions and the alternative explanations for at
least some of them.”279 It could also lead to “a significant problem of
hold-up.”280
This hold-up could occur because patentees can sue
downstream users with sunk investments for patent infringement on
any number of activities that would have otherwise been allowed by
patent exhaustion. As it is, suits against customers have been on the
rise.281 While cases thus far have either required notice to be given or
observed that notice was in fact given, in theory “innocent
subsequent purchasers could be sued for patent infringement for
violating conditions they knew nothing about.”282 The restraints also
harm competition by reducing output, increasing prices, and
excluding rivals from the market.283

277. Winston, supra note 238, at 108-09 (“As private legislation seeks to
circumvent established case law on the restraints available after the first sale of an
article that benefits from the protection given to patents, the balance between public
rights and owners’ rights tilts in favor of the owners and away from the public.”);
Lim, supra note 18, at 167-68 (“If patent owners like Monsanto could control every
use, sale or making of the seeds in the marketplace, the property rights of endconsumers such as farmers would be eroded, and intermediate service providers
such as seed cleaners and grain elevators could become contributory infringers.”).
278. Winston, supra note 238, at 121.
279. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 531 (“A patentee could certainly warn
against reuse, but it could not restrain reuse by means of a patent infringement
suit.”).
280. Id. at 542.
281. Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law’s Customer
Suit Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1606-15 (2013).
282. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 542; see also Love & Yoon, supra note
281, at 1606-15; Winston, supra note 238, at 121-28 (suggesting five factors to
make that determination: (1) the terms of the contract; (2) the nature of the right and
its commercial embodiment; (3) the price structure and time of transfer; (4) IP
owners’ policies or marketing program; (5) economic realities).
283. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 493 (“The principal harms that can result
from post-sale conditions are restraints on competition and restraints on innovation.
Restraints on competition occur when a practice reduces output, increases prices, or
unreasonably excludes firms from a market. Restraints on innovation occur when a
practice acts to hinder rather than to promote innovation, typically by imposing
limitations on the innovations of others.”).
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Hence, one may conclude that the law on patent exhaustion
provides that an authorized sale extinguishes all rights to that item.284
In the context of Bowman, the farmer had bought the seeds from a
grain elevator. The seeds should have been sold clear of any title or
lien to Monsanto. Patent exhaustion would allow Bowman to sell the
seeds, even for third-party replanting, without fear of infringement
inasmuch as he could have used it for feed or resold the seeds.285
Patent orthodoxy would hold that in that case, the third-party
would be liable only when the progeny seeds bearing the transgenic
traits were created, and Bowman would be guilty of inducing that
third-party’s infringement, assuming the required elements were
made out.286 It is the emergence of the progeny seed bearing the
patented trait to which infringement attaches, not the use of the seed
bought from the grain elevator to create new seed that is infringing.
However, Bowman should not be guilty of direct infringement
simply for making the sale in breach of the licensing terms.
Similarly, end users may be liable for “making” a new item
because patent liability arises from the unauthorized new creation
and not because of an unauthorized use of the item to effect that
creation. End users remain outside the reach of patent remedies for
breaches falling short of that. As Hovenkamp noted, “[i]f the original
purchaser breached an agreement to provide notice to downstream
purchasers, then the appropriate remedy would be a breach of
contract action against the first purchaser.”287
284. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
285. See Ghoshray, supra note 4, at 506 (“Under the traditional patent
exhaustion principle, upon the consummation of the sale from the third party to
Bowman, the patent holder Monsanto would not be conferred any residual control
over the use of those seeds, including their subsequent distribution.”).
286. In McFarling, the Federal Circuit actually endorsed the view that
infringement runs from the moment of new creation, not the use of the item against
contractual restrictions. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1342-43
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Based on the record before us, McFarling plants and grows the
first-generation seed in an identical fashion whether he intends to sell the secondgeneration seed as a commercial crop for consumption or whether he intends to
replant it. Thus, the Technology Agreement does not impose a restriction on the use
of the product purchased under license but rather imposes a restriction on the use of
the goods made by the licensed product.”); see also Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v.
SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) (setting out the requirements for inducement).
287. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 520; see also Static Control Components,
Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 586-87 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“This is
not to say, however, that state contract law may not be invoked. In the Order at
Record 1008, this Court addressed Static Control’s argument that, regarding Prebate,
Lexmark could not show any meeting of the minds as required by Kentucky contract
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A recent Federal Circuit case expressed a more moderate view.
In LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC, the court
stated that the “basic principle” underlying exhaustion is that “the
authorized transfer of ownership in a product embodying a patent
carries with it the right to engage in that product’s contemplated
use.”288 Absent were references to the requirement of the sale being
unconditional and even the requirement of a sale. Rather than be
bound by formalistic line drawing delineating sales and licenses, the
court held that exhaustion was triggered when the transferee acquired
title to the patented item, even if the transaction fell short of a sale.289
Neither was the adequacy of the patentee’s reward a necessary
condition to triggering exhaustion. To do so “‘would cast a cloud of
uncertainty’ over every transaction and every patented product.”290
Instead, the court expressed concern that “barring the use of the
meter with strips manufactured by the accused infringer would bar
the use of the meters for their contemplated function and extend the
patent monopoly improperly.”291 What was material was that the

law, and, therefore, Prebate terms could not constitute valid, enforceable contracts
between Lexmark and it customers.” (citation omitted)); Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. 617
(No. 06-937) (“Restrictions on downstream use or resale may arise as a matter of
state contract law, but not patent law . . . . .”); id. at 7 (“The doctrine bars the use of
patent law (but not contract law) to enforce restrictions on a purchaser’s use or
resale of a patented article that was purchased from the patentee or from someone
authorized by the patentee to sell the article.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 52122 (“Under the first sale doctrine, when a finished patented article is sold to the first
purchaser the patentee’s interests in that copy of the article are at an end; any
limitations on further disposition of the article are governed by contract law and
state public policy concerning restraints on alienation.”).
288. 734 F.3d 1361, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The perimeters of
“contemplated use” are bounded by the contractual language on permissible uses as
well federal preemption by the patent laws.
289. Id. at 1374 (“Thus, despite frequent references to ‘sales’ and
‘purchasers,’ the Court has more fundamentally described exhaustion as occurring
when the patented product ‘passes to the hands’ of a transferee and when he ‘legally
acquires a title’ to it. . . . Each of these formulations is broad enough to include a
transfer of title that does not amount to a sale.”).
290. Id. at 1377 (quoting Tessera, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 646 F.3d
1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that patent exhaustion applied even though the
seller failed to pay promised royalties to the patentee)); see also Static Control
Components, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 586 (“[T]his Court is now persuaded that,
regardless of the fact that Lexmark may not have received the full value of its
Prebate cartridges, after Quanta Lexmark may not invoke patent law in order to
enforce its Prebate terms.”).
291. LifeScan Scotland, Ltd., 734 F.3d at 1373.
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items sold were constructed with the patentee’s permission.292 To
hold otherwise “would be inconsistent with the doctrine’s underlying
rationale—to permit the owner of an item who received it in an
authorized transfer to use it.”293 While LifeScan did not address the
conditional sale doctrine directly, it creates a rift in the court’s
jurisprudence on licensing restrictions. This rift should be properly
addressed in a future case either by the Federal Circuit sitting en
banc or by the Supreme Court.
Restoring the full scope of exhaustion is an important step to
circumscribe overreaching by patentees. At the same time,
Hovenkamp pointed out that exhaustion had a key disadvantage:
“[O]nce such a sale is found enforcement of the post-sale restraint is
denied automatically, with no consideration of the restraint’s purpose
or effect. This means that market power, competitive effects and
implications for innovation are all irrelevant.”294 Here, he notes that
antitrust law and patent misuse are more finely calibrated
instruments better suited to the task.295
III. EXHAUSTION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENT MISUSE
In addition to patent exhaustion, Monsanto has been involved
in cases where allegations of patent misuse or antitrust violations
have been raised.296 Even though courts recite that patents “do not
292. Id. at 1374-75 (“A ‘sale’ limitation would indeed be inconsistent with
the Supreme Court’s decision in McQuewan, where the particular machines at issue
had never been sold, but had instead been manufactured by the accused infringer
with the permission of the patentee. Yet that lack of a ‘sale’ was no barrier to the
application of patent exhaustion. Because the machines had been constructed with
the patentee’s authorization and were the ‘private, individual property’ of the
accused infringer, they were ‘no longer under the protection of’ the Patent Act.”
(citations omitted)).
293. Id. at 1375.
294. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 541.
295. Id. at 531 (“Rule of reason analysis under the antitrust laws or perhaps
patent misuse doctrine seems more appropriate to the task.”).
296. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)
(discussing how a distributor of agricultural herbicides brought antitrust suit against
the manufacturer alleging Monsanto conspired with other distributors to fix resale
prices and terminated plaintiff for price-cutting); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d
1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing a farmer accusing Monsanto of misuse and
antitrust violations through its “seed grower incentive programs, its seed partner
license agreements, its grower license agreements, and its alleged refusal to sell
Roundup Ready® cotton seeds without the Bollgard trait”); Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing a farmer accusing
Monsanto of misuse and antitrust violations by refusing to allow the “untying” of
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confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws,”297 challenges against
Monsanto have fared dismally. Courts rejected antitrust accusations
on the basis of the “scope of the patent” approach unless there was a
per se violation, which only happened once.298 Misuse allegations
fared even worse. No court applying the “scope of the patent” test
has found Monsanto guilty of misuse.299
Like the law on patent exhaustion, the law on patent misuse has
been misapplied by the Federal Circuit. According to the Federal
Circuit, for misuse to be found, the patentee had to have broadened
“‘the scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.’”300 In
doing so, the Federal Circuit imported antitrust law’s requirement of
anticompetitive effects into misuse and reformulated it as an
“antitrust-lite” doctrine, despite Supreme Court precedent expressly
rejecting an antitrust basis for misuse and turning instead to patent
policy for that basis.301
“the seed and the trait by permitting the farmer to save and replant ROUNDUP
READY® seed each year, provided the farmer still pays directly to Monsanto the
required technology fee, rather than requiring a farmer to purchase both the seed and
the genetic technology together at the beginning of each growing season”).
297. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964)
(“The patent laws . . . are in pari materia with the antitrust laws and modify them
pro tanto.”).
298. Based on a Westlaw search of all reported cases where Monsanto was
named as a party in an antitrust suit. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. E.I. Dupont De
Nemours & Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1143-44 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (rejecting
Monsanto’s justification that it was “simply exercising its rights under its patent
grant,” noting instead that “[w]hile a patent holder enjoys certain statutory rights,
those rights are not unbounded,” and that conspiring with rivals to fix prices can
result in an antitrust violation).
299. A Lexis opinion search was conducted in the Lexis Federal Court
Cases, Combined database: “patent misuse” or patent w/3 misuse and date (geq
(1/1/1953) and leq (12/31/2013)) and parsed for cases where Monsanto was a named
party.
300. McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1341 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc.,
157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Only where the conduct exceeded that scope
would conduct be judged under per se rules or the rule of reason for categories of
conduct mirroring antitrust law.
301. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (“But
the public policy which includes inventions within the granted monopoly excludes
from it all that is not embraced in the invention. It equally forbids the use of the
patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent
Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.”), abrogated on other
grounds by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); see also
Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 493 (“The competitive rationale for the ‘misuse’
doctrine has never been articulated properly in the courts, except for attempts to
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The Federal Circuit’s proviso that “[i]n the cases in which the
restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, the patent misuse
defense can never succeed”302 meant that the test, while appearing to
be a hybrid test, essentially still adopted the “scope of the patent”
approach. The Federal Circuit affirmed the approach in subsequent
cases.303 Anticompetitive effects that result, whether in the context of
an allegation of misuse or antitrust, are excused as being within their
scope of the rights.
A. A Primer on Antitrust and Patent Misuse
Professor John Duffy noted that “[t]he patent system can best
be understood in reference to the theories and policies undergirding
property, competition, and natural monopoly regulation.”304
Exhaustion, antitrust law, and misuse overlap like three circles in a
Venn diagram.305 Screwdrivers can be used to hammer or pry if
necessary, but other tools are better suited for the task. It follows that
exhaustion should be used as part of a legal toolbox.
The antitrust and patent laws both seek to correct market
failure: antitrust law by restraining anticompetitive harm and patent

identify it with antitrust policy or to identify the harm as an improper ‘extension’ of
an IP right.”).
302. McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1341; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP
AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW § 3.2c (2d ed. Supp. 2011 & 2012) (noting that with this statement in
“Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, the Federal Circuit elevated the broadening rationale
to a bright-line rule” (citation omitted)).
303. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(“[P]atent misuse covers only activity falling outside of the patent grant, and
Scruggs did not point to any activity falling outside Monsanto’s patent.”); see also,
e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (describing
Monsanto’s licensing restrictions as its “prerogative”); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs.
Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (concluding
that an antitrust claim “does nothing to limit the right of the patentee to refuse to sell
or license in markets within the scope of the statutory patent grant”); Va. Panel
Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[B]ecause we
determine that the conduct underlying the allegations of misuse does not amount to
patent misuse, the same conduct cannot support a judgment that [the
patentee’s/licensor’s] conduct violated the Sherman Act.”).
304. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 510 (2004).
305. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 493 (“While these three doctrines—first
sale, antitrust, and misuse—originated at different times and addressed different
issues, they largely merged during the first half of the twentieth century.”).
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law by ensuring sufficient returns to inventors.306 Yet, post-sale
restraints or litigation to prevent resale in the absence of those
restraints can give rise to all three.307 As discussed in Part II,
exhaustion seeks to sever the bonds that would otherwise encumber
end users downstream and overcompensate patentees beyond the
revenue earned from their first sale.308

306. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A
Reexamination, OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 8), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486633 (“Antitrust Law’s
principal purpose is to correct market failures brought about by lack of competition
or to discipline activities that seek to limit it. The patent system is intended to
correct market failures that result when inventors cannot effectively appropriate the
returns to their inventions.”).
307. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638
(2008) (holding an infringement suit defeated because patentee’s method patents
exhausted by first sale); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942)
(holding that resale price maintenance was barred by authorized first sale of item
that sufficiently embodies patents); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No.
08cv1829 WQH (LSP), 2009 WL 684835, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009) (stating
that the defendant sought declaratory judgment of patent misuse from violation of
the patent exhaustion doctrine by seeking royalties on wireless communication
devices).
308. Ernst, supra note 258, at 479 (noting that patent exhaustion is
concerned about “innovation because it limits the right of exclusion from being
passed down the chain of production and distribution. To the extent the right of
exclusion spreads through the chain of production to prohibit parties who are remote
from the patent holder from using a licensed product, it can inhibit such third parties
from innovating by combining the licensed product with their own innovations”).
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Antitrust law is primarily concerned with protecting consumer
welfare from anticompetitive acts or agreements between entities
with appreciable market power by maintaining the robustness of
market competition.309 Antitrust policy believes consumers profit
from economic growth and are hurt by restrictions that exclude rivals
without providing offsetting benefits.310 It looks at the world through
the lens of price theory and seeks direct or circumstantial evidence of
anticompetitive harm that reduces consumer welfare.311 Antitrust law
therefore seeks to expand output, increase quality and variety, and
309. Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir.
2010) (“[C]onsumer welfare, understood in the sense of allocative efficiency, is the
animating concern of the Sherman Act.”).
310. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Consumer Welfare in Competition
and Intellectual Property Law, 9 Competition Pol’y Int’l 53 (2014).
311. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 116 (1978) (noting that antitrust is based on price theory, which “assures us
that economic behavior . . . is primarily directed toward the maximization of
profits”).
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reduce costs.312 Allowing patentees to control prices in goods sold
could result in allocative inefficiency. In contrast to patent law,
which proactively encourages promoting innovation through the
conferment of exclusive rights, antitrust law does not goad patent
owners to promote competition, only to refrain from injuring it.313
While antitrust law explicitly invites courts to consider the
effects of firm conduct, the Patent Act is silent about requiring courts
to do the same with patentees.314 Patent policy stems from the belief
that consumers benefit from a well-functioning patent system that
promotes innovation. It is primarily concerned about the generation
of new ideas, and fostering competition is a beneficial side effect of
that.315 It “reflects a [careful] balance between the need to encourage
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition
without any concomitant” technological advancement.316 Thus, the
right balance is to narrowly construe patent rights: “Since patents are
privileges restrictive of a free economy, the rights which Congress
has attached to them must be strictly construed so as not to derogate
from the general law beyond the necessary requirements of the
patent statute.”317
Other aspects of patent law also reflect this quid pro quo.
Patents must be novel, nonobvious, and adequately disclosed; are
limited to specific forms of subject matter; and must be useful.318 The
patent system rewards the first inventor to file, and the patent term is
generally limited to twenty years from the effective filing date. It

312. See Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 14).
313. I am grateful to Professor Mike Jacobs for this insight.
314. For one view on this, see Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at
32) (“To say this more bluntly, the only time patent law pays much attention to
markets is when the law incorporates antitrust principles.”).
315. Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475,
499 (2011) (“IP law’s role as the engine of innovation also gives it an independent
interest in enhancing competition. Competitive conditions affect a firm’s incentives
and ability to enter the market with new and innovative products.”).
316. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (“[A] patent owner may not take the property right granted by a patent and
use it to extend his power in the marketplace improperly, i.e. beyond the limits of
what Congress intended to give in the patent laws.”); see also Bohannan, supra note
315, at 479 (noting that the Federal Circuit’s reformulation “undervalues the fact
that the roots of misuse doctrine lie in IP policy, not in antitrust policy, and IP policy
has its own reasons for limiting overreaching in IP”).
317. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942).
318. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112 (2012).
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incentivizes early and complete disclosure, and it moves the
technology into the public domain.319
Patent misuse is a defense that shields defendants from
patentees who attempt to run roughshod over patent policy. While
also concerned about competition, patent misuse focuses on deterring
harm to the integrity of the patent system. For instance, patent
misuse prohibits arrangements that tie up property rights post-patent
expiration.320 If a patented machine had been sold, royalties are due
under the pain of patent remedies until expiration and under the pain
of contractual remedies thereafter.321 Parties may agree to postexpiration royalties for pre-expiration use of the invention.322 It is the
extension of the patent right, not the royalty, that is prohibited by
patent policy.323 Just as in the case of exhaustion, allowing patentees
to extend their right to sue for patent infringement gives them a
bargaining chip in negotiations to inflate the royalties they can
accrue during the life of their patent. The analysis and result is

319. John F. Duffy et al., 2013 National Lawyers Convention: Intellectual
Property: Intellectual Property, Free Markets, and Competition Policy, 37 HAMLINE
L. REV. 523, 524 (2014) (observing that patent law “always permits free entry into
the race to obtain patents. Patent systems encourage technological races to invent,
and that is one of the major benefits of the patent system. . . . [R]acing to obtain
patent rights also has a benefit that many people forget about, which is that the
sooner that the technology is patented, the sooner it enters into the public domain”).
320. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30 (1964) (holding a license
requiring royalty payment on a machine post-patent expiration unenforceable
“insofar as” it required such royalties); Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at
70).
321. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32.
322. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 496 (2007) (stating that patent misuse “does not
prohibit intellectual property owners from allowing licensees to satisfy payment
obligations on a deferred schedule that extends beyond the life of the patent”);
DARYL LIM, PATENT MISUSE AND ANTITRUST LAW: EMPIRICAL, DOCTRINAL AND
POLICY PERSPECTIVES 107 (2013) (stating that Brulotte is sensitive to “the need to
allow parties to contract freely”).
323. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32 (holding that the patentee made “a bald attempt
to exact the same terms and conditions for the period after the patents have expired
as . . . for the monopoly period”); id. at 31-32 (holding that the patentee attempted to
prevent machines from being removed from Yakima County before and after patent
expiration); see also Lim, supra note 229, at 336 (stating that Brulotte should remain
good law).
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consistent in both instances.324 Misused patents are rendered
unenforceable until the “baleful effects” of the misuse are purged.325
Patent misuse differs from exhaustion because it applies to
sales, leases, and licenses, thereby reaching corners of commerce
where exhaustion would not.326 The recent Ninth Circuit decision in
Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp. provides a useful illustration
of how patent misuse could operate on facts that would also give rise
to exhaustion but with a different basis from antitrust law.327
B. Lessons from Copyright Misuse
Omega sued Costco for copyright infringement because it sold
forty-three genuine Omega watches engraved with a copyrighted
Omega design without Omega’s authorization. The district court
found that attempting to control the importation and downstream sale
of Omega watches following an authorized sale amounted to
copyright misuse. However, the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel
chose to find for Costco on the basis of copyright exhaustion because
Costco raised the defense in a filing prior to oral argument.328

324. See Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 77) (“Brulotte is really
nothing more than a variant of the first sale doctrine, applied to post-expiry
royalties.”).
325. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957)
(“It is now, of course, familiar law that the courts will not aid a patent owner who
has misused his patents to recover any of their emoluments accruing during the
period of misuse or thereafter until the effects of such misuse have been dissipated,
or ‘purged’ as the conventional saying goes. The rule is an extension of the equitable
doctrine of ‘unclean hands’ to the patent field.” (citations omitted)).
326. Hovenkamp, supra note 93, at 511 (“Misuse, another judge-made
doctrine that was not fully developed until the 1942 Morton Salt decision, could
apply to both sales and leases of a patented good as well as licenses; thus it applied
in many situations when the first sale doctrine would not.” (footnote omitted)).
327. 776 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2015).
328. Id. at 695 (“[A]pplication of the first sale doctrine disposes of Omega’s
claim, resolves this case in Costco’s favor, and conclusively reaffirms that copyright
holders cannot use their rights to fix resale prices in the downstream market.”); see
also id. at 694 n.1 (noting Costco raised the argument based on the Supreme Court’s
intervening decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351
(2013)). Copyright exhaustion also provides guidance to the extent of patent
exhaustion. The Copyright Act provides that copyright exhaustion “modifies the
copyright owner’s distribution right, but not his reproduction right.” Sheff, supra
note 95, at 252 & n.106 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (“qualifying the
distribution right of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), but not the reproduction right of 17 U.S.C. §
106(1)”)).
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Judge Wardlaw issued a concurring opinion on finding for
Costco on the basis of copyright misuse329 and found misuse because
Omega attempted to use its copyright in its design to restrict
downstream competition in its watches.330 She began by noting that
the constitutional policy and sole rationale for granting copyright
protection was “‘to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.’”331
According to Judge Wardlaw, both antitrust and copyright
policies were relevant in determining the proper scope of the owner’s
exclusive rights332 and that copyright misuse was judicially crafted
“to combat the impermissible extension of a copyright’s limited
monopoly.”333 Thus, copyright misuse “is not limited to discouraging
anti-competitive behavior,” but to restrain copyright from “‘being
used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant
of a copyright.’”334 She concluded that “Omega’s expansion of its
329. Omega, 776 F.3d at 696 (Wardlaw, J., concurring) (chiding the majority
for “fail[ing] to do justice to the facts presented by this unique lawsuit”); see also id.
(“The district court granted summary judgment and awarded attorney’s fees to
Costco based on the defense of copyright misuse. The majority affirms the district
court relying upon the Kirtsaeng-resurrected first sale doctrine; a doctrine we held
inapplicable the first time around, and which the parties did not brief or argue in this
appeal.”).
330. Id. at 701 (“Omega attempted to use the copyrighted Globe Design to
decrease competition in the U.S. importation and distribution of its watches by it and
its authorized dealers—an obvious leveraging of a copyright to control an area
outside its limited monopoly on the design.”).
331. Id. at 698 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1975)); see also id. (“‘Implicit in this rationale is the assumption that in
the absence of such public benefit, the grant of a copyright monopoly to individuals
would be unjustified.’” (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (2014)); id. (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures,
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes
reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”).
332. Id. at 699 (“An owner’s attempt to impermissibly expand his lawful
protection from competition contravenes not only the policy of the copyright laws,
but also the central purpose of the antitrust laws.”).
333. Id.
334. Id. (quoting Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th
Cir. 1990)); see also Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d
640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The argument for applying copyright misuse beyond the
bounds of antitrust, besides the fact that confined to antitrust the doctrine would be
redundant, is that for a copyright owner to use an infringement suit to obtain
property protection, here in data, that copyright law clearly does not confer, hoping
to force a settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an opponent that may
lack the resources or the legal sophistication to resist effectively, is an abuse of
process.”).
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copyright-like monopoly eliminated competition from unauthorized
watch retailers like Costco, thereby allowing [it] to control . . . the
retail pricing of Seamaster watches sold in the United States. . . .
[S]uch an outcome directly controverts the aims of copyright law.”335
Judge Wardlaw’s reasoning stands in contrast to the Supreme
Court’s antitrust opinion in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., which overturned its own per se prohibition against
resale price maintenance in favor of a rule of reason analysis.336 The
majority justified its decision on the basis that antitrust policy
favored interbrand competition over intrabrand competition, which
was promoted by the resale price maintenance restrictions.337 Also in
contrast to antitrust law, intent was relevant to the determination of
liability.338 Judge Wardlaw rejected Omega’s argument that
anticompetitive motives were irrelevant on the basis that the
“definition [of] ‘use’ includes an inquiry into [its] purpose.”339 The
facts showed that customers could buy Omega’s watches at 35% less
at Costco but for Omega’s lawsuit. This “reduction of intrabrand
price competition for uncopyrightable Omega watches” constituted
misuse.340
In essence, Judge Wardlaw undertook an effects-based analysis
of Omega’s conduct. This echoes the Supreme Court’s decision in
Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, requiring lower courts to
apply the rule of reason in determining whether settlements between
patentees and potential generic rivals violated antitrust law.341 There,
335. Omega, 776 F.3d at 704 (Wardlaw, J., concurring).
336. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
337. Id. at 890-92. According to the Court, intrabrand competition
encouraged retailers to invest in services or promotional efforts that aid
manufacturers in competing against their rivals. Resale price maintenance also gave
consumers more tiered price and quality options, which free riding retailers might
eliminate. Id.
338. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322,
1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (refusing to inquire into the patentee’s intent “so long as
that anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory patent
grant”).
339. Omega, 776 F.3d at 701 (Wardlaw, J., concurring).
340. Id.
341. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); see also United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668-72
(3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing the
alleged anti-competitive effects through direct evidence via raised prices, lower
output or quality, or in the alternative, circumstantial evidence of market power;
then the defendant must offer pro-competitive justifications; and then the plaintiff
can refute that the restraint is unnecessary to achieve the stated objective). In
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the Court debunked the notion that conduct within the “scope of the
patent” circumscribes antitrust scrutiny only to instances where there
was sham litigation or fraud on the patent office. The Court was clear
that even if the patents in suit were valid and infringed, it wanted
explanations for those settlements.342 Like Judge Wardlaw, the
Actavis Court also stated that the appropriate scope of patent rights
was defined with reference to both patent and antitrust policies.343
It is worth pausing briefly to deal with the objection that
Actavis only applies to cases within the Hatch–Waxman
framework.344 As an initial matter, just because the Court articulated
contrast, per se prohibitions condemn specific practices such as horizontal price
fixing or market divisions that are “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.” See
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
342. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (“Solvay’s patent, if valid and infringed,
might have permitted it to charge drug prices sufficient to recoup the reverse
settlement payments it agreed to make to its potential generic competitors. And we
are willing to take this fact as evidence that the agreement’s ‘anticompetitive effects
fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.’ But we do not agree
that that fact, or characterization, can immunize the agreement from antitrust
attack.” (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677
F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012))); id. at 2237 (“Although the parties may have
reasons to prefer settlements that include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust
question is: What are those reasons? If the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to
share patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some other
justification, the antitrust laws are likely to forbid the arrangement.”); see also id. at
2244 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority seems to think that even if the patent
is valid, a patent holder violates the antitrust laws merely because the settlement
took away some chance that his patent would be declared invalid by a court.”).
343. Id. at 2225 (majority opinion) (“[T]o refer simply to what the holder of
a valid patent could do does not by itself answer the antitrust question. . . . [I]t would
be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s
anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, and not against
procompetitive antitrust policies as well. Both are relevant in determining the scope
of monopoly and antitrust immunity conferred by a patent . . . .”).
344. The Hatch–Waxman Act was designed to encourage entry by generics
who would assert drug patents that were invalid or not infringed by their
bioequivalent offering. To incentivize challenges, the Act allowed the first
successful challenger to share a 180-day duopoly with the patentee. Studies indicate
that prices fall by as much as 80% compared to those pre-generic entry. See UNITED
STATES,
GENERIC
PHARMACEUTICALS
(2014),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-otherinternational-competitionfora/generics_us_oecd.pdf
(updating
statistics
on
pharmaceutical pricing in the wake of generic entry); see also, e.g., Kevin D.
McDonald, Because I Said So: On the Competitive Rationale of FTC v. Actavis,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 36, 42 (“Perhaps the only good news for these courts is
that the Actavis ‘analysis’ by its terms applies only to Hatch-Waxman patent
cases.”).
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its holdings within Hatch–Waxman litigation does not automatically
mean that they do not have more general application. Recently in
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., the Court rejected
the Federal Circuit’s long-standing practice of reviewing district
court patent claim construction rulings without deference.345 Teva
involved drug patents litigated under the same Hatch–Waxman
framework as Actavis.346 Notwithstanding this, commentators have
noted that “Teva could have broad-ranging implications for clients in
the procurement and enforcement of their patent rights.”347
Similarly Actavis was hailed by Professor Michael Carrier as
potentially “one of the most important patent/antitrust rulings of all
time.”348 Professor Mark Lemley also observed that the Court’s
conclusion that patent scope is defined by both patent and antitrust
policy is “a very different conception of the rule of antitrust vis-à-vis
patents than we’ve had in certainly the last 40 years, which has been
that patent law decides what its scope is and then antitrust polices the
boundaries to make sure you don’t extend that scope.”349 Based on
this, he predicted that “patent and antitrust are headed for a much
more dynamic interaction . . . in trying to decide what the proper
345. 135 S. Ct. 831, 833 (2015).
346. See, e.g., Daniel E. Yonan & Jon E. Boljesic, Practice Considerations
L.
REV.
(Jan.
30,
2015),
Post
Teva
v.
Sandoz,
NAT’L
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/practice-considerations-post-teva-v-sandoz
(“Sandoz, as a generic pharmaceutical challenger under the Hatch–Waxman Act,
attacked the patent as indefinite because it contained claim language describing an
active pharmaceutical ingredient having a ‘molecular weight of 5 to 9
kilodaltons.’”).
347. Id.; see also David C. Berry, Supreme Court Limits Federal Circuit’s
Ability to Revise Claim Construction on Appeal, PATLIT BLOG (Jan. 21, 2015),
https://www.primaryopinion.com/articles/supreme-court-limits-federalcircuit%E2%80%99s-ability-revise-claim-construction-appeal (“[Teva] is likely to
introduce important strategic issues in patent cases, especially relating to conduct of
claim construction proceedings.”).
348. Michael Carrier, The U.S. Supreme Court Issues First Ruling on
Antitrust Legality of Reverse-Payment Drug Patent Settlements (Actavis), E(July
2013),
available
at
COMPETITIONS
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2293867; see also Supreme
Court Issues Significant Patent Antitrust Decision Rejecting the “Scope of the
Patent”
Rule,
Perkins
Coie
(June
18,
2013),
http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/pubs_Detail.aspx?publication=869018d4-026749b4-8c26-991255646b19 (describing Actavis as “the most significant patent
antitrust decision in decades . . . The implications of the decision beyond reverse
payment cases are yet to be determined”).
349. IP Law and Innovation with Mark A. Lemley and A. Douglas Melamed,
STAN. LAW. (Nov. 14, 2014), http://stanfordlawyer.law.stanford.edu/2014/11/ip-lawand-innovation-with-mark-a-lemley-and-a-douglas-melamed/.
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scope of a patent right is.”350 Since Actavis is the first patent/antitrust
ruling the Court made in the Hatch–Waxman context these
observations would make no sense at all if observations about the
“scope of the patent” test were limited only to that context.
Looking at the opinion itself, the Court dealt with the “scope of
the patent” issue in the first portion of Part II.A of its opinion before
moving to settlement agreements generally in the second potion of
Part II.A. In Part II.B, the court applied its analysis to reverse
payments within the Hatch–Waxman framework. In summing up its
analysis and dismissing the “scope of the patent” approach in Part
II.A (prior to dealing with settlement agreements), it stated that
In short, rather than measure the length or amount of a restriction solely
against the length of the patent’s term or its earning potential . . . this
Court answered the antitrust question by considering traditional antitrust
factors such as likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market
power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the
circumstances, such as here those related to patents. Whether a particular
restraint lies “beyond the limits of the patent monopoly” is a conclusion
that flows from that analysis and not . . . its starting point.351

None of the precedents cited by the Court itself in justifying its
preference for an effects-focused analysis over the “scope of the
patent” approach had anything to do with Hatch–Waxman litigation.
Finally, a careful reading of both the majority and dissent shows that
both sides were gridlocked over the broader question—whether
settlements within the patent scope should be scrutinized at all.352
Further afield in Lundbeck, the European Commission recently
concluded in the context of a regime that did not operate under
Hatch–Waxman framework that patent settlements between drug
patentees and their generic rivals were subject to scrutiny under
competition law.353 All these signs point to a change in a shift away
350. Id.
351. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231-32 (2013)
(citation omitted).
352. Id. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The point of antitrust law is to
encourage competitive markets to promote consumer welfare. The point of patent
law is to grant limited monopolies as a way of encouraging innovation. Thus, a
patent grants ‘the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention.’
In doing so it provides an exception to antitrust law, and the scope of the patent—
i.e., the rights conferred by the patent—forms the zone within which the patent
holder may operate without facing antitrust liability.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980))).
353. See Bernardine Adkins & Samuel Beighton, Paying for Delay and
Patent Settlement Arrangements - the European Commission (at Last) Publishes the
Lundbeck Decision, WRAGGE LAWRENCE GRAHAM & CO. (Jan. 29, 2015),
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from the “scope of the patent” approach beyond the Hatch–Waxman
framework.
Patents are rarely coextensive with monopoly power. To the
extent they create barriers to competition, these barriers may simply
be a function of the exclusionary rights conferred by the patent. At
the same time, it is remarkable that the application of antitrust law to
patentee conduct within the scope of their patents should be
remarkable at all. It is hornbook law that even validly obtained
patent rights are subject to other laws, whether they are health and
safety regulations imposed under the Food and Drug Authority or
consumer protection laws enforced by the Federal Trade
Commission.
In surveying the history of judicial scrutiny of patent rights,
Professor Jorge Contreras observed the twentieth century is full of
instances where companies were found to have abused patent rights
despite acting within their “scope.”354 Just like any other propertyowning business, they must account for their actions even when they
fall within the scope of the patents. The Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit in United States v. Microsoft Corp. deemed Microsoft’s
argument that lawfully acquired intellectual property rights cannot
give rise to antitrust liability as “border[ing] upon the frivolous.”355 It
explained that it “is no more correct than the proposition that use of
one’s personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to
tort liability.”356 The Supreme Court has also been unequivocal that
patent cases should not treated differently from their non-patent
counterparts.357

http://www.wragge-law.com/insights/paying-for-delay-and-patent-settlementarrangements-the-european-commission-(at-last)-publishes-th/ (“The fact that a
patent (if found to be valid and infringed) grants the patent holder a right to exclude
products falling within the scope of the patent does not mean that the patent holder
necessarily complies with EU competition law by using any method to achieve the
same exclusionary outcome.” (emphasis omitted)).
354. Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND, ANTITRUST L.J.
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2374983.
355. 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
356. Id.
357. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015)
(requiring the Federal Circuit to give deference to claim construction determinations
based on findings of fact); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (clarifying that an “exceptional case” within meaning of the
Patent Act’s fee-shifting provision was the same as the standard generally applicable
in civil actions); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006)
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Post-Actavis, formalistic line drawing based on the “scope of
the patent” approach is past its legal shelf life.358 And it is for the
better. Any approach carving out broad zones of immunity risks
being both over- and under-inclusive. One treatise author warned
that
a patentee could circumvent the patent exhaustion doctrine altogether by
simply imposing resale price, territorial, or other competitive restrictions
on what subsequent purchasers can do with its patented product even after
they have paid full value for the product, and then argue that the restraint
is immune from antitrust challenge because the product is patented.359

On the one hand, conduct outside of the scope that may benefit
consumers or promote innovation may be condemned. On the other
hand, judges’ hands are tied if faced with restrictions that distort
market competition or hurt innovation. The term “scope” also
nothing to provide courts with a rule that can be comprehensively
and consistently applied, particularly with licensing agreements that
contain terms that are not expressly stated in the patent instrument.360
Actavis reflects the maturity and confidence of a court willing
to eschew treating patentees with kid-gloves in favor of a more
challenging but doctrinally robust approach. Courts no longer have
the option of tiptoeing around calls to address harmful effects of
activity taking place within the scope of patents owned by Monsanto
or another patentee.361 The treatment of patent misuse allegations
(holding that injunctions in patent law should be granted in accordance with the
principles of equity common to other areas of the law).
358. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
466-67 (1992) (“Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than
actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law.”); Lim, supra note
18, at 202-03 (“Since patent misuse analysis typically starts with the analysis of
patent scope, the doctrine will likely have to be rethought in light of Actavis as
well.”).
359. HOLMES, supra note 268, § 17:4.
360. Bohannan, supra note 315, at 496 (“Most contract terms cover practices
that technically fall outside the scope of the patent grant—otherwise, a contract
would be unnecessary—but certainly not all of these practices are harmful to IP
policy.”); see also id. (noting that the beyond-the-scope test does not provide a
meaningful way to determine which of these terms lies within the scope of the grant
and which do not). Courts have applied “patent scope” at least three different ways.
First, it can be defined by the claims in a patent instrument. Second, it can be
defined physically by the embodiment of the invention, quintessentially in tying
cases. Third, it can be defined temporally by the duration of the patent. See LIM,
supra note 322, at 391-404.
361. See, e.g., Salvaggio, supra note 169, at 460-61 (“While antitrust and
patent misuse were not issues on appeal in this case, Monsanto has gained an
extreme amount of market power and has received favorable treatment in the courts
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against Monsanto tracking the “scope of the patent” approach also
requires rethinking.
IV. MONSANTO THROUGH THE LENS OF ACTAVIS
We owe much to Monsanto and other agrobiotech companies.
Calls for greater scrutiny are understandably met with reservation.
After all, as the adage goes, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” But those
skeptics need only look as far as other corporate leviathans—from
tech giants like IBM,362 Microsoft,363 and Qualcomm364 to drug
companies like Servier,365 Reckitt,366 and Solvay367—to know that
innovation and patent abuse are not mutually exclusive.
How can vigilance against harm to competition or innovation
policy goals be balanced against preserving incentives to innovate
and freedom to conduct business? One approach is to carve out a
zone of immunity, intervening only in narrow instances such as
fraud, sham litigation, or tying.368 The alternative is to look at
while maintaining a high degree of control over its goods following sale; the
inability of existing limiting doctrines to capture or apply to the nature of
Monsanto’s goods yields a prime example of whether new limiting doctrines would
need to be created to reign in the almost unconditional protection the company
currently enjoys.”).
362. See Rachel Konrad, IBM and Microsoft: Antitrust Then and Now, CNET
NEWS (June 7, 2000, 2:50 PM), http://news.cnet.com/IBM-and-Microsoft-Antitrustthen-and-now/2100-1001_3-241565.html.
363. See id.
364. See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case for Patent Misuse, 51
IDEA 559, 582 (2011) (discussing the case).
365. See Mark Rosman & Seth Silber, DOJ’s Investigation into Generic
Pharma Pricing Is Unusual, LAW360 (Nov. 12, 2014, 5:44 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/595444/doj-s-investigation-into-generic-pharmapricing-is-unusual.
366. See Jonathan H. Hatch & Robert P. LoBue, Court Allows “Product
Hopping” Claims to Proceed in Suboxone Litigation Based on Allegations of
Removal of Prior Formulation and Disparagement of Generic Competition,
ANTITRUST UPDATE (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.antitrustupdateblog.com/blog/courtallows-product-hopping-claims-to-proceed-in-suboxone-litigation/.
367. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
368. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322,
1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder may enforce
the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed
invention free from liability under the antitrust laws. We therefore will not inquire
into his subjective motivation for exerting his statutory rights, even though his
refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an anticompetitive effect,
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whether the patentee’s justification in exercising its rights was
merely a pretextual front for anticompetitive conduct as the Court
did in Actavis.369
The former is easy to administer since drawing a large box and
refusing to act on anything happening inside it means mostly doing
nothing. A rule is clearer and provides certainty; a standard more
precisely tracks policy goals, but its administration is more
complex.370 Operationalizing a standard “tread[s] a fine line between
detailed prescription and inchoate principle.”371 Managing what is
inside the box—moving from rules to a standards-based approach—
involves more dicey determinations of why, when, and how. But it is
more likely to bring about nuanced outcomes better aligned with
policy goals.
This Part uses past cases where Monsanto had been accused of
patent misuse or antitrust violations as an anecdotal canvas to
illustrate how the effects-based standard can be successfully
operationalized. It focuses on three critical features of that standard.
The first feature is that the standard must be supported by a
coherent theory of harm to competition or innovation. Monsanto was
most vulnerable under a theory of foreclosure. Antitrust
commentators accuse Monsanto of leveraging its market power in
the trait market to foreclose competition in the traited seed market
through its anti-stacking provisions.372 In comparison to antitrust
so long as that anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory
patent grant.”).
369. See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (noting that the reverse payments at
issue were “unusual”); Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125
F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Neither the aims of intellectual property law, nor
the antitrust laws justify allowing a monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business
justification to mask anticompetitive conduct.”); see also Data Gen. Corp. v.
Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that the
presumption of legitimacy can be rebutted by evidence that the monopolist acquired
the protection of the intellectual property laws in an unlawful manner).
370. Allen R. Kamp, Jurisprudence: A Beginner’s Simple and Practical
Guide to Complex Legal Theory, 2 CRIT: CRITICAL STUD. J. 62, 76, 78-81 (2009)
(discussing the “good” and “bad” attributes of rules and standards).
371. Id. at 77 (citation omitted).
372. See Lina Khan, How Monsanto Outfoxed the Obama Administration,
SALON (Mar. 15, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/03/15/how_
did_monsanto_outfox_the_obama_administration/ (“Several experts agree that the
strongest case the DOJ could have brought against Monsanto would focus on how it
has used its monopoly in one market—the provision of genetic traits—both to
exclude rivals and to gain advantage in another market: the breeding and retail of
seeds.”).
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harm, patent misuse harm focuses on abuses of the patent right in
contravention of patent policy. There is no need to show market
power unless it is related to the tying of patented and unpatented
goods, where the Patent Act specifically requires it.373 Under both
antitrust and misuse theories of harm from foreclosure, access is
based on circumscribing the patentee’s right based on supervening
patent or antitrust policy. The terms of access may be determined by
expert opinion, as they routinely are.
The second feature is that the one alleging the harm must show
that patentees like Monsanto have or are at least capable of effecting
that harm. Antitrust law requires the showing of actual harm or, in
the alternative, market power. Patent misuse does not require a
showing of market power. The ability to effect the harm alleged thus
rises and falls with the credibility of the theory of foreclosure alleged
as long as the conduct supporting that theory is undisputed. The third
feature is that the approach should contain heuristics to make it
administrable, such as harm to competition and innovation, and a
shifting of burdens informed by judicial experience and economic
learning in appropriate cases.
A. Developing a Theory of Harm
By the time Actavis prohibited market division agreements in
the market for the patentee’s drugs, its primary market, lower courts
had already prohibited activities that foreclosed competition in
related secondary markets in a number of antitrust cases.374 But how
do these precedents inform past cases involving Monsanto?
As an initial matter, restrictions on seed saving, the restriction
at issue in Bowman, are the least controversial. Since future
generations of seeds would rely on Monsanto’s patents, noreplanting restrictions could simply be another way of saying that
unauthorized “making” of new seeds would attract patent
373. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012) (“No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief
for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of . . .
condition[ing] the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented
product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a
separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market
power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license
or sale is conditioned.”).
374. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84-85 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (finding tying Internet browser to operating system to be illegal).
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infringement.375 However, as discussed in Section II.B, the
restrictions should add nothing to Monsanto’s right to sue for
infringement under the conditional sale doctrine. These private
servitudes cannot be readily identified nor their value ascertained.
Such costs and uncertainties should not be borne by end users but
rather by a manufacturer and patentee negotiating at arm’s length.376
Suits against consumers previously sanctioned under the conditional
sale doctrine should now attract scrutiny and, where appropriate,
condemnation.377
Monsanto’s other restrictions, previously sanctioned by courts,
should be reexamined. These include technology fee payments,378
restrictions on seed use,379 offering discounts for carrying its seeds as
a proportion of the distributors’ inventory, restrictions preventing
seed distributors from carrying or marketing rivals’ seeds,380 and antistacking provisions.381 These restrictions undercut the argument that
375. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298-99 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(“Monsanto has a right to exclude others from making, using, or selling its patented
plant technology, and its no replant policy simply prevents purchasers of the seeds
from using the patented biotechnology when that biotechnology makes a copy of
itself. This restriction therefore is a valid exercise of its rights under the patent
laws.” (citation omitted)); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (N.D.
Miss. 2001) (“Without the prohibition against the saving of seed for replanting or
resale, Monsanto’s patent would soon be rendered useless by virtue of the potential
for exponential multiplication of the seed containing its patented technology.”).
376. See Love & Yoon, supra note 281, at 1631-35 (arguing that it would be
more efficient for patentees and manufacturers to litigate the patent lawsuit).
377. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO L.J.
885, 932-50 (2008) (discussing why licensing servitudes running with personal
property are harmful, even in the absence of anticompetitive effects sufficient to
result in antitrust violations).
378. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 517 F. Supp.
2d 1125, 1137 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (“Courts considering the issue have held generally
that the technology fee payments required by Monsanto’s licensing agreements with
seed growers, restrictions stipulated in the licensing agreements and restrictions on
seed growers’ use of the seed incorporating Monsanto’s traits, are within the scope
of Monsanto’s patent rights and therefore do not violate antitrust law.”); Scruggs,
459 F.3d at 1340-41 (“Monsanto’s uniform technology fee is essentially a royalty
fee, the charging of which is also within the scope of the patent grant.”).
379. See Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1340-41 (requiring the use of Roundup with
Roundup Ready).
380. Christopher Leonard, Monsanto Stomps Down Budding Seed
Competitors, USA Today (Dec. 14, 2009, 10:51 AM), http:// www.usatoday.
com/money/industries/food/2009-12-14-monsanto-practices_N.htm.
381. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 575 (N.D. Miss.
2004) (holding that such restrictions were “clearly field of use restrictions which fall
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farmers want Monsanto’s seed for its own sake, weakening the nexus
between the commercial success of Roundup Ready and
justifications based on rewarding innovation.
Anti-stacking restrictions seem particularly pernicious because
they threaten to foreclose precisely the sort of cumulative innovation
that injects competition through new and better products. This theory
of harm has received significant traction. DuPont had intended to
commercialize its Optimum GAT (OGAT) trait, which improved
yields stacked with Monsanto’s Roundup Ready trait.382 Monsanto
sued DuPont for patent infringement, obtaining a billion dollars in
damages even though not a single stacked soybean had been sold
because it was based on a hypothetical negotiation.383 Monsanto and
DuPont settled with the latter dropping its antitrust suit against
Monsanto in exchange for stacking rights.384
Monsanto had also been the target of antitrust investigations by
state and federal antitrust agencies for anticompetitive licensing
restrictions involving patented traits and herbicides and refusing to
allow varietal trait stacking.385 State and federal agencies eventually
closed their investigations after Monsanto made several
commitments.386 While Monsanto’s private settlements are a move in
the right direction, they have no precedential value and do nothing to
clarify when and how access should be granted as well as on what
terms.
within the scope of the patent monopoly and are, therefore, lawful”); Scruggs, 459
F.3d at 1339.
382. See Bernard Chao & Jonathan R. Gray, A $1 Billion Parable, 90 DENV.
U. L. REV. ONLINE 185, 185 (2013) (“DuPont had made no money for any sales of
infringing seeds and Monsanto had lost no sales of its seeds because of DuPont’s
infringement. Nevertheless, the jury awarded one billion dollars in damages to
Monsanto.”).
383. Id. at 186-88 (discussing the reasonable royalty calculation).
384. Andrew Pollack, Monsanto and DuPont Settle Fight over Patent
Licensing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/
business/monsanto-and-dupont-settle-fight-over-roundup-readytechnology.html?_r=0 (“Under the terms of the agreement, announced Tuesday,
DuPont will pay Monsanto at least $1.75 billion over 10 years for the rights to
technology for genetically engineered soybeans that are resistant to herbicides.”).
385. Pollack, supra note 132 (“Critics, including some competitors, say that
Monsanto has great leverage over the seed business and growers through restrictive
contracts that must be signed to use Monsanto’s genes or to grow the genetically
modified crops.”).
386. Khan, supra note 372 (“Those close to the investigation also note that it
became easier for officials to justify inaction because Monsanto cleaned up its act as
soon as authorities came knocking.”).
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As a matter of antitrust law, one plausible theory of harm is the
essential facilities doctrine. Generally, there is no duty to license
rivals.387 However, antitrust law prohibits vertically integrated
companies from creating or maintaining their market power through
limiting access to patented technology needed to compete in a
secondary market.388
In MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone &
Telephone Co., the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
where the owner denies access to competitors of an essential facility
it controls that cannot be practically or reasonably duplicated, and
that it can feasibly provide access to, antitrust law can require
compulsory sharing of that facility.389 In Bellsouth Advertising v.
Donnelly Information, the court noted that although the essential
facilities doctrine has been applied predominately to tangible assets,
there is no reason why it could not apply to intellectual property.390
While the Supreme Court is agnostic about an “essential facilities
doctrine,”391 it has recognized terminating a profitable course of prior
dealing is evidence of the profit sacrifice element of a
monopolization claim.392
An alternative antitrust theory of harm is Monsanto’s refusal to
license facilitates monopolization. In Data General v. Grumman
Systems Support, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit used an
387. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
388. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 141-44, 156-59
(1948) (tying patented machines and copyrighted films); Image Technical Servs.,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Kodak’s refusal to sell patented parts to ISOs constituted monopoly leveraging from
parts to servicing). But see In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox Corp.,
203 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that Xerox’s refusal to sell patented
parts to ISOs did not violate the antitrust laws).
389. 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983) (condemning AT&T’s refusal
to grant competing suppliers of long distance telephone services access to local
telephone facilities that it controlled).
390. 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 999
F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993).
391. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 411 (2004) (“We have never recognized such a doctrine, and we find no
need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here.” (citation omitted)). But see 1
HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 13.3c1 (2d ed. Supp. 2014)
(calling out the Court for engaging in “revisionist history”).
392. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (“[U]nilateral termination of a voluntary (and
thus presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a willingness to forsake
short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.”).
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approach that seemed prescient of Actavis.393 It sought to read the
copyright and antitrust statues in light of each other by scrutinizing
the exercise of the exclusionary rights under copyright law, but
requiring the antitrust plaintiff to rebut the presumption that the
copyright owner’s refusal to license was justified.394 This approach
was also endorsed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Image Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak Co.395 In Kodak, the
Ninth Circuit found the justification pretextual and adopted long
after the fact.396
In either case, an argument for court-mandated access will soon
run into resistance. The Supreme Court in Verizon Communications
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP warned that compelling
firms “to share the source of their advantage” is in “tension” with
antitrust policy for three reasons.397 First, it “may lessen the incentive
for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically
beneficial facilities.”398 Denying a lawful monopolist the fruits of its
monopoly could diminish its incentive to innovate in the first
place.399 Thus, as Judge Learned Hand cautioned, “[t]he successful
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon
when he wins.”400 Second, it “requires antitrust courts to act as
central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other
terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill suited.”401 Third, it
could “facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion.”402
The third objection may be swiftly dealt with. Catastrophic side
effects are a possible but rare occurrence in medical treatment.
393. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st
Cir. 1994).
394. Id. at 1187.
395. 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997).
396. See id. at 1219-20.
397. 540 U.S. at 407-08.
398. Id. at 408.
399. Id. at 407 (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an
important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly
prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To
safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be
found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive
conduct.”).
400. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 421, 430 (2d Cir.
1945).
401. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
402. Id.
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Doctors, informed by experience and scientific knowledge, make a
call on whether intervention is better than inaction. Similarly judges,
informed by experience and legal knowledge, make a call on whether
collusion is likely and whether its effects would be so extreme as to
warrant inaction. In the real world, it is difficult to imagine warring
litigants suddenly becoming conspirators-in-arms when one of the
parties was compelled to share its competitive advantage because the
other squealed to the courts.
The first objection is particularly pronounced with patent law
because “[t]he tension between the objectives of preserving
economic incentives to enhance competition while at the same time
trying to contain the power a successful competitor acquires is
heightened tremendously when the patent laws come into play.”403
According to Hovenkamp, the basis for the “scope of the patent” test
was a response to “unreasonably hostile” antitrust policy.404 This
“walled garden” thus “protected the patent from significant antitrust
overreaching.”405
The “walled garden” approach echoes the broad patent scope
advocated by Professor Edmund Kitch.406 Under Kitch’s “prospect
theory,” broad patents that allow patentees to coordinate their
activities with other firms post-grant will encourage patentees to
invest in development without fear that rivals would steal their
work.407 The patent right should extend beyond the reward
commensurate to the disclosure in the patent but rather “reaches well
beyond what the reward function would require.”408 Enhanced
efficiency “turns not upon the size of the firm, but its dominance
over a fruitful technological prospect.”409
403. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1981).
404. See Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 10, 11) (“The ‘beyond
the scope’ formulation is a relic of a bygone approach to antirust and regulation . . .
which regarded regulation as ‘ousting’ antitrust from the regulated market
altogether.”).
405. Id. (manuscript at 10).
406. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & ECON. 265, 271-75 (1977) (analogizing patents to mining claims over
minerals). I am grateful to Professor Josh Sarnoff for an illuminating discussion on
Kitch.
407. See id. at 266, 276-77; Duffy, supra note 304, at 440 (“Kitch’s
justification for the patent system was thus forward-looking: The function of the
patent system is to encourage investment in a technological prospect after the
property right has been granted.”).
408. Kitch, supra note 406, at 267.
409. Id. at 286.
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Kitch is correct that patent scope influences technological
development, both in the sense of individual inventions like
Roundup Ready and a future line of improvements extending from it,
such as stacked traits. However, contrary to what Kitch suggests,
granting broad rights to an initial inventor like Monsanto may not
induce more effective development and future invention.
The work of Professors Robert Merges and Richard Nelson
provides doctrinal justification for access. They expressed concern
that “broad patents could discourage much useful research.”410 This is
because “[o]nce a firm develops and becomes competent in one part
of a ‘prospect,’ it may be very hard for it to give much attention to
other parts, even though in the eyes of others, there may be great
promise there.”411 They therefore concluded that “many independent
inventors will generate a much wider and diverse set of explorations
than when the development is under the control of one mind or
organization,”412 and advocate that “[it] is much simpler to grant
roughly identical licenses to all who will pay a standard rate.”413
Roundup Ready through widespread adoption has become an
industry standard or de facto standard essential patent. A trait like
Roundup Ready may appear to be a product of discrete innovation by
Monsanto. However, where it has a variety of new applications, its
innovation trajectory is more cumulative, and dissemination can be
improved through licensing and cross-licensing. In short, a wider
talent pool can only be brought in with real competition.
DuPont had argued that by refusing to license those traits for
“stacking” within the seeds sold, Monsanto unlawfully excluded
competition, allowing it to set the minimum prices for seed without

410. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 870 (1990).
411. Id. at 873; see also id. at 875 (“In our own research, we have not found
a single case where the holder of a broad patent used it effectively through tailored
licensing to coordinate the R&D of others.”).
412. Id. at 873 (“The only way to find out what works and what does not is
to let a variety of minds try. If a property right on a basic invention covers a host of
potential improvements, the property right holder can be expected to develop the
basic invention and some of the improvements.”).
413. Id. at 874-75; see also id. at 907 (“The holder of a patent on a broad
prospect opened by advances in science need not attempt to control the development
of that prospect in any detail. Instead, she could license widely and collect royalties.
. . . This approach is normally more conducive to the development of multiple
applications than where the patent holder restricts entry.”).
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significant impact on its market share.414 Access to the Roundup
Ready trait would allow DuPont and others to offer stacked seed.
Seen in this light, the argument that the essential facilities doctrine
could apply to require compulsory access to traits like Roundup
Ready becomes more compelling.415
Alternatively, an argument for access may be made on the basis
of patent misuse. While patent misuse can be difficult to navigate,416
it ameliorates the disadvantages in antitrust enforcement because it
renders the affected patent unenforceable. As one treatise noted, “[i]t
may be that the pressure to use the essential facilities doctrine to
compel licensing of patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms will be lessened by the availability of equitable remedies that
can achieve the same end in appropriate cases without invoking the
mechanism of antitrust law.”417
With patent misuse, there is usually no need to set conditions
for access. By rendering the patent temporarily unenforceable, the
patentee has every incentive to reach a licensing agreement with the
potential entrant. Courts can arrest attempts at patent hold-outs by
unwilling licensees in the same way they can prevent hold-outs by
opportunistic licensors. By focusing on unfair competition and harm
to innovation, misuse can give a more flexible and holistic treatment
to the misconduct.
Professor Christina Bohannan has argued that foreclosure is
misuse’s main mandate.418 This includes foreclosure that results in
unfair competition, restraints on innovation, and impinges on the

414. Defendants’ Amended Answer & Counterclaims at 19, Monsanto Co. v.
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., No. 4:09-cv-00686 (ERW) (E.D. Mo. Nov. 16,
2012).
415. Cole, Horton & Vacca, supra note 107, at 320 (arguing that “patents
governing GM seeds should be deemed de facto standard-essential patents (de facto
SEP), when certain requirements are met” with the result that “[o]nce the GM seed
has been labeled a de facto SEP, courts can find an implied license between
Monsanto and farmers” (footnote omitted)); see also Purcell, supra note 166, at
1271 (“Given that the anti-stacking provisions in Monsanto’s licenses had the clear
effect of restricting competition in stacked traits, it stands to reason that these
licenses count as denial for the purposes of essential facility analysis.”).
416. Lim, supra note 229, at 363 (“[C]ritics argue that the vagueness of
misuse detracts from commercial certainty needed by businesses and innovators.”).
417. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 391, § 13.3c3.
418. Bohannan, supra note 315, at 478 (“I argue that if misuse is really to be
used as an instrument to effectuate IP policy and is to be confined to those practices
that are serious enough to warrant its severe remedy, misuse should be focused on
foreclosure.”).
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public domain.419 In these areas, patent and copyright policies share
the same wellspring.420
Foreclosure has been a particular pernicious problem because it
impedes the advance of technical progress that is the raison d’être of
patent rights. The Constitution mandates that exclusive rights granted
under patent law promote technological progress, but those rights
occasionally impede that very progress.
The Supreme Court noted that “a page of history is worth a
volume of logic.”421 Vested business interests have resisted
derivative, incremental, and sometimes exponentially disruptive use
of their intellectual property. Just as photocopies did not decimate
the printing business and the online music stores did not destroy the
recording industry, circumscribing the intellectual property owner’s
control over the emergence of new and useful products can only
promote the kind of technological progress inimical to economic
prosperity. Unlike Bowman, who merely sought to replicate the trait
to avoid paying Monsanto for its seed, those that license traits like
Roundup Ready that have become de facto standards can only serve
to expand the universe of possible offerings to consumers and foster
more vigorous competition between seed companies.
Other commentators have identified other harms, including
preventing economic loss that occurs in defensive research activities
in patent circumvention and impediments to innovation from
awarding patents to early stage inventors at the expense of late-stage
inventors.422
In practice, this means that, as with Judge Wardlaw’s opinion
in Omega, the presence of contractual or antitrust issues should not
derail parallel considerations of patent misuse. An action for breach

419. Id. at 500 (describing misuse “that foreclose[s] others from (1)
competing in a particular market; (2) producing technology that they are otherwise
lawfully entitled to develop (i.e., restraints on innovation); or (3) accessing
information or technology that rightfully belongs in the public domain” (footnote
omitted)); see also id. at 501-25 (describing how they are applied to tying, restraints
on innovation and non-compete agreements, post-expiration royalties, reach-through
agreements, and licenses restricting access to public domain technology).
420. For another area where the two streams of intellectual property have
commingled, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 936-37 (2005) (importing the theory of harm from inducement patent
infringement into the copyright context).
421. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
422. Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent
Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 400 (2003).
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of contract or an exclusive dealing restraint flows from a licensing
provision empowered by the patent right.
Patent misuse proscribes abuses, which include physical or
temporal extensions, causing anticompetitive effects, as well as other
abuses such as vexatious litigation, which do not.423 Patentees who
place a burden on downstream innovation through an overextension
of their patent rights contravene patent policy in a similar way that a
claim covering an abstract idea would preempt use of the approach in
all fields and would effectively grant a monopoly over the idea.424
The technological merits of the invention are irrelevant.425
In the context of stacking, an argument may be made that
patent policy allows derogation from patentees’ right to appropriate
returns.426 Where the party seeking access is offering “a different,
better product,” commentators have argued that this kind of
competition is consistent with patent policy.427 Where the patentee
423. See LIM, supra note 322, at 374-76.
424. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014)
(“We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of
pre-emption.”); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132
S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (“[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a
patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”); id.
at 1301 (expressing “concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by
improperly tying up the future use of” building blocks of human ingenuity).
425. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013) (“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery
does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”); Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under
Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 117, 133 (2005) (“The
misuse doctrine was a special form of punishment devised for over-reaching
patentees who were using their patents to monopolize something other than the
invention.”).
426. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (allowing
experimental use for “‘amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry’” (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343,
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000))); see also Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co.,
No. 4:09cv00686 (ERW), 2010 WL 3039210, at *10 (E.D. Mo. July 30, 2010). The
defendants argued that experimental use allowed them to study and improve upon or
design around the Roundup Ready trait. Id. at *7. The court found that the
exemption was “very narrow” and “strictly limited” to “‘amusement, to satisfy idle
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.’” Id. at *10 (quoting Madey, 307 F.3d
at 1361-62). It found the defense “plainly inapplicable” because the stacked soybean
and corn seed had commercial implications and is directly in line with the
defendants’ business operations in making seed products. Id.
427. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual
Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (2014) (“Market substitution
is important because a use that does not interfere with the plaintiff’s market in some
way generally does no relevant harm. Technical similarity is also important because

640

Michigan State Law Review

2015:559

refuses to offer a new product in a secondary market for which there
is potential consumer demand without a legitimate justification, the
foreclosure could impede technological progress by denying a
potential entrant the input necessary for it to do so.428 Restrictions on
one inventor to take the next step forward because of another
inventor’s overreaching disrupts the balance envisioned by patent
policy.
Mention should be made about 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4), which
has potential for mischief on this issue of refusals to license. The
Federal Circuit in Scruggs relied on § 271(d)(4), which immunizes
patentees who refuse to license their technology from “misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right.”429 As an initial matter, it should
be noted that § 271(d)(4) applies only to unilateral and unconditional
refusals to license. Refusals to license that involve price-fixing and
other conditions are subject to ordinary antitrust and misuse rules.430
One overlooked point is that patent policy requires any refusal
relying on § 271(d)(4) to be constitutional. Since the Patent Act
subsists on the constitutional mandate to promote technological
progress, cases interpreting § 271(d)(4) to sanction refusals to license
hamper that progress and must themselves be unconstitutional.431
not all acts that interfere with a plaintiff’s market are problematic. A defendant who
enters the market with a different, better product, for instance, may erode the market
for the plaintiff’s product, but the law should not prohibit that competition.”
(footnote omitted)).
428. Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone
Wars: Triangulating the End Game, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 70 (2014) (“[C]ourts
are increasingly intolerant of hold-ups and hold-outs.”).
429. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
430. See Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 10) (“As a matter of
competition policy, the ‘beyond the scope’ formulation makes little sense. Antitrust
is concerned with practices that are not authorized by other statutory provisions and
realistically reduce output and raise price.”); see also id. (manuscript at 14) (“[T]he
Patent Act does not authorize product price fixing, market divisions unrelated to
production licenses, predatory pricing in patented goods, anticompetitive
acquisitions, resale price maintenance of patented goods, ties in the presence of
market power, exclusive dealing, or infringement suits based on patents that the
owner knows or should know are invalid or unenforceable under the circumstances.
The Patent Act expressly permits unilateral refusals to license, but does not say
anything about concerted refusals to licenses . . . .” (footnote omitted)); HOVENKAMP
ET AL., supra note 391, § 6.5.
431. Where there are multiple reasonable interpretations of a statute, the one
that avoids constitutional issues would be chosen. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543
U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (“[The canon of constitutional avoidance] is a tool for
choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on
the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises
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That settles the first objection to requiring access. What of the
second objection—the difficulty of setting a rate for access and the
task of ongoing supervision? The reluctance to undertake a more
onerous inquiry led courts adopting the “scope of the patent”
approach to assume without supporting data that the price paid to
Monsanto reflected only the cost for their specific “use.”432 For
example, in Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, the district court concluded that
Monsanto “would apparently never permit Ralph to save seed for
replanting or transfer at any price” because it had not done so
before.433 Since courts had always given Monsanto carte blanche to
dictate its terms, it never had to do otherwise.434
A patent is not a fiat to extract every iota of value from the
invention, only a means to appropriate what is necessary to
incentivize innovation. For the court in Ralph to reach its conclusion
based only on the absence of past conduct ducks the more pertinent
question of what it costs the agrobiotech industry to produce new
traits and varieties as well as what it ought to cost. This opaque
revenue structure makes it difficult to judge whether the price
charged is commensurate with the particular use right conferred.
There is little, if any, information about how patents perform in
the agrobiotech industry, how patents are valued, and how the
welfare of users and licensees can be improved. Here, parallels may
be drawn between the drug and agrobiotech industries.435 Both have
similar cost and market structures: high sunk costs and barriers to
entry, with few market players. The cost of developing new products
and the ease of misappropriation have been touted as the backbone
argument for a robust application of patent rights.
serious constitutional doubts.”); see also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635
(1883) (“Proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government requires the
courts of the United States to give effect to the presumption that [C]ongress will
pass no act not within its constitutional power.”).
432. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298-99 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
433. 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Monsanto Co. v.
Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 574-75 (N.D. Miss. 2004), aff’d, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
434. Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1384.
435. Amanda Welters, Note, Striking a Balance: Revising USDA Regulations
to Promote Competition Without Stifling Innovation, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
407, 423, 426 (2012) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act is a viable regulatory framework for
the agricultural industry. The similarities between the pharmaceutical and
agriculture industries, and the effectiveness of the Hatch-Waxman Act in the
pharmaceutical industry, suggest that use of such a framework would be successful.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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Agrobiotech companies invest an estimated fifty to a hundred
million dollars annually to research, develop, and market traits and
varieties.436 A study by the Center for the Study of Drug
Development at Tufts University pegs the cost of drug development
at $2.6 billion annually.437 Observers say the figure is so high
because it includes the cost of drugs that failed to win regulatory
approval, trial complexity and scale, a focus on chronic and
degenerative diseases, and higher failure rates.438
A similar study for the agrobiotech industry will better allow
calibration of royalties between various uses and a better allocation
of rights between patentees and users. Indeed, the Court had
instructed that “[a]ntitrust analysis must always be attuned to the
particular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue.”439
More information on the cost and revenue structure of the
agrobiotech industry would help courts have a better sense of
whether the restraint was necessary. Courts and antitrust enforcers
can take the presence of those irregularities into consideration in
their deliberations without dictating prices sold.440
Where appropriate, the courts can use that information to set
the terms for access as well. The excuse that judges cannot set those
terms is simply unconvincing. Courts are regularly faced with the
task of quantifying both past and future damages, whether in patent
or antitrust law. They are aided in this task by economic experts who
provide technical and economic data that help courts understand how
markets and technologies work. Antitrust agencies today boast small
armies of economists, and private parties regularly seek the
assistance of economic consultants. Similarly, judges and juries in
436. Sorting Out the Facts Behind Stacks, MONSANTO, http://www.
monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/gene-stacks-facts.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
437. The Price of Failure, ECONOMIST (Nov. 29, 2014), http://
www.economist.com/news/business/21635005-startling-new-cost-estimate-newmedicines-met-scepticism-price-failure.
438. One example is Gilead, which was recently sued in a class action
lawsuit where it was accused of charging “exorbitant” prices for its blockbuster
hepatitis C drug Sovaldi. Each pill costs $1,000 and each twelve-week course
$84,000, compared to between $50,000 and $70,000 for the same twelve-week
course in some European countries. Andrew Pollack, AbbVie Deal Heralds Changed
Landscape for Hepatitis Drugs, N.Y. Times (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/12/22/business/pharmacy-deal-heralds-changed-landscape-for-hepatitisdrugs.html?_r=0.
439. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 411 (2004).
440. Id. at 408 (observing that courts are “ill suited” to act as “central
planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing”).
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patent cases rarely have any technical background and yet must deal
with construing claims over complex technology with the help of
experts. The reliance on experts is routine. It stretches credulity to
think that the combined brainpower of experts cannot offer courts an
educated determination on what fair terms for granting access might
look like.
Assuming that the terms of access need to be judicially
determined, the system is largely self-policing once they have been
set. The aggrieved party can determine if the deviation from
prevailing cost limitations is so egregious that it warrants the cost of
bringing a complaint for contempt. Its interests are aligned with the
public and stand as their proxies. Courts thus need not actively
supervise patentees. They need only respond to charges of contempt,
which they are again well-versed to rule upon.
The more accurate reason for judicial restraint is harder to
prove. Foreclosure cases can be difficult to adjudicate because they
invariably involve tradeoffs. When patentees such as Monsanto
control technology that rivals could use to make different or better
products, the case for granting access is a strong one. Where the
harm to competition and innovation are likely to be present,
shielding the patentee’s conduct from scrutiny is dangerous. If
innovation plays a central role in economic growth, legal outcomes
that harm innovation also dampen it significantly.441 At the same
time, weakening the patentee’s control over its primary market, and
even secondary ones, may dampen its incentive to invest in further
innovation. Ill-defined boundaries of legality may deter efficiencyenhancing novel business practices.442
Even though antitrust law relies heavily on economic evidence,
how that evidence is interpreted will be influenced by individual
values.443 Professor Marina Lao observed that ideological differences

441. See Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 45-46) (giving the
example of how the Wright brothers used doctrine of equivalents to “shut down the
superior technology contained in the Curtiss airplane . . . [which] may have delayed
the development of a military-worthy United States aircraft until after World War
One was over”).
442. Thomas A. Lambert, Defining Unreasonably Exclusionary Conduct:
The “Exclusion of A Competitive Rival” Approach, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1175, 1192
(2014).
443. Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164, 164 (Harvey J. Goldschmid, H. Michael
Mann & J. Fred Weston eds., 1974) (“The old adage ‘seeing is believing’ contains a
double measure of truth, for there also is much merit in the notion that ‘believing is

644

Michigan State Law Review

2015:559

have a particularly strong influence with exclusionary conduct
“because the competitive effects of various forms of dominant firm
conduct are often unclear, and the theories offered to support either
permissive or restrictive standards are inconclusive.”444
For instance, the appropriate amount of deference courts should
give to patentees like Monsanto will turn to a significant extent on
the position one takes in the Schumpeter–Arrow debate.
Schumpeterians believe that dominant firms are more innovative
than firms in competitive markets.445 In contrast, Arrow argued that
dominant firms were already earning supra-competitive profits and
had little to gain from innovation, making competition the real driver
of innovation as firms innovate to remain competitive.446
Unfortunately, neither economic theory nor empirical evidence
conclusively supports either side.447
seeing.’ Facts must be placed into a system of belief before they yield to
interpretation.”).
444. Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 ANTITRUST
L.J. 649, 653 (2014) (“In this context, it is almost inevitable that a policymaker’s
values will influence which theoretical models she will choose, whether her default
is to intervene or not intervene if the theories and the evidence are indeterminate,
what types of evidence she would consider relevant, and so forth. Her core
economic and political beliefs will also likely affect her perspective on the aggregate
social costs of false negatives relative to false positives, which will impact her
judgment on whether liability should be found in a particular case or, indeed,
whether a particular case should be brought in the first place.” (footnote omitted)).
445. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81106 (3d ed. 1950) (arguing that a monopolist has less concern that rivals would be
able to appropriate its innovative ideas and successfully compete with the
monopolist, and this incentivizes the monopolist to engage in research and
development); see also Spencer Weber Waller & Matthew Sag, Promoting
Innovation, 100 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2479569 (“Taking Schumpeter
seriously means designing a legal and regulatory system which maximizes the
incentives and opportunities for challengers to innovate to displace incumbents
while minimizing incentives and opportunities for incumbents (who may have once
been challengers) from engaging in exclusionary conduct that degrades the
opportunities and incentives for future challengers to dislodge them.”).
446. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 609 (1962).
447. See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Competition and Innovation, in 1 ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 577, 583
(Wayne Dale Collins et al. eds., 2008) (“Economic theory does not provide
unambiguous support either for the view that market power generally threatens
innovation by lowering the return to innovative efforts or for the Schumpeterian
view that concentrated markets generally promote innovation . . . .”); Douglas H.
Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust
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Another ideological strain underlying the “scope of the patent”
approach and decisions like Trinko may be represented by the
Chicago school of antitrust and its concern that proscribing excessive
pricing could interfere with markets’ price-setting mechanism and
with the signaling and rationing functions it carries out.448 In contrast,
the post-Chicago school advocates a more interventionist brand of
antitrust.449 One specific concern is the ability to raise rivals’ costs,
which forces the rivals affected to raise prices and reduce output, in
turn profiting the dominant firm whose goods suddenly seem cheaper
or more readily available.450 Foreclosure is one manifestation of this
strategy.451 Those who subscribe to Schumpeter and the Chicago
school will counsel against intervention while those who subscribe to
Arrow and the post-Chicago school will favor it.
The case for acting against allegations of foreclosure will be
stronger where the party alleging the harm can show that the patentee
has the ability to effect that harm. Antitrust law measures this ability
through direct and circumstantial evidence of anticompetitive effects.
Patent misuse does not require market power, except in tying cases.
Instead, similar to the analysis for copyright misuse seen in Omega,
the analysis focuses more on the plausibility of a coherent theory of
harm to innovation resulting from an abuse to the patent system.
Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4-5 (2012) (arguing that the empirical literature
supports neither Schumpeter’s nor Arrow’s hypothesis); Michael L. Katz & Howard
A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 22 (2007) (“The
literature addressing how market structure affects innovation (and vice versa) in the
end reveals an ambiguous relationship in which factors unrelated to competition
play an important role.”).
448. See Lim, supra note 229, at 331-34 (tracing the influence of the
Chicago school on the self-restraint exhibited by judges in antitrust and patent
misuse cases); ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER,
ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION
POLICY 66 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that the Chicago school viewed most markets as
self-correcting, and supernormal profits would induce entry and erode market share).
449. See Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical
Conduct: Where Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S.
ANTITRUST 141, 143, 145-52 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (summarizing the postChicago rebuttal to the Chicago school on exclusionary conduct).
450. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209,
213-14 (1986).
451. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition
Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 511-15 (1999)
(arguing that the net harms from foreclosure are worse the allowing the refusal to
grant access).
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B. Ability to Effect the Harm
Prior to Actavis, the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works Inc.
v. Independent Ink, Inc. opened a crack to an effects-focused analysis
when it eliminated the presumption that patents necessarily confer
market power.452 Illinois Tool Works shifted the analysis from one of
per se illegality to a rule of reason analysis. This made it more
difficult for antitrust plaintiffs, who now had to prove market power
through economic evidence. The Court also identified a synergistic
relationship between antitrust law and patent misuse since the market
power presumption migrated from the latter into antitrust law.453
Actavis shifted the analysis from one of per se legality to a rule
of reason analysis. How would this have changed the approach taken
in earlier cases involving Monsanto? The District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi in Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs found
Monsanto could not have market power in the trait market because it
was synonymous with the market encompassed by its patent scope.454
It dismissed the claim that Monsanto had market power in the market
for traited seeds because it refused to include the sales of any of its

452. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc. 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006); see
also, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007)
(“Although a patent confers a lawful monopoly over the claimed invention, its value
is limited when alternative technologies exist.” (citation omitted)).
453. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 39 (“Our opinion in International Salt
clearly shows that we accepted the Government’s invitation to import the
presumption of market power in a patented product into our antitrust
jurisprudence.”); see also id. at 42 (“While the 1988 amendment does not expressly
refer to the antitrust laws, it certainly invites a reappraisal of the per se rule
announced in International Salt.”).
454. 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 582 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (finding that Monsanto
“cannot be held liable under the antitrust laws for the natural monopoly afforded
under the Patent Act” for “monopoliz[ing] and/or attempt[ing] . . . monopoliz[ation
of] the market for Roundup Ready soybean and cotton [traits]”), aff’d, 459 F.3d
1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (“Although [the ‘605] patent does not explicitly claim seed containing a
Roundup Ready genetic trait, it claims plant cells having that genetic trait, and
farmer-grown Roundup Ready soybeans undisputedly contain such cells. Thus, as in
the case of the ‘435 patent, Monsanto’s ‘605 patent reads on both purchased and
farmer-grown Roundup Ready soybeans. There is no patent misuse in the license
terms for either patent.”). Monsanto Co. v. Swann, No. 4:00-CV-1481 CEJ, 2001
WL 34079480, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 19, 2001) (“The Roundup Ready® technology
that is involved in this litigation is owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not
violate the Sherman Act by reason of a monopoly it has over its own product.”).
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licensees.455 In its view, Monsanto only had 25.6% of the soybean
market and 0% of the cotton market.456 Finally, without separately
undertaking analysis of the glyphosate market, the court proceeded
to dismiss monopolization claims related to that market because
“none of Monsanto’s conduct . . . could reasonably be considered
anti-competitive.”457 The Federal Circuit affirmed without reference
to the court’s analysis of market power.458
As a matter of antitrust law, Monsanto’s admission in an earlier
case that it could unilaterally dictate prices to seed partners and
farmers based on its patents should give antitrust enforcers cause for
pause.459 Market definition is only necessary as part of the inquiry
about circumstantial effects of market power if there is no evidence
of direct effects.460 Direct evidence of harm includes rising prices and
restricted output, while circumstantial evidence of harm depends on
finding high market shares in a properly defined market coupled with
anticompetitive conduct through exclusionary or exploitative
conduct.461
Antitrust law does not condemn high prices per se and indeed
condones monopolists charging “as high a rate as the market will
455. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (“Monsanto’s market share must be
determined solely on the quantity of goods and/or services Monsanto sold to
consumers. At best, only the market shares of Monsanto’s wholly owned
subsidiaries are to be included.” (citation omitted)).
456. Id.; see also Monsanto Co. v. Trantham, 156 F. Supp. 2d 855, 864
(W.D. Tenn. 2001) (making similar findings).
457. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 583.
458. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
459. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1297 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (“Monsanto states that as the patent holder it decides unilaterally the terms on
which its patents are licensed and its product sold under the Technology
Agreements. Monsanto explains that the seed companies that are licensed by
Monsanto to produce and sell the modified soybean seed have no control over the
terms of the Technology Agreements that Monsanto requires of farmers who choose
to purchase the Monsanto seed.”).
460. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir.
2000) (“The Supreme Court has made it clear that there are two ways of proving
market power. One is through direct evidence of anticompetitive effects. The other,
more conventional way, is by proving relevant product and geographic markets and
by showing that the defendant’s share exceeds whatever threshold is important for
the practice in the case.” (citation omitted)).
461. Market power, the ability to raise prices above those that would prevail
in a competitive market, Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27
n.46 (1984), is essentially a “‘surrogate for detrimental effects.’” Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (quoting 7 P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 429 (1986)).
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bear.”462 Despite the rhetoric that patentees like Monsanto can charge
as much as they wish,463 the government is clearly concerned about
price irregularities.464 Between 1995 and 2011, Monsanto’s soybean
seed prices increased 325%, largely due to licensing fees.465 While
higher prices do not in themselves indict an antitrust defendant, they
are probative of direct anticompetitive effects.466 Ostensibly, any
company that can profitably increase prices 325% without fear
consumers will switch to a substitute warrants further investigation
as to the nature and extent of its market power.467
Further, while Monsanto has cross-licenses with 200 seed
companies, competition has been described as a “fiction.”468 Seed

462. Berkey Photo, Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir.
1979).
463. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 574-75 (N.D. Miss.
2004) (“Monsanto urges its technology fees are simply royalties and that the patent
laws permit it to charge any royalty it chooses. Monsanto’s position is correct. The
patent laws permit a patentee to ‘exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the
leverage of that [patent] monopoly.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964))), aff’d, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
464. See, e.g., Luke M. Olson & Brett W. Wendling, The Effect of Generic
Drug Competition on Generic Drug Prices During the Hatch-Waxman 180-Day
Exclusivity Period (Fed. Trade Comm’n, Working Paper No. 317, 2013), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/estimating-effect-entrygeneric-drug-prices-using-hatch-waxman-exclusivity/wp317.pdf; Gillian Mohney,
Generic Drug Price Sticker Shock Prompts Probe by Congress, ABC News (Nov.
21, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/generic-drug-pricesskyrocketing-lawmakers-warn/story?id=27060992.
465. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, SEED GIANTS VS. U.S.
FARMERS 16 (2013), available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/seedgiants_final_04424.pdf.
466. See Berkey Photo, Inc., 603 F.2d at 296; Martin, supra note 157, at 14445 (“The exorbitant increase in the cost of Monsanto seeds claims a greater share of
farmers’ operating costs, gross crop income, and net return per acre.”); CTR. FOR
FOOD SAFETY & SAVE OUR SEEDS, supra note 465, at 18 (quoting Dr. Charles
Benbrook, agricultural economist: “‘If these GE seed price and income trends
continue, the consequences for farmers will be of historic significance, as dollars
once earned and retained by farmers are transferred to the seed industry’”).
467. McEowen, supra note 94, at 652 (“Anticompetitive concerns are
heightened if the licensing agreements operate as a substantial barrier to potential
competition in trait and transgenic seed markets or have the effect of increasing the
price of seed while simultaneously concentrating the seed market amongst fewer
firms.” (footnote omitted)).
468. Elizabeth I. Winston, A Patent Misperception, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 289, 305 (2012); see also MOSS, supra note 165, at 24 (describing joint venture
agreements “that restrict the licensing of one partner’s technology outside the
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companies are tied by licensing restrictions much in the same way as
farmers are.469 The high cost of research and development as well as
regulatory barriers make entry by rival developers of traited seeds
difficult.470 Other circumstantial indicia of market power include the
presence and degree of barriers to entry as well as barriers to
expansion.471 The Justice Department had released a report in May
2012 highlighting the fact that farmers faced high prices and
increasingly limited options for seeds as a result of companies’
merger activities.472
It is appropriate to define the market for patented traits, as
opposed to the market for traited seed, when those rights are
marketed separately from the products in which they are used.473
Courts have rarely done so and only when the patent is itself an
industry standard.474 The fact that Monsanto commanded the market
agreement, thus impeding rivals’ access to that technology for the purposes of
developing competing products”).
469. See John Hession, Biotech Consolidation: Is There Light in the Tunnel?,
MASS HIGH TECH (June 25, 2009, 3:39 PM), http:// www.bizjournals.
com/boston/blog/mass-high-tech/2009/06/biotech-consolidation-is-there-lightin.html?page=all; see also Matson, Tang & Wynn, supra note 1, at 44 (“A few big
multinationals (led by Monsanto and DuPont) dominate the club. Each of the
oligopoly firms controls a network of subsidiary firms. The remaining ‘independent’
seed companies are tied by patent licensing and other arrangements to the oligopoly
networks, and rely on those networks for patented seed varieties and GMO traits.”).
470. Ronald & McWilliams, supra note 26, at A19 (noting that regulatory
costs have been pushed up “to the point where the technology is beyond the
economic reach of small companies or foundations that might otherwise develop a
wider range of healthier crops for the neediest farmers”).
471. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).
472. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND AGRICULTURE: VOICES FROM THE
WORKSHOPS ON AGRICULTURE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN OUR 21ST CENTURY
ECONOMY AND THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD 18 (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/283291.pdf; see also Tom Philpott, DOJ
Mysteriously Quits Monsanto Antitrust Investigation, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 1, 2012,
7:03 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/tom-philpott/2012/11/dojs-monsantoseedindustry-investigation-ends-thud (warning that firm dominance in the
agrobiotechnology industry promotes a “high degree of concentration, high and
rising prices, limited choice, [and] stagnant innovation”).
473. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.2.2, at 9 (1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (defining the relevant market
for traits involves identifying “the smallest group of technologies and goods over
which a hypothetical monopolist of those technologies and goods likely would
exercise market power—for example, by imposing a small but significant and
nontransitory price increase”).
474. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314, 316 (3d Cir.
2007).
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for glyphosate-resistant traits and licensed numerous seed partners
for trait stacking satisfies this requirement. The Court should also
have taken into account glyphosate-resistant traits deemed
substitutable with Roundup Ready.475
Commonly recited figures for Monsanto’s market share in
traited seeds are as follows: soybean seeds at 90%, corn at 80%, and
cotton at 90%.476 Monsanto also controls 60% of the wholesale
licensing market for patented seed varieties.477 It did not make a
difference whether farmers bought the seed from Monsanto or its
licensees. This was probably because, unlike the court who was
blinkered by the “scope of the patent” approach, they understood that
the dynamics of the traited-seed market were such that Monsanto
would commandeer the material terms of their sales to farmers.
With respect to the market for glyphosate herbicides, the
Supreme Court had found Monsanto guilty of price-fixing in that
market just over a decade before based on Monsanto having 15% of
the corn herbicide market and 3% of the soybean herbicide market.478
While anticompetitive harm still needs to be proven, this should have
at least given the Court cause to consider that Monsanto may well
still have market power in the glyphosate market owing to patents,
other intellectual property rights, or other market advantages.479
Finally, the fact that farmers have a variety of other seed
choices to pick from does not by itself answer the question of

475. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 473, § 3.2.2,
at 10. Technology substitutes include “other technologies and goods which buyers
would substitute at a cost comparable to that of using the licensed technology” if a
monopolist raised the price of its technology. Id.
476. Mitchell, supra note 117 (noting that Monsanto owns “about 80% of
U.S. corn and more than 90% of U.S. soybeans are grown with seeds containing
Monsanto’s patented seed traits (whether sold by Monsanto itself or by licensees)”);
April Davila, Monsanto’s Cotton Strategy Wears Thin, OUR WORLD (Aug. 26,
2011), http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/monsantos-cotton-strategy-wears-thin.
477. DUPONT/PIONEER HI-BRED INT’L, COMMENTS OF DUPONT/PIONEER HIǦ
BRED INTERNATIONAL REGARDING AGRICULTURE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
ISSUES IN OUR 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY 4 (2010), available at http://www.justice.
gov/atr/public/workshops/ag2010/comments/254990.pdf.
478. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 755-56 (1984).
479. Id. at 765 (finding Monsanto and its distributors agreed to maintain
resale prices and terminate price-cutters). The case was also significant in laying
down “plus factors” that required plaintiffs to show direct or circumstantial
“evidence that tends to exclude the possibility” that the parties were acting
independently. Id. at 764.
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whether those products are true substitutes to traited seed.480 In an
age where rivals are planting crops supercharged with modified
traits, farmers that rely on conventional seed risk “being left in the
dust.”481 A farmer eschewing those traits could no more compete
against rivals using traited seeds than a horse and buggy could
substitute the planes, trains, and automobiles we take for granted
today. Indeed, the reason for the significant price decrease in
conventional seeds is precisely because its technological irrelevance
has led to a precipitous fall in demand. Even though consumers may
find organic and genetically modified produce interchangeable, high
production costs prevent organic farmers from offering large-scale,
competitively priced alternatives.482
Patent misuse does not require its complainant to show market
power. It is sufficient to prove that the conduct supporting the theory
of harm had in fact occurred. Thus according to Judge Wardlaw in
Omega, the defendant simply had to show that the copyright owner
had in fact used its copyright to prevent parallel importation to raise
the defense of copyright misuse.483 The inquiry is obviously factspecific, and the ingredients required to validate the defendant’s
narrative will depend on the theory of harm alleged. 
The price of a more sophisticated discourse is complexity.
Critics have noted that the antitrust rule of reason can be confusing
and even inconsistent, giving lower courts and litigants few clear
rules.484 It turns on economic analysis that is sometimes
480. See, e.g., Monsanto v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(finding no sale of future seed not conditioned to buying seed in suit or impediments
preventing switching to “over two hundred commercial sources of soybean seed,
including several herbicide-resistant soybeans” available); see also id. (“[A]
purchaser’s desire to buy a superior product does not require benevolent behavior by
the purveyor of the superior product. Nor does an inventor of new technology
violate the antitrust laws merely because its patented product is favored by
consumers.”).
481. Tempe Smith, Note, Going to Seed?: Using Monsanto as a Case Study
to Examine the Patent and Antitrust Implications of the Sale and Use of Genetically
Modified Seeds, 61 ALA. L. REV. 629, 647 (2010) (“In order for farmers in today’s
society to survive, they must be willing to embrace these technological advances, or
they risk being left in the dust because of their inability to produce product at the
same rate and at the same cost as those farmers who do embrace technology.”).
482. I am grateful to Professor Mark Patterson for this insight.
483. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir.
2015).
484. See Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455,
465 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Unfortunately, the Grinnell test is not of much assistance in
resolving particular cases. Every competitor seeks to capture as much business as
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“impenetrable.”485 Jurors have been “overwhelmed, frustrated, and
confused by testimony well beyond their comprehension,” and “at no
time did any juror grasp—even at the margins—the law, the
economics, or any other testimony.”486 These are legitimate concerns,
but they are not intractable. The framework can be made sufficiently
clear so that businesses can operate without complicated and
uncertain balancing exercises, except at the fringes.
C. Improving Administrability
Since the beginning, Congress tasked the courts to build the
analytical framework for antitrust law.487 Since “the means of illicit
exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad,” this
was necessary.488 In the hundred years since the antitrust laws were
enacted, they have adopted doctrines linked to market performance
or expectations.489 The antitrust rule of reason has to make the
possible.”); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 253, 255 (2003) (noting that these verbal formulae “are not just vague but
vacuous” because they “are utterly conclusory, failing to identify a coherent norm
that provides any real help in distinguishing bad behavior from good or even in
knowing which way certain factual conclusions cut”).
485. Bill Baer, Connecting the Antitrust Dots: In Praise of Herb Hovenkamp,
100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 1, 3 (2014).
486. Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New
Media, and Deviancy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54 (1995).
487. Diane P. Wood, The Responsibility of the Judiciary in the
Implementation of Competition Policy, in POLICY ROUNDTABLES: JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW 27, 27 (1996), available at http://www.
oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/1919985.pdf (“From the
time the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, it has been understood as a ‘common
law’ type of statute, a statute setting forth very general propositions, that the Judges
in common law fashion would implement and develop on a case by case basis.”);
see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931) (describing
the Federal Trade Commission Act’s prohibition on “unfair methods of competition”
as a phrase that “do[es] not admit of precise definition,” and that “the meaning and
application . . . [would] be arrived at by . . . ‘the gradual process of judicial inclusion
and exclusion’” (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877)));
United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(noting that the Clayton Act “was deliberately couched in general and flexible
terms” and that it was incumbent on the judiciary to fashion “a coherent body of
substantive law out of the [c]ongressional policy and language”).
488. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (per curiam).
489. Baer, supra note 485, at 3 (“This consensus on how best to maximize
consumer welfare owes much to the contributions of economists and legal scholars
who, beginning in the 1950s, argued that many of the antitrust decisions of that
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analysis more administrable, and these can be adapted to patent
misuse analysis.
The first way is through the filter of an antitrust injury.
Weeding out frivolous antitrust claims or misuse defenses at an early
stage can protect patentees while ensuring that legitimate complaints
are given full and fair consideration. The second is through the use of
a truncated analysis where judicial experience and economic learning
give courts the confidence to shift the burden of explaining the
conduct to the patentee.
The “antitrust injury” was devised by courts to filter out
complaints by injured rivals that do not hurt consumers, and it
requires a nexus between the anticompetitive effects and the act.490
That conduct must go beyond excluding rivals and harm the
competitive structure.491 Courts focus on evidence of competitive
effects and efficiencies in the motion to dismiss and summary
judgment stages in burdens of pleading, production, and proof.492
The antitrust injury requirement aligns private litigation to
antitrust law’s interest in promoting consumer welfare. It prevents
plaintiffs from using antitrust suits as a means to impair rivals.493
Other factors in assessing antitrust standing include “the directness
period lacked sound economic foundations.”); Duffy, supra note 319, at 542
(“[W]hat a move from per se legality or per se illegality towards the rule of reason
means is something like what it is meant in every other area of antitrust law that has
moved from per se treatment to the rule of reason: more rigorous economic analysis,
more attention to economic evidence rather than less.”).
490. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl–O–Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977) (explaining that antitrust injury is “injury of the type the antitrust laws were
[designed] to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants’ acts
unlawful”); Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The
Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 735 (2012)
(“Oftentimes, the filtering process commences with challenges to standing that
evaluate the plaintiff’s ability to allege ‘antitrust injury,’ and many cases fail to
overcome even this first hurdle.” (footnote omitted)); see also Brunswick Corp., 429
U.S. at 488 (holding that plaintiffs had not established antitrust injury where they
sought to recover for “profits they would have realized had competition been
reduced” but for the defendant’s pro-competitive activities); Atl. Richfield Co. v.
USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (stating that an injury “causally
related to an antitrust violation . . . will not qualify as ‘antitrust injury’ unless it is
attributable to an anticompetitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny”).
491. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 488.
492. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (requiring the
complaint to “possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief’”
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2))).
493. Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 308, 313-14 (D.D.C.
2011).
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of the injury, whether the claim for damages is ‘speculative,’ the
existence of more direct victims, the potential for duplicative
recovery and the complexity of apportioning damages.”494
The antitrust injury requirement has been applied in the
essential facility context. As the court in The David L. Aldridge Co.
v. Microsoft Corp. put it, “[a] facility is essential under the antitrust
laws only when it is vital to both the plaintiff’s individual
competitive viability and the viability of the market in general.”495
Plausibility is the key, as the allegation must nudge the claim
“across the line from conceivable to plausible.”496 The complaint
must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”497
Commentators have noted that the “antitrust injury” filter “generally
works well to sort the strong cases from the weak cases,” preventing
plaintiffs from proceeding to trial.498
Even though courts are already throwing out misuse defenses
for sloppy lawyering, the process can be improved. Motions to strike
or dismiss in misuse cases have risen from 3% between 1953 and
1962 to 31% between 2003 and 2012.499 A survey of reported misuse
cases between 1953 and 2012 “showed an astounding lack of
awareness” on what is required for defendants to survive dismissal.500
For example, in Monsanto Co. v. Boggs Farm Centers, Inc., the
district court struck the defendants’ misuse claim because it did
“nothing more than make a conclusory allegation of patent misuse,”
“omitted any short and plain statement of facts and failed totally to
allege the necessary elements of the alleged claim.”501
Patent misuse could incorporate a similar heuristic to safeguard
against “innovation injury.” In patent misuse cases, the defendant
494. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 806 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
495. 995 F. Supp 728, 753 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
496. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
497. Id. at 556; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(explaining that a complaint falls short when it does not “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’”
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
498. See, e.g., Gavil, supra note 490, at 735-36.
499. See LIM, supra note 322, at 305-06.
500. Id. at 307.
501. No. 4:10CV286 (HEA), 2010 WL 4792103, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 18,
2010); see also Monsanto Co. v. Swann, No. 4:00-CV-1481 (CEJ), 2001 WL
34079480, at *3-4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 19, 2001) (dismissing the defendant’s misuse
claim for failure to identify with specificity allegations claimed to constitute patent
misuse).
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similarly stands before the court as a proxy for the public interest.502
Like the fair use defense, patent misuse safeguards the public domain
and restrains overreaching.503 Over time, an effects-focused
framework should better help patent attorneys offer courts better
articulated grounds for raising the misuse defense.504 This is
important because a patent defendant raising a misuse defense is
standing as proxy for the public interest. Hence, the more
information the court has, the better position it will be in
adjudicating between the parties while taking into account the public
interest.
The second way an effects-focused analysis can be made more
administrable is through the use of a truncated approach. Truncation
provides an efficient method of addressing conduct that can be
condemned without costly argument and deliberations.505 Courts
adopt an approach similar to truncation when there is direct evidence
of anticompetitive effects.506 Conversely, where a restraint is

502. See Lim, supra note 229, at 379 (reporting a judicial interviewee’s
observation that “even a rogue infringer does the public a service by exposing a
patentee’s egregious conduct”).
503. Id. at 319 (“Patent misuse may be analogized to the fair use defense in
copyright law.”).
504. Procter & Gamble Co. v. CAO Grp., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-337, 2013 WL
5353281, at *4-6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2013) (noting it is the adverse effect upon the
public interest that disqualifies patentees from maintaining the suit, regardless of
whether the particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent).
505. Timothy J. Muris & Brady P.P. Cummins, Tools of Reason: Truncation
Through Judicial Experience and Economic Learning, ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at
46, 50 (“Truncation remains an important tool, both to promote efficient antitrust
enforcement against those few restraints that can be condemned based on prior
judicial experience and current economic learning without detailed and expensive
consideration of market issues, and to prohibit restraints that are shown through
appropriate direct evidence to cause substantial anticompetitive effects.”).
506. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 416 F.3d 29,
34-38 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Truncated analysis falls along the continuum between a full
rule of reason and per se treatment. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526
U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (“The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive
effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend
to make them appear. We have recognized, for example, that ‘there is often no
bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis . . . .’” (quoting Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26
(1984))); see also David Eisenstadt & James Langenfeld, The Role of Economics in
Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 52, 52
(“Typically, reference to economic theory or published quantitative evidence is used
to demonstrate that such restraints will harm consumers by increasing price or
reducing output, absent some clear offsetting efficiency explanation.”).
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ancillary and necessary for the procompetitive effect, courts have
also blessed it in a “‘twinkling of an eye.’”507
The burden shifting may be critical for courts to obtain the
information they need to fully decide on the merits of a case. An
empirical study conducted by Professor Michael Carrier found that
courts in antitrust cases did not balance anything 96% of the time
when they applied the rule of reason.508 Rather, courts “typically
dismiss[ed] the case at any one of the three stages that precedes the
ultimate balancing.”509 A decade later, Carrier’s updated study noted
that courts disposed of 97% of their cases at the first stage on
grounds that the plaintiff failed to show anticompetitive effects.510
Only in 2% of the cases does the balancing actually take place, and it
was done in “a cursory fashion.”511 This is anecdotally affirmed by
case commentators.512
507. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 20304 (2010) (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 109 n.39) (finding
the shared interest in the success of the football league and in maintaining a
competitive balance among athletic teams justified a “defendant’s quick look
approach”).
508. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the
Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1267-68 (reviewing all 495 rule of reason
cases between 1977 and 1999).
509. Id. at 1268-69 (finding that 84% of cases are disposed of at the initial
stage, where the plaintiff must show a significant anticompetitive effect resulting
from the restraint; 3% of cases found the restraint illegal because the defendant
failed to show procompetitive justifications for the restraint; 1% of cases were
dismissed because the plaintiff could not show the restraint was unnecessary to
achieve the objectives or that the objectives could be achieved by alternatives “less
restrictive” of competition).
510. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the
21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828, 831 (2009).
511. Id.
512. See, e.g., Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2,
the Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 445-47 (2006) (“The [Microsoft] court actually compared
effects only when analyzing Microsoft’s restrictions on computer manufacturers’
modifications of the Windows start-up screens. This conduct, which impeded rivals
but the court found justified by substantial efficiencies, involved agreements also
subject to Sherman Act Section 1’s rule of reason. By contrast, when analyzing
Microsoft’s unilateral ‘product design’ conduct . . . the court, while using the
language of comparing effects, in fact avoided that inquiry. Rather than compare
effects, the court found in some instances no anticompetitive effect, in some no
justification, and in others no rebuttal to the justification. . . . Revealingly, the
Microsoft court also appeared to protect certain conduct as essentially per se lawful.
. . . In other words, the court determined that impeding rivals through conduct
deemed to reflect only efficiency was, in effect, protected ‘superior skill, foresight,
and industry.’” (footnote omitted)).

Living with Monsanto

657

Commentators studying the Court’s Actavis decision explain
why it makes sense in certain cases to place the burden of production
on antitrust defendants.513 They note that
[a]llocating the burden to the defendant to provide justifications for a
settlement also makes sense: it would be unreasonable and inefficient to
expect a plaintiff to prove the absence of any convincing justification
without requiring the defendants first to narrow the scope of the facts and
justifications at issue by making their case.514

Where the patentee made a sufficient sizable payment, the
court will accept that as a proxy for possible anticompetitive harm
and require the patentee to justify that payment.515
The Supreme Court had instructed that “it is normally not
necessary to litigate patent validity.”516 Rather, courts can turn to the
presence of a payment from the patentee to the generic as
circumstantial evidence of anticompetitive effects.517 Hovenkamp
described the sort of reverse payments described in Actavis as a
“prime example” of conduct “highly likely to harm consumer
welfare.”518 They create little duopoly cartels between the patentee
and potential generic entrant by shielding the patent from challenge,
no matter how weak it is.519 These payments contravene antitrust
513. Aaron Edlin et al., Actavis and Error Costs: A Reply to Critics, 14
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 4 (2014) (“The Court’s repeated use of the terms
‘unexplained’ or ‘unjustified’ to modify ‘large reverse payments’ suggests that such
payments are not illegal if appropriately justified, and that the burden is on the
defendant to justify (i.e., explain) them.”).
514. Id.
515. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236-37 (2013)
(“The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of course, that even a
small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment. But, be that as it may, the payment
(if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition. And, as
we have said, that consequence constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm. In a
word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate
for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration
of the validity of the patent itself.”).
516. Id. at 2236.
517. Id. (“[W]here a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified
anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely [has] the power to bring that harm about in
practice. . . . [T]he ‘size of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a
prospective generic [challenger] is itself a strong indicator of [such] power . . . .’”
(citation omitted)); see also id. at 2236-37 (noting that a large, “unexplained reverse
payment can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without
forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the [patent’s] validity”).
518. See Hovenkamp, supra note 306 (manuscript at 19).
519. Id. (manuscript at 26) (noting that most reverse payments occur over
“secondary . . . patents on new dosages, new treatments or new combinations of
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policy because the market division agreements provide no
cognizable procompetitive justifications such as joint production,
distribution, or sharing of technology. Nor are there “legitimately
conflicting” litigation claims where parties could act as proxies for
the public; here their interests in settling are merely pre-textual.520
Actavis rejected a truncated approach simply on the existence
of a reverse payment and advocated one that placed the burden on
the patentee and generic drug company receiving that payment to
account for disparities between the payment and expected litigation
costs. In doing so, the Court used an unexplained large payment as
circumstantial evidence of anticompetitive harm.521 Similarly,
patentees in Monsanto’s position would be made to bear the burden
of justifying their conduct once conduct consistent with possible
anticompetitive harm is shown. This incentivizes patentees to adduce
evidence for courts to more fully consider the merits of the case
which would not have been made available had the burden of
production not shifted.
Courts have occasionally paid more attention to analyzing
licensing restraints. For instance in Scruggs, the district court
rejected an allegation of tying on the basis that Monsanto had
required use of Roundup and Roundup Ready crops because
Roundup “was the only EPA-approved herbicide that could be used
on Roundup Ready crops during that period.”522 Once competing
glyphosate herbicides met EPA labeling requirements for “over-thetop” use, Monsanto’s license agreements allowed those to be used.523
The Federal Circuit affirmed on appeal.524 Similarly, in Trantham,
the court found that Monsanto offered a “superior product . . . that
has been warmly received by the seed producers, retailers, and
individual farmers.”525
well-established drugs,” which are declared invalid or not infringed 70% of the
time); see also id. (manuscript at 19) (“This is why the Supreme Court acted
correctly when it held that such agreements could be condemned without necessarily
inquiring into questions about patent validity or infringement.”).
520. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931).
521. Actavis, 133 S. Ct at 2236-37.
522. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 577 (N.D. Miss. 2004),
aff’d, 459 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
523. Id.
524. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The
record shows that Monsanto’s competitors sought and obtained regulatory approval
and that when they did, Monsanto modified its contracts accordingly.”).
525. Monsanto Co. v. Trantham, 156 F. Supp. 2d 855, 863 (W.D. Tenn.
2001).
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However, these are exceptions rather than the norm. There may
indeed be good reasons for prohibiting stacking, such as a gene or
trait degradation.526 If Monsanto or another patentee refuses to
license a patent covering a technology standard because doing so
would threaten its reputation or the integrity of its products, it will be
best placed to proffer that evidence. The key is whether the patentee
is leveraging control over patented traits to control ancillary spheres
that fall outside of its primary market. Similarly, if the EPA revokes
product registrations for failing to meet stewardship standards or if
targeted pest or weeds develop resistance to the traits in question, the
patentee should also be required to produce evidence supporting that
assertion.527 In Scruggs, the district court assumed those assertions
warranted the grant of an injunction against the infringer–farmer.528
This mirrors a similar “rule of reason” approach advocated by
patent law commentators and used by the Supreme Court when
deciding patent cases. For example, Professor Peter Lee observed
that multifactor balancing tests set out by the Supreme Court in
patent law can impose high information costs on lower courts and
suggested that those costs can be mitigated by clearly structuring the
expected inquiry.529 One example, Lee suggests, is to delineate a set
of weighted factors with a view that a later decision provides the
base from which to build a better vantage point for the next court.530
It also signals to litigating parties the factors to focus on or how to
conduct business to preemptively avoid a challenge.531
526. VANDY HOWELL ET AL., COMPETITION AND INNOVATION IN AMERICAN
AGRICULTURE 42 (2009), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
documents/monsanto.pdf (noting that Monsanto has argued that “stacking” its GMO
traits with GMO traits from competing sources may impair the performance of its
GMO traits in some cases).
527. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 576-77 (finding the restriction was
necessary to comply with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (2012)); see also id. at 577 (“Because Roundup was
the only product labeled for use ‘over-the-top’ of Roundup Ready crops between
1996 and 1998, it was the only EPA-approved herbicide that could be used on
Roundup Ready crops during that period. Beginning in 1999, Monsanto’s license
agreements and/or technology use guides authorized the use of any competing
glyphosate herbicide which met EPA labeling requirements for ‘over-the-top’ use as
a permissible alternative to Roundup.”).
528. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 758 (N.D. Miss. 2001).
529. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 66-68
(2010).
530. Id.
531. Other areas of complex litigation such as those involving FRANDencumbered patents have benefitted from well-reasoned decisions that both provide
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Patentees who argue that defendants have infringed on their
claimed invention because variations between the two are
insubstantial may be prevented from doing so if the prosecution
history of the patent shows that they had surrendered the equivalent
during prosecution.532 In order to overcome this bar, patentees need
to show that the amendment was due to reasons that were
unforeseeable, affected the claim tangentially, or was made due to
some other reason owing to linguistic constraints.533 The goal is to
get relevant information from the parties and to place the burden on
the one best suited to provide that information.
Like antitrust law, a truncated approach to patent misuse can be
developed through economic and judicial learning. One instance
where burden shifting might be appropriate is where a defendant can
show that a patentee controlling an industry standard is using
through antistacking restrictions to prevent the emergence of a new
product not offered by the patentee itself. Once the defendant shows
that access to the patent technology is required, the burden should
shift to the patentee to show why refusing access is justified by
patent policy considerations. Unlike with antitrust law, impact on
market competition, while relevant, is not essential to the analysis.
A second instance could be the use of the conditional sale
doctrine to curtail patent exhaustion. The Federal Circuit’s intention
to infuse a balancing mechanism into the misuse doctrine was
directionally correct, but cabining it within the antitrust rule of
reason was doctrinally indefensible and the Federal Circuit was
simply wrong in its application of Supreme Court precedent.534
Where the presence of a conditional sale clause is proven, the burden
should shift to the patentee to explain it. In an appropriate case, the

the basis for further refinement and minimize the cognitive burdens involved in the
inquiry. See id.
532. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
740 (2002) (“[W]hen the court is unable to determine the purpose underlying a
narrowing amendment—and hence a rationale for limiting the estoppel to the
surrender of particular equivalents—the court should presume that the patentee
surrendered all subject matter between the broader and the narrower language.”).
533. Id. at 740-41 (“The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time
of the application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than a
tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be some other reason
suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the
insubstantial substitute in question. In those cases the patentee can overcome the
presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of equivalence.”).
534. Lim, supra note 229, at 332-34.

Living with Monsanto

661

court could decide to sever the offending clause, uphold the rest of
the license, and leave the patent’s enforceability intact.535
A third instance could be based on classic forms of misuse such
as tying, post-royalty extensions and market division agreements.
Each of these instances finds justification for intervention based on
judicial experience.536 Again, the court could spare the patentee from
the consequences of misuse if it can show that patent policy is
furthered by siding with the patentee. Since patent policy favors the
public benefit over private interests, the burden on the patentee will
predictably be a heavy one, but at least for the patentee, it will be
preferable to the swift condemnation it would currently face.
In assessing the consistency of an explanation to patent policy,
economics can help the analysis. Innovation economics is a growing
branch of economics doctrine that pursues higher productivity
through greater innovation and looks beyond input resources and
price signals to economic growth.537 An empirical study shows that
misuse is most often alleged in cases involving tying, licensing
restrictions, and vexatious litigation.538 Future studies parsing
through those cases can identify the features that lead to their
condemnation or acquittal and identify appropriate instances where
the burden shifting may be shifted based on economic theory. These
studies can assist courts in articulating more analytically robust
opinions that are also better aligned to policy goals.
As much as predictability is a desired trait, liability
determinations under misuse or antitrust cannot be formulaically
535. For an example in the context of royalty extensions, see Cordance Corp.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 310, 336-37 (D. Del. 2010) (“[E]ven
assuming that Cordance’s contractual agreements did constitute patent misuse per se
under Brulotte, it does not follow that the court need render the ‘710 patent
unenforceable in its entirety. The court might invalidate only the post-expiration
passive royalties. And here, any final extension that would put the GSP Agreement
beyond the term of the ‘710 patent has not yet been and might never be exercised.”).
536. Lim, supra note 229, at 309. (“Examples of patent misuse include tying,
package licensing, and horizontal price-fixing and territorial allocationsunder the
guise of sham patent licenses.”).
537. See ROBERT D. ATKINSON & STEPHEN J. EZELL, INNOVATION
ECONOMICS: THE RACE FOR GLOBAL ADVANTAGE 297 (2012) (“Innovation
economists focus on the actual processes of production and innovation, such as
trying to determine why firms develop and adopt new technologies and what
policies can spur them to do more. . . . [I]nnovation economics holds that while
markets are important, left to themselves they will not produce the amount of
innovation and growth possible without supplementation by strong public
innovation policies.”).
538. LIM, supra note 322, at 6, 14.
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applied. As Justice Holmes reminded us, the life of the law is
experience, not logic.539 Those who emphasize the paramount
importance of certainty at the expense of justice must realize that the
law on patent misuse and the antitrust laws are advanced by
judges.540 Each time there was an advance in the law, it was because
of “the bold spirits who were ready to allow it if justice so
required.”541
Ultimately, an effects-focused approach requires litigants to
provide more information and invites judges to think a little harder in
light of judicial experience and economic learning.542 As cases are
litigated, the boundaries of permissible payments will be mapped
out, guiding settling parties and allowing antitrust agencies to plan
their resources more efficiently.543 The framework itself must adjust
and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life, for the avenues
by which the progress of innovation and competition may be stalled,
but are never closed.
539. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (John Harvard
Library 2009) (1881).
540. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 89899 (2007) (“As courts gain experience considering the effects of these restraints by
applying the rule of reason over the course of decisions, they can establish the
litigation structure to ensure the rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints
from the market and to provide more guidance to businesses. Courts can, for
example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where
justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit
anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones.”); Gavil, supra note
490, at 734-35.
541. Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 KB 164 (“On the one side
there were the timorous souls who were fearful of allowing a new cause of action.
On the other side there were the bold spirits who were ready to allow it if justice so
required. It was fortunate for the common law that the progressive view prevailed.”).
542. 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 382 (3d ed. 2010)
(“We thus have no choice except to make the best judgments we can, guided by the
statutory purpose, our knowledge of the economy, generally accepted economic
principles, and the facts of the case.”).
543. Brenna E. Jenny, Information Costs and Reverse Payment Settlements:
Bridging the Gap Between the Courts and the Antitrust Agencies, 30 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 231, 299 (2014) (“By broadcasting a range of payments that they
will generally consider to be low risk, courts allow parties to react accordingly when
structuring a settlement.”); see also William E. Kovacic, THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY: THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF BETTER
PRACTICES 59 (2009), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_statements/federal-trade-commission-100-our-second-century/
ftc100rpt.pdf (describing how the FTC’s ability to achieve its mission of protecting
consumers depends on efficient allocation of agency resources).
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CONCLUSION
The new normal is one where American farmers no longer save
their seed. It resulted from declining government funding and the rise
of private interests in meeting the demands placed on modern
agriculture. The advances in agricultural technology will benefit
farmers and consumers of their produce.
While the Supreme Court correctly found for Monsanto in
Bowman, future cases must iron out the two kinks it left behind.
First, inadvertence cannot shield a farmer from patent infringement.
Second, authorized sales exhaust all rights to seed sold, even when
they are transacted conditionally. In cases involving antitrust and
misuse, patentees can no longer rely on courts applying a formalistic
analysis of patent scope.
Post-Actavis, courts will look to both antitrust and patent
policies in determining whether the restraint is legal. Whether
Actavis succeeds in catalyzing a more careful balance between the
rights of agrobiotech patentees and the rest of society depends on
litigants and judges. They will have to understand the logic and
limits of an effects-focused framework and have the confidence to
push those limits when necessary. While the task will not be easy,
stakeholders can do no worse than squander the opportunity given to
them by failing to try. Our future depends on it.
Postscript: Acting sua sponte, the Federal Circuit on April 14,
2015 ordered en banc briefing on the issue of patent exhaustion in
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc., 785 F.3d
565 (Fed. Cir. 2015), sua sponte hearing en banc Nos. 2014-1617,
2014-1619. One of the two questions it has posed for itself is to
consider whether to overrule Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,
976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), in light of Quanta Computer, Inc. v.
LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), “to the extent it ruled that
a sale of a patented article, when the sale is made under a restriction
that is otherwise lawful and within the scope of the patent grant, does
not give rise to patent exhaustion[.]”

